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395 
A Collision Course Between TRIPS 
Flexibilities and Investor-State Proceedings 
Cynthia M. Ho* 
This Article discusses an important, yet understudied threat to patent, 
as well as other intellectual property sovereignty under TRIPS: pending and 
potential challenges by companies under international agreements protecting 
investments. Although such agreements have existed for decades, Philip 
Morris and Eli Lilly are blazing a new path for companies to sue countries 
they claim interfere with their intellectual property rights through so-called 
investor-state arbitrations. These suits seek hundreds of millions in 
compensation and even injunctive relief for alleged violations of 
internationally agreed intellectual property norms. The suits fundamentally 
challenge TRIPS flexibilities at the very time the Declaration on Patent 
Protection and Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, as well as the UN 
High Level Panel Report seek to encourage countries to utilize them. These 
disputes may have a chilling effect on countries that would otherwise consider 
following policy recommendations to better utilize TRIPS flexibilities. 
Given the importance of this threat to TRIPS and domestic sovereignty, this 
Article analyzes the pending disputes and offers some proposals for how to 
promote TRIPS flexibilities and sovereignty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although the areas of intellectual property rights and protection of foreign 
investments have coexisted peacefully for decades, they are now on a collision 
course. Phillip Morris and Eli Lilly have claimed that alleged violations of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
compromise their “investments” of intellectual property, such that they should be 
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financially compensated by countries where they obtained these investments.1 
These assertions are not made in the World Trade Organization (WTO) forum. 
Rather, they are made under international agreements that permit foreign investors 
to bring unique claims against a country before a tribunal of three typically private 
attorneys, in a so-called “investor-state” arbitration proceeding.2 Investor-state 
claims can exist without regard to compliance with other international agreements, 
such as TRIPS, and may exist in agreements that do not have any intellectual 
property norms.3 These claims are a creative way for companies to directly challenge 
TRIPS despite the fact that they cannot do so at the WTO.4 Moreover, companies 
can obtain substantial financial compensation that would not typically be available 
at the WTO.5 
These investment claims may create havoc concerning TRIPS flexibilities. 
Notably, TRIPS only requires countries to provide minimum, but not uniform 
standards of protection.6 Because of this, TRIPS is often considered to have built-
in flexibilities that permit compliance with TRIPS while also recognizing domestic 
priorities.7 Indeed, policy makers have repeatedly recommended countries take 
 
1. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Can., International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
[ICSID] Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Eli Lilly,  
Notice of Arbitration], http://www.italaw.com/cases/1625 [https://perma.cc/J9AS-CLQ6]; Philip 
Morris Asia Ltd. v. Austl., Permanent Court of Arbitration [PCA] Case Repository No. 2012-12,  
Notice of Arbitration (Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration], 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/851 [https://perma.cc/5NYB-39BB]; Philip Morris Brands Sàrl  
v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 1 (Feb. 19, 2010) [hereinafter  
P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration], http://www.italaw.com/documents/PMI-UruguayNoA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9U7H-4RXM]. 
2. This is alternatively called investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), or less frequently, 
Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration. 
3. For example, the Philip Morris dispute against Australia was initiated under a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty. See Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K.,  
Sept. 15, 1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 386. Even when investment claims exist in an agreement with IP rules, 
they are typically in different parts of a free trade agreement, such as under NAFTA. 
4. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 22, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU] (referring to contracting parties, i.e. countries, as the only ones that 
can initiate a dispute). 
5. The routine remedy in a WTO case is to come into compliance with WTO requirements. See 
id. art. 19.1 This may require amending a law. In addition, although a prevailing country could 
occasionally obtain financial recourse, that is only if a country fails to bring its laws into compliance. See 
id. Moreover, even if this were the case, any monetary compensation would be provided only to the 
prevailing country. See id. 
6. See, e.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 1.1,  
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
7. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 198–201 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi  
A. Yusuf eds., 1998) [hereinafter Correa, Patent Rights]; CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION 
GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 70–97 (2009); Joseph Straus, Implications of the TRIPs 
Agreement in the Field of Patent Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS: THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 160, 187 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard 
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advantage of these flexibilities in the decades since TRIPS was concluded.8 The 
Declaration on Patent Protection: Regulatory Sovereignty Under TRIPS, written by 
forty academics, aims to clarify these flexibilities,9 and the recent UN High Level 
Panel on Access to Medicines reiterates that these flexibilities should be adopted.10 
However, the pending investor-state cases may make states reluctant to take 
advantage of these flexibilities. After all, an investment tribunal could require a 
nation to pay millions in compensation for an alleged violation of investment 
agreement. This possibility could have a substantial chilling effect. 
In addition to having a chilling effect on TRIPS flexibilities, investment claims 
premised on alleged violations of TRIPS could result in conflicts with the WTO/
TRIPS regime. This seems particularly likely since investor-state tribunals frequently 
issue decisions that are criticized as surprising and inconsistent.11 There would be a 
direct conflict if a WTO panel and an investment tribunal interpreted the identical 
TRIPS provision differently, which is possible since neither system presently 
precludes simultaneous or even subsequent litigation. Even if a WTO panel 
adjudicated a similar factual situation first, an investor-state tribunal would not be 
bound to the WTO decision.12 Notably, although WTO rulings tend to be 
 
Schricker eds., 1996); World Health Org. et al., Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and 
Innovation: Intersections Between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade 13, 57, 71–73 (2012). 
8. See e.g., Chamber of Deputies Ctr. for Strategic Studies & Debates, BRAZIL’S PATENT 
REFORM: INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 57, 79 (2013) [hereinafter 
BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM]; CHAN PARK ET AL., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, USING LAW 
TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION 
AND MEDICINES LAW, 15–16, 22 (2013); U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV.-INT’L 
CONFERENCE ON SCI. & TECH. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 367 (2005); Report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Access 
to Medicines: Promoting Innovation and Access to Health Technologies, § 2.6.1 (Sept. 14, 2016) [hereinafter 
UN 2016 High Level Panel Report]; Carlos Correa, Guidelines for the Examination of Pharmaceutical 
Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective 26 (WHO-ICTSD-UNCTAD Working Paper, 2007); 
World Health Org. et al., supra note 7, at 209–19. 
9. Matthias Lamping et al., Declaration on Patent Protection - Regulatory Sovereignty under TRIPS, 
45 IIC - INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 679 (2014) [hereinafter Declaration on Patent 
Protection]. 
10. UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, § 2.6.1. 
11. See, e.g., August Reinisch, The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceeds and Possible Solutions, in 
BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTOR ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY, 113, 115–117 (Michael 
Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Anne van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of International 
Investment Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 91, 99 (2006) [hereinafter van Aaken, Fragmentation of 
International Law]; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005) [hereinafter 
Franck, Legitimacy Crisis]; Federico Ortino, Legal Reasoning of International Investment Tribunals: A 
Typology of Egregious Failures, 3 J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 31 (2012); see also discussion of 
inconsistency infra pp. 116-17 
12. Not only are the two systems entirely distinct such that a decision in one system is not 
binding in another, but investor-state tribunals are not obligated to follow past tribunal rulings. See, e.g., 
Christoph Schreuer & Matthew Weiniger, A Doctrine of Precedent?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 1188 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
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consistent with prior decisions,13 and uniformity is promoted through a standing 
Appellate Body,14 there is currently no similar system in place to lend uniformity to 
all investor-state disputes.15 
The investment cases challenging TRIPS come at a time when there is not 
only an explosion of investment cases16 but also significant criticism of investment 
claims.17 These investment claims involving IP are arguably expected given that 
companies increasingly consider IP a valuable type of investment. However, the 
potential for conflict between these two systems seems largely overlooked. 
Importantly, even those who vigorously defend investment claims fail to recognize 
the collision course between TRIPS and investment claims. This Article aims to 
address this gap and show why existing defenses of investment claims fail to address 
the unique problems with challenging international IP norms in investment cases. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides fundamental background 
to the initial investment disputes by explaining the relevant law and policy of 
intellectual property, as well as investment state arbitration. It also documents the 
current under-recognition of the inherent problems of challenging international IP 
norms through investment arbitration. Part II discusses the facts and claims of the 
initial disputes impacting TRIPS, including policy problems. It also discusses 
possible future cases that may arise. Part III then explores possible ways to minimize 
the present collision course between IP agreements and investment agreements. 
 
13. E.g., Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part 
Two of A Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (1999) (WTO tends to operate with de facto stare 
decisis). 
14. DSU, supra note 4, art. 17. 
15. See infra note 78 and accompanying text However, in two recent agreements, there is an 
appeals tribunal. See Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-EU, art. 8.28, COM (2016) 0443 ( July 5, 2016) [hereinafter 
CETA]; EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed Text as of January 2016, art. 13 (Feb. 1,  
2016) [hereinafter EU-Vietnam FTA], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437 
[https://perma.cc/U34F-FTLF]. Although this is a notable change, it is still different than the WTO 
system in that the appeals would only be for that single agreement and would not result in uniformity 
amongst all investment agreements. 
16. Whereas the first investment treaty arbitration was only in 1987, from 2012–2014, between 
forty and sixty claims were filed each year, with over 600 claims currently pending in over fifty countries. 
See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS, at 5, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2015/1 (Feb. 2015) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Recent Trends]; U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development, Recent Developments in Investor-State  
Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Updated for the Multilateral Dialogue on Investment, at 2–3,  
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/3/REV (2013); see also Burghard Ilge, Both Ends,  
To Change a BIT is Not Enough: On the Need to Create Sound Policy Frameworks for Investment 6  
(2015) (only nineteen known cases in 1997, but at least one new case every week in 2015), 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/to-change-a-bit-is-not-enough/ [https://perma.cc/RCG8-3CFE]. The 
number of claims continues to grow. In 2016, nearly 1000 new cases were filed involving 3000 parties 
from over 1000 countries. ICC Reveals Record Number of New Arbitration Cases Filed in 2016, INT’L 
CHAMBER COM. ( Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.iccwbo.be/icc-reveals-record-number-of-new-
arbitration-cases-filed-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/GGY7-6LVX]. 
17. See infra Part I.B.3. 
Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017 11:04 AM 
400 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:395 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Part lays the groundwork to understand the initial landmark cases 
challenging TRIPS issues through investment arbitration. Part A explains 
intellectual property law and policy, including the current international landscape. 
Part B explains international agreements permitting investor-state claims. 
Understanding their genesis, including underlying policy reasons, is critical to 
illuminate the present conflict. Section B explains not only investment law, but some 
basics of key claims that are at issue in both cases, including “expropriation” of 
investments, as well as when a company has purportedly been denied “fair and 
equitable treatment.”18 Section C then addresses the largely unrecognized conflict 
for TRIPS flexibilities in investment arbitration. 
A. Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
Traditionally, the existence and scope of intellectual property rights were solely 
a function of domestic policy concerning which interests a nation wanted to foster. 
Intellectual property rights were understood to impose a social cost in that such 
rights generally result in higher priced goods. Some countries viewed some goods, 
such as drugs, to be an area where the social cost of patent protection should be 
viewed skeptically in light of an interest in ensuring that drugs are not priced beyond 
reach.19 
Today, however, most countries do not have the luxury of designing 
intellectual property laws solely based on domestic policy. This is because over 160 
countries are members of the WTO, which requires compliance with the 
“minimum” levels of intellectual property rights under TRIPS.20 TRIPS is 
considered a landmark agreement that for the first time requires countries to 
provide patent rights. Under TRIPS, all member countries (except Least Developed 
Countries) must now provide patent protection regardless of their policy 
preferences.21 
Although it is well known that TRIPS requires “minimum,” but not uniform 
standards,22 the “minimum” standards have been hotly contested. This is partly a 
 
18. These are unique claims to investment suits. See infra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
19. See, e.g., Correa, Patent Rights, supra note 7, at 192 (over 50 countries did not provide patents 
on drugs prior to TRIPS). 
20. Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https:/perma.cc/AJZ4-U4SZ] 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2016). 
21. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Extension of the 
Transition Period Under Article 66.1 of the TRIPS Agreement for Least-Developed Country Members for 
Certain Obligations with Respect to Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. IP/C/73 (Nov. 6, 2015); TRIPS, 
supra note 6, art. 27. 
22. The fact that TRIPS only requires minimum standards is underscored by the fact that 
subsequent to TRIPS, parties attempted, but failed, to adopt an international agreement requiring 
uniform standards that would not have been necessary if TRIPS had such standards already. E.g., 
Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without Consensus: Critical 
Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 89–90 (2007). 
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function of the fact that TRIPS does not define key aspects of the minimum 
standards. For example, although TRIPS states that members must grant patents 
for “inventions” if they meet certain criteria such as being “new,” having an 
“inventive step,” and being “capable of industrial application,” TRIPS leaves these 
key terms undefined.23 Before TRIPS, countries often defined these terms 
differently and because TRIPS requires minimum instead of uniform standards, 
continued flexibility seems to have been contemplated.24 Accordingly, scholars, as 
well as policy makers, believe that countries retain substantial discretion in deciding 
these terms.25 
Importantly, although WTO countries are now required to provide intellectual 
property rights, this does not indicate that all WTO countries believe this is good 
domestic policy. Some countries, such as India, resisted incorporating intellectual 
property rights into the WTO/TRIPS framework and also tried to minimize the 
scope of obligations.26 There are a variety of theories on why developing countries 
agreed to TRIPS, but not one of them suggests that such countries were agreeing 
that it was good policy to adopt stronger intellectual property rights. Rather, the 
theories range from ignorance of the impact of TRIPS, to the fact that TRIPS 
should be considered a treaty of adhesion.27 
On the other hand, the existence of TRIPS does reflect the fact that some 
countries, and especially some industries (such as pharmaceutical companies), were 
desirous of stronger global protection that led to TRIPS. Until TRIPS, there was no 
multilateral international agreement mandating any type of intellectual property 
protection exist. Previously, multilateral agreements primarily aimed to help 
inventors more easily obtain global protection if a country elected to provide it.28 
 
23. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27. 
24. Notably, not only were there different definitions of these terms, but TRIPS even permits 
slightly different key terms, stating, for example, that a country can require an invention to be “useful” 
or have “industrial application” even though these terms are not interchangeable. See TRIPS, supra note 
6, art. 27. 
25. E.g., E. Richard Gold & Michael Shortt, The Promise of the Patent in Canada and Around 
the World, 30:1 CAN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 35 (2014); Correa, Patent Rights, supra note 7, at 198– 
00; Reichman & Dreyfuss, supra note 22, at 89; PARK, supra note 8, at 39; UNITED NATIONS  
DEV. PROGRAMME, supra note 8, at 57; UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 22. 
26. E.g., Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, 
India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, art. III, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100147.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HUC-SVFJ] 
(proposing limiting scope of IP in WTO); see also A.V. Ganesan, Negotiating for India, in THE MAKING 
OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 
211, 213–14 ( Jayashree Watal & Antony Taubman eds., 2015) (noting that India resisted including IP 
as not adequately trade related and concerned about the impact on affordable medicine). 
27. E.g., Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369,  
373 (2006); Donald P. Harris, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27  
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 681, 691 (2014). 
28. E.g., Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 3–4, Mar. 20, 1883,  
as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, July 14, 1967, arts. 2–3 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305 (last amended Sept. 28, 1979) (showing that if a nation provided patents, it could not treat 
Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017 11:04 AM 
402 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:395 
But now, although many countries and some scholars consider TRIPS to require 
too much IP protection, some developed countries such as the United States have 
sought and continue to seek international agreements requiring even more 
protection.29 These “TRIPS-plus” agreements are often bilateral agreements with 
developing countries that may sign agreements to gain desired market access 
without fully understanding the implications of the intellectual property 
provisions.30 Scholars consider these TRIPS-plus agreements savvy forum shifting 
by countries that did not obtain optimal levels of protection under TRIPS31 and also 
note how TRIPS-plus agreements reduce TRIPS flexibilities.32 In a similar fashion, 
the companies now bringing landmark investment claims may be shifting to the 
investment tribunal forum to seek remedies that they cannot obtain in the WTO 
directly or even by lobbying their governments which often exercise substantial 
discretion in deciding what claims to challenge at the WTO.33 
Against the upward ratcheting of IP standards, some counter-movements 
promote the use of TRIPS flexibilities. The Doha Public Health Declaration, for 
 
its nationals better than foreign applicants); Patent Cooperation Treaty June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 
1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (Oct. 3, 2001) (providing a mechanism to help inventors more easily obtain patents 
in multiple countries with a single application if countries provided patents). 
29. E.g., RUTH MAYNE, HUMAN DEV. REPORT OFFICE, UNDP, REGIONALISM, 
BILATERALISM AND THE TRIPS PLUS AGREEMENTS: THE THREAT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
1 (2005), http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2005_mayne_ruth_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
N832-KKZW]; Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 827, 866–69 (2007); 
DEERE, supra note 7, at 113–42. 
30. E.g., MAYNE, supra note 29, at 6–8. 
31. See, e.g., Susan Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and 
TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP L. 447, 454 (2011) [hereinafter Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough]. Of course, 
this is not the first instance of forum shifting. Incorporating IP standards in the WTO framework is 
generally considered a landmark forum shift that was orchestrated not just by countries, but also by a 
few powerful industries that successfully lobbied their governments. E.g., SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE 
POWER, PUBLIC LAW (2003). 
32. E.g., CYNTHIA M. HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 223–51 (2011) [hereinafter HO, 
ACCESS TO MEDICINE] (providing an overview of TRIPS-plus standards and how they limit TRIPS 
flexibilities); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Under BITs, FTAs and 
TRIPS: Conflicting Regimes or Mutual Coherence, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 485, 490–93 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds. 2011) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights]; Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough, supra note 31, at 454. 
33. See, e.g., James Gathii & Cynthia Ho, Regime Shifting of IP Law Making and Enforcement from 
the WTO to the International Investment Regime, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914650 [https://perma.cc/YNF4-
3K42]; see also Valentina S. Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics: Pharmaceutical Patents, Public Health and 
Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 113, 142 (2015) [hereinafter Vadi, 
Towards a New Dialectics] (noting that as TRIPS disputes have declined, there are now IP-related 
investment disputes). In fact, some have specifically noted how investment-state arbitrations can be 
considered TRIPS Plus. E.g., LUKAS VANHONNAEKER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AS 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS: FROM COLLISION TO COLLABORATION 177–86 (2015). But see 
Bertram Boie, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: Is there 
a TRIPS-Plus Dimension? 40–44 (NCCR Trade, Working Paper No. 2010/19, 2010) (noting that 
although BITs may require more than TRIPS, they arguably address different subject matter, such that 
they are not TRIPS-plus, so much as incongruent). 
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example, affirmed that members have flexibility in implementing TRIPS in a way 
that protects public health.34 Since then, some countries have adopted or considered 
adopting national laws to better incorporate TRIPS flexibilities.35 The need to 
incorporate TRIPS flexibilities was recently underscored by the September 2016 
Report of the United Nations (UN) Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Access 
to Medicine, which it issued after public hearings worldwide.36 However, the use of 
these flexibilities may be threatened by the pending disputes premised on alleged 
TRIPS violations. Indeed, although the initial investment disputes involve only 
three countries, they seem designed to influence the laws of other countries that are 
not formal members of these disputes.37 
B. Investment Agreements (Permitting Investor-State Arbitration) 
There are currently over 3,000 international agreements that provide “foreign” 
investors to a particular country with certain rights concerning their investments, as 
well as a mechanism to enforce these rights before a tribunal of private arbitrators.38 
The vast majority of these agreements are bilateral investment agreements.39 
However, recent trade agreements include a chapter on investment agreements, as 
well as chapters on other topics such as intellectual property rights.40 This Section 
 
34. World Trade Organization [WTO], Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) (“we 
affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of 
WTO members’ right to . . . promote access to medicines for all.”). 
35. India, Argentina and the Philippines have already adopted some TRIPS flexibilities. E.g., 
The Patents (Amendment) Act, No. 15 of 2005, India Code (2005) [hereinafter India  
Patents (Amendment) Act]; Republic of the Philippines, Congress of the Philippines, Republic Act  
No. 9502 ( June 6, 2008), http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2008/ra_9502_2008.html 
[https://perma.cc/3LTT-7J3H]; Non-patentable Subject Matter according to the New Guidelines of the 
Argentine PTO, MOELLER IP ADVISORS, ( June 24, 2013), http://www.moellerip.com/non-patentable-
subject-matter-according-to-the-new-guidelines-of-the-argentine [https://perma.cc/ 
HD9A-Z4KZ]; see also Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND. 
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295 (2014-2015). Countries that are contemplating following suit include Brazil and 
South Africa. See, e.g., Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (Sept. 2013) (S. Afr.), http://ip-
unit.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/DRAFT-IP-POLICY.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LRY-Y6Q6]; 
Catherine Tomlinson et al., Reforming South Africa’s Procedures for Granting Patents to Improve Medicine 
Access, 105 S. AF. MED. J. 741 (2015); BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM, supra note 8. 
36. See UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 22. 
37. E.g., Ruth Okediji, Is Intellectual Property “Investment”? Eli Lilly v. Canada and the 
International Intellectual Property System, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1121, 1121–22 (2014); see also Gathii & 
Ho, supra note 33 (arguing that these initial disputes indicate an intent to shift from the WTO/TRIPS 
regime to the use of investment disputes to effectuate policy changes in domestic and global laws). 
38. E.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: PREVENTION AND 
ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 3, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales  
No. E.10.II.D.11 (2010) [hereinafter UNCTAD, INVESTOR STATE DISPUTES]. 
39. E.g., U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV., Investment Policy Hub: International Investment 
Agreements Navigator (2013), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA [https://perma.cc/GTR8-
FYBK] (showing that there are over 2,900 bilateral investment treaties, but fewer than 400 other types 
of agreements). 
40. E.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992,  
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFF. U.S. TRADE 
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explains the unique claims, and how they are enforced, followed by criticisms of this 
system. This Section primarily focuses on the similarities among the majority of 
existing agreements, including criticisms of such agreements, although 
modifications in a few recent agreements are also addressed at the end of the 
Section. 
1. Background 
Agreements permitting investor-state arbitrations have been introduced since 
1959 to promote foreign direct investment in countries.41 They were largely 
introduced in agreements by newly independent countries desirous of encouraging 
foreign investments.42 The new rights and mechanism for enforcement were 
intended to address a myriad of prior problems that often discouraged investments. 
For example, foreign investors might be loath to purchase property in a state when 
they know they could be the target of unlawful state action (i.e., taking their 
purchase without compensation), and not have recourse. Lack of recourse might 
exist because the nation did not have a robust rule of law, because the government 
had sovereign immunity, or because the judgment was not enforceable. Investors 
often had to seek intervention by their governments, which usually took the form 
of military interventions, often referred to as “gunboat diplomacy.”43 Against this 
backdrop, new claims specific to foreign investors, as well as a method to enforce 
them, were created to mitigate risks and induce foreign investment.44 
Investment agreements generally provide the same basic set of enforceable 
substantive rights to investors intended to contribute to a stable investment 
climate.45 Some of the rights clearly aim to put foreign investors on a level playing 
field with domestic ones. For example, there is usually a guarantee that foreign 
 
REPRESENTATIVE (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) [hereinafter TPP], https://ustr.gov/tpp/ 
[https://perma.cc/9NLT-EBSB]. 
41. See generally U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN 
THE MID 1990S, U.N. Doc UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8, 8–10 (1998) (showing 
that Germany and Pakistan signed the first such agreement in 1959); see also Rudolf Dolzer & Christoph 
Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2d ed. 2012) (showing that although international 
agreements to promote investments date back to the late 1700s, they were limited in scope to 
expropriation and importantly lacked arbitration-type remedies common in modern agreements). 
42. E.g., UNCTAD, INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES, supra note 38, at 3–4; LORENZO COTULA, 
INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., INVESTMENT TREATIES AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: 
INVESTMENT LIBERALISATION 1 (2014). 
43. E.g., KENNETH VANDEVALDE, UNITED STATES INVESTMENT TREATIES: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 7 (1992); see also Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid 
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 15–17 (2014) 
(discussing gunboat diplomacy as well as broader historical context). Alternatively, investors sometimes 
sought to have their home country make a claim on their behalf at the International Court of Justice, 
but that resulted in only a small number of successful claims and even those that were successful did 
not result in any compensation to the investor and were not truly enforceable without enactment of a 
Security Council Resolution. See, e.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1536–37. 
44. E.g., VANDEVELDE, supra note 43, at 7. 
45. E.g. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 146–51 (2d ed. 2015). 
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investors will not be treated less favorably than domestic ones and that they will be 
free from unreasonable or discriminatory measures; this is referred to as “national 
treatment.”46 Similarly, most agreements require that investors be provided the most 
favored nation treatment such that foreign investors under one agreement are 
provided no less favorable treatment than foreign investors under a different 
agreement.47 
However, there are two other core obligations in most agreements that may 
provide investors with more rights than domestic ones and are of particular issue 
concerning intellectual property claims.48 First, states are prohibited from 
expropriating investments without compensation.49 Although somewhat analogous 
to domestic takings laws in most countries, the interpretation is often broader than 
under domestic laws.50 Second, states are required to provide minimum standards 
of treatment to foreign investments, which is often referred to as “fair and equitable 
treatment” (FET).51 Although some aspects of what could constitute an FET claim 
might have parallels in domestic law such as denial of due process and undue 
discrimination, such claims generally have no true parallel to the extent that they 
focus on protecting alleged “legitimate expectations” of investors.52 
FET claims deserve special discussion not only since investors tend to prevail 
on these, but also because they are more likely to create problems with IP norms 
given their broad scope. The concept of “legitimate expectations” was first 
 
46. E.g., id. at 149; U.S. Dep’t of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 3 (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 U.S. Model BIT]. 
47. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art.4; SALACUSE, supra note 45, at 149. E.g.,  
Claudia Salomon & Sandra Friedrich, How Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Bilateral Investment  
Treaties Affect Arbitration, PRACTICAL LAW ARBITRATION, 3–4 (2013), https://m.lw.com/ 
thoughtLeadership/favoured-nation-clauses-arbitration [https://perma.cc/WL4U-9QRW] 
(showing that although the original intent would seem reasonable, it has been used creatively to expand 
protection). 
48. Nations that promote such rights, however, often misrepresent this issue. See, e.g., Investor-
State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Fact Sheet, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 2015) 
[hereinafter ISDS Fact Sheet], https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/ 
2015/march/investor-state-dispute-settlement-isds [https://perma.cc/JB7N-RATQ] (alleging that 
claims under investment agreements simply “mirror” U.S. rights and are “designed to provide no greater 
substantive rights to foreign investors than are afforded under . . . U.S. law.”). 
49. See, e.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art. 6; NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110. 
50. E.g., Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s  
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 30, 37 (2003); LISE JOHNSON ET. AL, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV.,  
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND US DOMESTIC LAW, 1, 7 (May 
2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-
U.S.-Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-19-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KX6-PZEL]. 
51. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105; TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6; SALACUSE, supra note 
45, at 241 (noting that this is a requirement of “virtually all investment treaties” even though 
formulations differ). 
52. E.g., Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State “Commitments” 
and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361, 381–82 (2013) (noting that 
protection of expectations, versus actual rights, provides investors more protection against regulatory 
change than under U.S. domestic law). 
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mentioned by a tribunal in 2003 and is now considered “so general a provision [that 
it] is likely to be almost sufficient to cover all conceivable cases.”53 In addition, even 
though tribunals have stated that defeat of legitimate expectations alone is not an 
automatic breach of FET, it nonetheless can be given significant weight, arguably 
disproportionately, in ultimately finding a violation of an FET claim.54 Recent 
expansive interpretations of FET claims have resulted in a proliferation of claims; 
this stands in stark contrast to previous decades where the standard was rarely 
invoked because it was considered only applicable where action was egregious and 
shocking.55 
An important aspect of modern investment claims is the process for 
addressing these claims, including how it is dramatically different than most 
adjudications. Investment claims are a unique aspect of international law that permit 
private companies to assert a claim against a state.56 The ability of a company to sue 
a host state directly is considered an unprecedented “revolutionary innovation” in 
international law that usually involves only state-to-state interactions.57 In addition, 
how the claims are adjudicated is also notable. Investment claims are decided by a 
tribunal of three individuals that lacks the independence of most domestic and 
international courts.58 There is also a high level of confidentiality regarding not only 
hearings, but also written submissions; this means that generally only parties to the 
 
53. Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB 
(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004); F. A. Mann, British Treaties for 
the Protection and Promotion of Investments, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 243 (1981). 
54. E.g., Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection Under Investment Treaties: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis 167–68 (2014); Clayton v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 
¶ 572 (Mar. 17, 2015); see also LISE JOHNSON & LISA SACHS, COLUM. CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., 
THE TPP’S INVESTMENT CHAPTER: ENTRENCHING, RATHER THAN REFORMING, A FLAWED 
SYSTEM 5 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2015/11/18/the-tpps-investment-chapter-entrenching-
rather-than-reforming-a-flawed-system [https://perma.cc/5YUX-UNR7]. 
55. E.g., Bryan Mercurio Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Intellectual Property Rights in 
International Investment Agreements, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 871, 894 (2012) [hereinafter Mercurio, 
Awakening]; see also Barnali Choudhury, Evolution or Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment 
in International Investment Law, 6 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 297, 298 (2005). The standard dates back 
to a 1926 case concerning international standards in which a tribunal held that to violate international 
standards, treatment of an alien should amount to “an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, 
or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that every 
reasonable and impartial man would recognize its insufficiency.” Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 
R.I.A.A. 60, 61–62 (Mex.-U.S.A. Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1926); see also Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. 
v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, ¶ 128 ( July 20) (noting that state arbitrariness would require “willful disregard of 
due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises a sense of judicial propriety”). 
56. E.g., Gus Van Harten, Perceived Bias in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in THE BACKLASH 
AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 433, 434–35 (Waibel et al. eds., 
2010) [hereinafter Van Harten, Perceived Bias]. 
57. BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 145 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 24, 
2007) (“profound transformation of international investment law”); Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without 
Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 256 (1995) (“dramatically different from anything previously known in the 
international sphere”). 
58. E.g., Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 397 
(2014); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 521–22 (1997); Van Harten, 
Perceived Bias, supra note 56, at 439. 
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dispute have full access to all the information.59 Under the vast majority of 
agreements, the tribunal is also not required to permit interested third parties to 
participate.60 Finally, there is currently no possibility of appeal in all but two of over 
3000 agreements.61 Awards can theoretically be annulled,62 but the conditions are 
very limited.63 Although these features are radically different than most adjudicatory 
systems, they are based on earlier international commercial arbitration between 
private parties for whom confidentiality was considered essential.64 However, as will 
be discussed in the next section, investment claims inherently involve public 
matters, such that the model for private parties may be a poor fit. 
 
59. E.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1544–45. 
60. E.g., Jeffery Atik, Legitimacy, Transparency and NGO Participation in the NAFTA Chapter 
11 Process, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 135, 147 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004). The trend in recently concluded and pending 
agreements is toward more transparency and participation. However, that has no retroactive impact on 
older agreements. 
61. The EU has included an appeal process in its agreement with Vietnam, as well as with 
Canada, and the proposed agreement with the US. See EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 15; CETA, supra 
note 15, art. 8.27–.28; Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, EU Finalises Proposal for Investment Protection 
and Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015). In addition, although its success is uncertain, the EU has 
proposed a multilateral investment court. Appeals could be introduced in other agreements. See The 
Multilateral Investment Court Project, EUR. COMM’N (Dec 21, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 [https://perma.cc/7QVT-FX6S]. 
62. E.g., Letter from Payam Akhavan, Associate Professor, McGill University, et al., to Harry 
Reid, U.S. S. Minority Leader, et al. (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.mcgill.ca/fortier-chair/isds-open-letter 
[https://perma.cc/J6PY-RSU9] [hereinafter April 2015 Letter] (stating that “[a]wards are subject to 
review either in national courts or by ad hoc annulment committees composed of representatives drawn 
from rosters created by states”). 
63. International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States, art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 UNTS. 159 [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention] (permitting annulment if the tribunal was not properly constituted, the tribunal manifestly 
exceeded its powers, there was corruption by a member, there was a serious departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure, or the award failed to state the reasons on which it was based);  
U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 
art. 34 (1985 with amendments as adopted in 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW2W-FV7E] 
(limited grounds for setting aside an award). Moreover, attempts to annul are generally unsuccessful. 
E.g., UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that all five applications for annulment in 
2014 were entirely rejected). But see Promod Nair & Claudia Ludwig, ICSID Annulment Awards: Time 
for Reform? 5 GLOBAL ARB. REV. 18, 19–20 (2010) (suggesting that in some cases, annulment 
proceedings have been more akin to appellate review despite lack of support from language of ICSID). 
The lack of review of such awards was recently reinforced when the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
domestic courts must not review their merits. BC Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134  
S. Ct. 1198, 1212 (2014). 
64. E.g., Frank Garcia et al, Reforming the International Investment Regime: Lessons from 
International Trade Law, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 861 (2015). 
Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017 11:04 AM 
408 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:395 
2. Criticism of Investment Claims 
Although investment claims and the investor-state system were originally 
applauded for promoting investment flows,65 they are now highly controversial.66 
There are several key criticisms that will be explained in this section. A major issue 
is that investment claims are often expansively interpreted in favor of investors. 
Moreover, investment claims can be interpreted inconsistently. This results in a 
serious chilling effect—especially given the increasing number of claims and 
significant awards. A related issue is the lack of democratic accountability by 
tribunals. After discussing each of these criticisms, recent initiatives aimed at 
addressing criticisms will be explained, including why these fail to fully address 
problems relating to TRIPS issues. 
A major issue with investment claims is their expansive interpretation. 
Although most agreements have similar protections, they tend to leave key terms 
undefined.67 Even newer generation agreements that provide factors to consider for 
either expropriation or FET claims, still leave much discretion in the hands of 
tribunals since they provide no guidance on how to weigh and balance broad 
factors.68 Moreover, since investment claims primarily exist in bilateral investment 
agreements that focus on investments, undefined terms, as well as ambiguities, may 
be resolved in favor of investors because of the lack of competing language in the 
 
65. E.g., David P. Riesenberg, Note, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy 
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 985 (2011). 
66. E.g., Simon Lester, The ISDS Controversy: How We Got Here and Where Next, INT’L  
CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV.: OPINION ( June 1, 2016), http://www.ictsd.org/ 
opinion/the-isds-controversy-how-we-got-here-and-where-next [https://perma.cc/F5EQ-ZSV9]; 
Elizabeth Warren, Opinion, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,  
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-dispute-
settlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274-
e5209a3bc9a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/G2JF-5KGV]; The Arbitration Game: Governments  
are Souring on Treaties to Protect Foreign Investors, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11, 2014), http:// 
www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756-governments-are-souring-treaties- 
protect-foreign-investors-arbitration [https://perma.cc/P336-GJSE]. For example, the E.U. initiated a 
public consultation to address concern about whether to include an investment chapter in its pending 
agreement with the US. European Commission Press Release IP/14/56, Commission to Consult 
European Public on Provisions in EU-US Trade Deal on Investment and Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement ( Jan. 21, 2014). 
67. For example, most agreements provide for FET claims without any reference point by 
which to determine the standard. E.g., Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Public Welfare?—Intellectual 
Property Rights, Health and the Evolution of Treaty Drafting in International Investment Agreements, 6  
J. INT’L DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 252, 265 (2015) [hereinafter Mercurio, Safeguarding ]. Accordingly, 
there remains significant uncertainty concerning the scope of such claims, as well as the potential for 
them to be interpreted expansively. E.g., Lee M. Caplan & Jeremy K. Sharpe, United States, in 
COMMENTARIES ON SELECTED MODEL INVESTMENT TREATIES 755, 756 (Chester Brown ed., 2013); 
LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN ET AL., LSE ENTERPRISE, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF AN EU-USA 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION TREATY 29 (2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/260380/bis-13-1284-costs-and-benefits-of-an-eu-
usa-investment-protection-treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QYG-89FN]. 
68. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, Annex B.4(a); CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(1)–
(4); see also Mercurio, Safeguarding, supra note 67, at 259–60. 
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treaty to promote public interest goals.69 In addition, tribunals sometimes interpret 
agreements in favor of investors without textual support. For example, even though 
FET claims under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are 
expressly linked to violations of international law, which should require general and 
consistent practice of states,70 some NAFTA tribunals have found FET violations 
without considering international law.71 Critics of investment claims often express 
concern about investor-friendly rulings.72 Not only critics but also some defenders 
have noted investment agreements have become an economic bill of rights solely 
for foreign investors since corporations generally have rights, but no duties, whereas 
host states have duties, but no rights.73 Even some arbitrators have themselves 
 
69. E.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case  
No. ARB/02/6, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 116 ( Jan. 29, 2004) (“It is legitimate to resolve 
uncertainties in its interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.”); Siemens 
A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 81 (Aug. 3, 2004) 
(referring to treaty purpose as “to protect” and “to promote” investments). 
70. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105(1). 
71. For example, in Metalclad, a tribunal found Mexico in violation of FET under  
NAFTA, which requires such claims to be tied to minimum standards of treatment under  
customary international law, which in turn means a general and consistent practice of all states,  
without actually examining customary international law. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, Award, paras. 74–101 (Aug. 30, 2000) (discussing expropriation, 
but never actually addressing what constitutes customary international law before finding a  
violation). Similarly, in Railroad Development Corporation, the NAFTA tribunal arguably failed to 
consider customary international law when it found that customary international law can be a 
developing standard. R.R. Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Guatemala, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/23,  
Award, para. 218 ( June 29, 2012) (not evaluating customary international law and instead alleging it  
can be a developing standard); see also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS II: A SEQUEL, at xv, 11 (2012); Matthew C. Porterfield, 
A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair and Equitable Treatment under Customary 
International Law by Investment Tribunals, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-
and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investment-tribunals/ [https:// 
perma.cc/FV3G-55KR]. Indeed, by 2001 after several NAFTA panels interpreted this requirement to 
go beyond customary international law, NAFTA parties issued an interpretative note attempting to 
cabin the scope of this standard. NAFTA Free Trade Comm’n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain  
Chapter 11 Provisions ( July 31, 2001), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38790.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/23PZ-MCYZ]. However, this has not completely solved the problem. E.g., Saluka 
Inv. B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 309 (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Mar. 17, 2006), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DRQ-CCHY] 
(considering FET unmoored to customary international law). 
72. E.g., Gus Van Harten, et al., Public Statement on the International Investment Regime  
(Aug. 31, 2010), [hereinafter Van Harten, Public Statement] http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ [https://perma.cc/NW53-N9RA] 
(public statement of academics criticizing pro-investor interpretations); A. Claire Cutler, New 
Constitutionalism, Democracy and the Future of Global Governance, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
CRISIS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: REIMAGINING THE FUTURE 89, 103–04 (Stephen Gill ed., 2015); 
see also van Aaken, Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 11, at 126 (“it seems fair to say that 
tribunals have been on the whole rather investor friendly” although noting that a few recent decisions 
or minority opinions have taken a different approach). 
73. E.g., THE SEATTLE TO BRUSSELS NETWORK ET AL., A TRANSATLANTIC CORPORATE  
BILL OF RIGHTS: INVESTOR PRIVILEGES IN EU-US TRADE DEAL THREATEN PUBLIC INTEREST  
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expressed concern in recent years concerning expansive interpretations.74 In 
addition to expansive interpretations of investment claims, many have criticized 
tribunals for expansively interpreting who is considered a foreign investor; tribunals 
are criticized for blessing “nationality shopping,” which refers to a phenomenon 
whereby companies re-incorporate or incorporate subsidiaries to take advantage of 
investment agreements, such as in the Philip Morris case.75 
A related issue to expansive investor-friendly rulings is that they are often 
inconsistent. On one level, inconsistency should be expected since agreements have 
different language. However, tribunals have interpreted identical wording in 
different ways.76 The UN Conference on Trade and Development has recently 
noted that contradictions between awards is a major concern, especially in light of 
a proliferation of cases.77 The inconsistency is exacerbated by the lack of any 
 
AND DEMOCRACY (2013), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/transatlantic-
corporate-bill-of-rights-oct13.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCD-MQ3X]; Susan D. Franck, Empirically 
Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007). 
74. E.g., Fauwaz Abdul Aziz, Investor-state Arbitration System Needs ‘Complete Overhaul’, 
BILATERALS.ORG, (May 12, 2014), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investor-state-arbitration-system 
[https://perma.cc/P2GK-L2X2] (noting prominent lawyer who has served as counsel in several 
investment cases expressed problem in keynote address to annual Investment Treaty Arbitration 
Conference). 
75. Jane Kelsey & Lori Wallach, “Investor-State” Disputes in Trade Pact Threaten Fundamental 
Principles of National Judicial Systems, PUB. CITIZEN 3 (Apr. 2012), http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/isds-domestic-legal-process-background-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/YEH7-9G6Z]; 
Rachel Thorn & Jennifer Doucleff, Disregarding the Corporate Veil and Denial of Benefits Clauses: Testing 
Treaty Language and the Concept of “Investor”, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION 3 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); see also Anne van Aaken, Perils of Success? The Case 
of International Investment Protection, 9 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1, 20 (2008) (noting extreme case in 
Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine in which Ukrainian investors incorporated in Lithuania and then used that 
to invest back in Ukraine). Some suggest that these broad interpretations are a function of the fact that 
arbitrators are paid by the hour such that they have an incentive for suits to continue. E.g., Gus Van 
Harten, A Report on the Flawed Proposals for Investor-State Dispute Settlement ( ISDS) in TTIP and 
CETA 3 (Osgoode Hall L. Sch., Research Paper No. 16, 2015) [hereinafter Van Harten, Flawed 
Proposals] (noting that salaries are a function of whether a case continues). Although the Australian 
panel properly rejected this attempt, future tribunals of course need not follow that approach. Philip 
Morris v. Austl., Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) 
[hereinafter P.M. v. Austl., Award], http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VUN-W4M4]. 
76. For example, several cases against Argentina were decided by tribunals with the same 
President, but used different interpretations and reached differing conclusions regarding the same basic 
facts. E.g., Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 642–43 (2012); see 
also Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 12, at 1196–98 (identical wording interpreted differently); 
Stephanie Bijlmakers, Effects of Foreign Direct Investment Arbitration on a State’s Regulatory Autonomy 
Involving the Public Interest, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 245, 253 (2012) (noting divergent interpretation 
of comparable factual and legal cases in Lauder v. Czech Republic and CME v. Czech Republic). 
77. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
In Search of a Roadmap, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/PCB/2013/4 (May 24, 2013). 
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appellate body under virtually all agreements.78 In fact, even defenders of the current 
system have acknowledged this problem.79 
The expansive and inconsistent rulings lead to the most significant criticism 
of investment claims—that they have a chilling effect on legitimate domestic action. 
Notably, companies might be inclined to file claims that have a limited chance of 
success in hopes of encouraging governments to settle, which usually favors 
companies.80 However, chilling effects are not solely a result of actual claims; 
legitimate action can also be suppressed because of specific threats, or even the 
possibility of action. For example, some countries declined to enact plain-package 
tobacco laws after specific threats, whereas other countries, such as New Zealand, 
delayed enacting contemplated legislation even though not specifically threatened.81 
Even more concerning, countries might fail to even begin to take legitimate 
regulatory or legislative action for fear of potential claims. Some of these chilling 
effects can be hard to document and there are admittedly often multiple variables 
that impact domestic action.82 However, there is adequate evidence such that 
 
78. E.g., id. at 8–9. Of course, there is an appeal possible under two current agreements. See, e.g., 
supra note 61. 
79. E.g., Franck, Legitimacy Crisis, supra note 11, at 1617–25; Schreuer & Weiniger, supra note 
12, at 1201–03. However other defenders of investment agreements may not view this as problematic. 
E.g., Stephen Schwebel, In Defense of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 135 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, 
Nov. 24, 2014, at 2, http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-135-Schwebel-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M3LV-7LTU] (comparing inconsistency to conflicts between state and federal 
courts in the United States); José E. Alvarez, The Emerging Foreign Direct Investment Regime, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 94, 97 (2005) (noting that inconsistent rulings are inherent to the existing 
structure of the dispute settlement and differing treaty texts). 
80. E.g., POULSEN ET AL., supra note 67, at 28, 30. 
81. Sabrina Tavernise, Tobacco Industry Tactics Limit Poorer Nations’ Smoking Laws,  
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1; see also John Muchangi, Why MPs Should Pass Tobacco  
Regulations, STAR (Mar. 30, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2015/03/30/why- 
mps-should-pass-tobacco-regulations_c1109267 [https://perma.cc/9HWW-D64Y] (detailing the 
efforts of tobacco companies to derail efforts to enact regulations in Kenya); Rachel Rose  
Jackson, Tobacco Industry Accused of ‘Intimidation and Interference’ in Kenya, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/mar/02/tobacco-industry-accused-
intimidation-interference-kenya [https://perma.cc/8UJE-Y92P]; Cancer Action Network, TPP Fact 
Sheet, May 2015; Tobacco Institute of South Africa, Submission on Draft Regulations in Terms  
of Section 37(3) of the Namibian Tobacco Products Control Act, 2010 (2011), http:// 
www.fairwarning.org/2012/11/as-nations-try-to-snuff-out-smoking-cigarette-makers-use-trade-
treaties-to-fire-up-legal-challenges/4tisanamibia2011-dec-14/ [https://perma.cc/Q6Y5-JGNV]. 
82. E.g., Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political 
Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 609 (Chester Brown 
& Kate Miles eds., 2011) (“[R]egulatory chill does not lend itself to statistical analysis.”). 
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scholars and policy makers have expressed concern.83 In addition, the concern has 
become part of mainstream public discussions.84 
Another major issue of concern is the inherently public-private nature of 
disputes that lacks democratic accountability under most existing agreements. 
Investor-state disputes inherently involve disputes of public policy and domestic 
regulation, yet are generally decided by tribunals that lack the hallmarks of a 
democratic process to protect public interest.85 Under most agreements, the 
arbitrators are not independent and lack job security common to most courts; an 
arbitrator in one case can also serve as an attorney for a party in another case, which 
would never happen in a traditional judicial setting.86 Notably, although the model 
of decision making is borrowed from traditional commercial arbitration, there are 
some key differences. First, investor claims are more likely to raise public policy 
issues than disputes between private parties; whereas confidentiality in commercial 
 
83. Rep. of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on Human Rights,  
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, ¶ 35 ( July 2, 2003) (warning that investor-state arbitrations could 
have a chilling effect on efforts to promote human rights and a healthy environment); see also Rep. of 
the Indep. Expert on the Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable Int’l Order Alfred-Maurice de 
Zayas, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/44 ( July 14, 2015); Peter Muchlinski, Trends in 
International Investments: Balancing Investor Rights and the Right to Regulate: the Issue of National  
Security, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008–2009, 35, 39– 
40 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment  
Report 2003: FDI Policies for Development: National and International Perspectives 111 (2003); Letter 
from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the Univ. of Cal., Irvine School of Law, et al., to Harry Reid,  
U.S. S. Minority Leader, et al. (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
03/ISDS-Letter-3.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/SRM9-VG59] [hereinafter March 2015 Letter] (noting 
that investor challenges threaten domestic sovereignty); Van Harten, Flawed Proposals, supra note 75, at 
7–11 (2015). 
84. Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System that Lets Corporations Sue 
Countries, THE GUARDIAN ( June 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/DF33-
D65E]; Glyn Moody, Corporate Sovereignty’s Chilling Effects, TECHDIRT (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:03  
AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141121/07460329216/corporate-sovereigntys-chilling-
effects.shtml [https://perma.cc/AW66-TCCL]; Danielle Kurtzleben, Why Elizabeth Warren is 
Declaring War on an Obscure Trade Policy, VOX (last updated Feb. 28, 2015, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/2/28/8124057/investor-state-dispute-settlement-elizabeth-warren 
[https://perma.cc/B54X-PXA8]. 
85. E.g., Barnali Choudhury, Democratic Implications Arising from the Intersection of Investment 
Arbitration and Human Rights, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 983 (2009); Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in 
International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 367, 385–93 (2014). 
86. NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER ET AL., INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., 
ARBITRATOR INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY: EXAMINING THE DUAL ROLE OF ARBITRATOR 
AND COUNSEL (2010), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2011/dci_2010_arbitrator_independence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E2EH-HB2S]; see also David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy Community 44 (OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment, Working Paper No. 2012/3, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
inv/investment-policy/WP-2012_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP9A-4EMC] (stating that a majority of 
arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases whereas about 10% of arbitrators have 
acted as counsel for states in other cases). 
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arbitration is not controversial, it is for disputes involving wider policy issues.87 
Second, unlike commercial arbitration claims between private parties that only arise 
because of an explicit consent in an agreement to the dispute, no such consent is 
generally required for an investor-state claim state since the agreement itself is 
considered consent for all disputes that arise after the conclusion of the agreement.88 
This general consent for future investor-state claims has been considered to be a 
“blank cheque which may be cashed for an unknown amount at a future, and as yet 
unknown date,” transforming “investor-state arbitration from a modified form of 
commercial arbitration into a system to control the state’s exercise of regulatory 
authority.”89 There is serious concern that general consent to permit a tribunal of 
private individuals to decide investment claims undermines democratic principles.90 
In addition, the lack of transparency and inability for interested parties to participate 
have also been cited as major problems.91 
3. Addressing Criticisms? 
In light of these concerns, the recently concluded Transpacific Partnership 
(TPP), a trade agreement that covers the United States and Pacific Rim countries,92 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the 
 
87. See, e.g., Kate Miles, Reconceptualizing International Investment Law: Bringing the Public 
Interest into Private Business, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND NATIONAL AUTONOMY, 295, 
295 (Meredith Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel eds., 2010) (noting that the public interest is inherently 
involved in investor-state disputes). 
88. This is true for agreements since the 1990s. E.g., GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 24–26, 30 (2007); see also, e.g., TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.19. This 
consent resulted in a substantial increase in claims. VAN HARTEN, supra, at 30. 
89. Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the 
International System of Investor Protection, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 600, 607–08 (2005) (quoting 
ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 21–22 (1999)). 
90. E.g., Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of 
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 779 (2008). 
91. E.g., Daniel Barstow Magraw Jr. & Niranjali Manel Amerasinghe, Transparency and Public 
Participation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 337, 337 (2009); Valentina  
S. Vadi, Trade Mark Protection, Public Health and International Investment Law: Strains & Paradoxes, 
20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 773, 779–80 (2009) [hereinafter Vadi, Trade Mark Protection]. 
92. The TPP was concluded on October 5, 2015. Jackie Calmes, 11 Pacific Nations and  
U.S. Endorse Giant Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, at A1. Countries signed the agreement on 
February 4, 2016. E.g., Press Release, US Trade Representative, TPP Minister’s Statement (Feb. 4, 
2016), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2016/February/TPP-
Ministers-Statement [https://perma.cc/7PDP-VLD7]; Trans Pacific Partnership Trade Deal Signed in 
Auckland, BBC NEWS (Feb 4, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35480600 [https:// 
perma.cc/H7WD-5TSV]. Of course, the status of the TPP is questionable since the recent  
U.S. withdrawal from the agreement would seem to preclude possibility of ratification. See TPP,  
supra note 40, art. 30.5 (requiring ratification by at least 6 countries that represent 85% of the TPP’s 
combined GDP); see also Joshua Berlinger, TPP Unravels: Where the 11 Other Countries Go From Here, 
CNN ( Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/asia/tpp-other-11-countries-what-next/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MGU-NLEV] (explaining that both the US and Japan need to ratify the agreement 
for it to be effective). 
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EU,93 as well as the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) between the United States and European Union (EU) have proposed some 
changes to traditional investment claims. Although the TPP and TTIP may not be 
ratified, they arestill relevant to consider as a comparison to older investment 
agreements and whether its language addresses recognized problems.94 Under the 
TPP and TTIP there are listed factors to consider for what constitutes indirect 
expropriation.95 Although defenders claim this protects the domestic right to 
regulate,96 the language still clearly contemplates that in some unspecified “rare” 
instances, nondiscriminatory regulatory action that is designed to protect legitimate 
public welfare, such as health, could be considered expropriation.97 Similarly, these 
agreements attempt to cabin FET claims; for example, the TPP clarifies that 
violation of a separate international agreement does not necessarily establish a 
breach;98 however, even though alleged violation of a separate international 
agreement, such as TRIPS, is not an automatic breach, there is nothing to preclude 
a tribunal from considering this relevant.99 CETA, on the other hand, focuses 
instead on denial of justice, such that violation of TRIPS should not alone be 
considered a breach.100 
Since 2015, the EU has introduced a major innovation to recent and pending 
agreements. Notably, its proposal to the TTIP includes the first-ever appointed 
investment tribunal court and an appellate body; in addition, it would prevent 
arbitrators from also serving as lawyers in other investment cases.101 The initial 
reaction to this proposal by the U.S. Trade Representative was fairly negative,102 and 
 
93. CETA, supra note 15. 
94. E.g., Kavaljit Singh, The TPP IS Dead. What Happens Next?, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Dec. 7, 
2016), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-tpp-is-dead-what-happens-next/5560781 [https:// 
perma.cc/24BH-UVTQ]. 
95. Both TPP and CETA list specific factors relevant to assessing indirect expropriation. TPP, 
supra note 40, Annex 9-B, para. 3(a) (including character of government action, the extent to which it 
interferes with distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the economic impact of 
the government action); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Ch. II, Annex I, arts. 2–3 
(proposed July 31, 2015) [hereinafter TTIP], http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/ 
september/tradoc_153807.pdf [https://perma.cc/S32C-CCUE] (character of government measure, 
duration of the measure, and economic impact of measure are relevant). However, CETA does not 
include comparable clarifications. See generally CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.12 (expropriation). 
96. E.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, UPGRADING AND IMPROVING 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Upgrading- 
and-Improving-Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4NG-W2QB] 
(“We would never negotiate away our right to do so, and we don’t ask other countries to do so either.”). 
There is even some proposed language that aims to protect domestic regulation. E.g., TTIP, supra note 
95, art. 2 (“The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of the Parties to regulate within their 
territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives . . . .”). 
97. E.g., TTIP, supra note 95, art. 3; TPP, supra note 40, Annex 9-B, para. 3(b). 
98. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6(2)–(3); CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(2) (limited situations). 
99. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6(3). 
100. CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10(2). 
101. TTIP, supra note 95, arts. 9–11. 
102. E.g., Krista Hughes & Philip Blenkinsop, U.S. Wary of EU Proposal for Investment  
Court in Trade Pact, REUTERS, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade- 
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it is especially unclear whether the TTIP will move forward under the current U.S. 
administration.103 However, since announcing this, the EU added this same unique 
process in the EU-Vietnam agreement, and even in CETA despite the fact that 
CETA was officially concluded two years earlier.104 Moreover, as will be discussed, 
even this significant proposal will not address the unique conflict investment claims 
have with TRIPS flexibilities. Accordingly, although these proposals can be 
considered an attempt to address previous criticisms, they ultimately fail to address 
the conflict with TRIPS flexibilities that is the focus of this Article. 
C. The Under-Recognized Current Conflict 
The lack of recognition of the impending conflict is best appreciated in light 
of two issues that will be explained in this Section. First, there are few who even 
recognize the potential for the disciplines to overlap. Even when there is recognition 
that IP issues could be central to investment claims, there is generally no 
acknowledgement that IP norms could be threatened. Second, the defenders of the 
present system have repeatedly asserted certain defenses that fail to recognize IP 
conflicts. Since these defenses are so widely reported, they likely overshadow the 
limited recognition of mere overlap. 
 
ttip-idUSKCN0SN2LH20151029 [https://perma.cc/4HJM-8BBG]; see also BROMUND ET AL., The  
U.S. Should Reject the European Commission’s Proposed Investment Court (Heritage Foundation Issue 
Brief No. 4485, Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/11/the-us-should-
reject-the-european-commissions-proposed-investment-court [https://perma.cc/358T-MCKD]. 
103. E.g., Alex Lawson, Trump’s Election Puts TTIP In the Freezer: EU Trade Boss, LAW 360 
( Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/884136/trump-s-election-puts-ttip-in-the-freezer-
eu-trade-boss [https://perma.cc/GJS7-5KMQ]; Sean O’Grady, By Scrapping TPP and TTIP, Trump  
Has Boosted American Jobs in the Short Term—and Destroyed Them in the Long Term, INDEP. ( Jan. 24,  
2017), http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/donald-trump-trade-deals-tpp-ttip-american-business-
workers-boost-short-term-destroy-long-term-a7543706.html [https://perma.cc/CWM5-XP2N]; 
Tereza Novotna, Will Donald Trump Shoot Down TIIP or Rebrand It as the Trump Trade and Investment 
Partnership?, LSE U.S. CENTRE BLOG ( Jan. 19, 2017), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ 
2017/01/19/will-donald-trump-shoot-down-ttip-or-rebrand-it-as-the-trump-trade-and-investment-
partnership/ [https://perma.cc/U5Q9-8DN5]. 
104. EU-Vietnam FTA, supra note 15; CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.27–28. Technically, the EU 
was simply scrubbing the document, but it added substantial changes, including a permanent investment 
tribunal, as well as an appellate tribunal. E.g., Stephen Drymer, CETA Under New Management: Why 
is Trudeau Changing the Game?, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (May 
12, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/ceta-under-new-management-why-trudeau-
changing-game [https://perma.cc/887S-GRH8]; Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Legal 
Scrubbing or Renegotiation? A Text-As-Data Analysis of How the EU Smuggled an Investment Court Into 
Its Trade Agreement with Canada, THE PLOT (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.the-
plot.org/2016/03/24/legal-scrubbing-or-renegotiation/ [https://perma.cc/YBS7-53KQ]. 
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1. Limited Recognition of Overlap, Let Alone Conflict 
The first issue is the limited recognition of overlap by attorneys,105 scholars, 
and policy makers.106 Of course, the Philip Morris and Eli Lilly investment cases 
reflect corporate recognition of the overlap and although these cases are recent, 
there is evidence that the tobacco industry was aware of the overlap two decades 
ago.107 However, it is notable that despite widespread criticism of investment claims, 
until recently there were relatively few that had noted the potential for IP to intersect 
with investment agreements, let alone result in a collision of norms.108 For example, 
 
105. In 2009, when a publication aimed at international investment attorneys published a special 
issue on how intellectual property could be protected under investment agreements, it was noted that 
the literature concerning this overlap was in its infancy. Markus Perkams & James  
M. Hosking, The Protection of Intellectual Property Rights Through International Investment Agreements: 
Only a Romance or True Love?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., Aug. 2009, at 2, 2 nn.6–7. 
106. Although some public interest groups seem well aware of the threat to TRIPS flexibilities 
based on informal discussions, they do not necessarily expressly mention TRIPS flexibilities in 
documents aimed at the public at large. E.g., U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA Foreign 
Investor Privileges Regime to Attack Canada’s Medicine Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Denial  
of a Patent, PUB. CITIZEN ( Jan. 2013), http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/ 
PC-factsheet-on-Eli-Lilly-ISDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPW3-NWJX] (noting that, if successful, Eli 
Lilly’s suit would permit corporate enforcement litigation of WTO rights even though corporations 
have no such rights in at the WTO, although not focusing on threat to TRIPS flexibilities). However, 
groups do note the issue in other situations. E.g., Ante Wessels, ISDS Threatens Privacy and Reform of 
Copyright and Patent Law, FOUNDATION FOR A FREE INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, Apr. 30, 
2014, at 17, http://people.ffii.org/~ante/ISDS/FFII_NL_ISDS-threatens-privacy.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/YF4W-K42F] (Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure comment to Dutch 
Parliament noting that Canada’s “minor adjustment” to patent law prompted Eli Lilly’s $500 million 
claim and that bigger reforms will “seriously endanger” a major overhaul of patent and copyright laws). 
Similarly, representatives of Public Citizen, Health Gap, and MSF, together with other intellectual 
property law professors, requested permission to file an amicus brief in the Eli Lilly  
v. Canada case. Letter from Burcu Kilic, Legal & Policy Dir., Glob. Access to Meds. Program,  
Pub. Citizen, & Brook K. Baker, Senior Policy Analyst, Healthgap, to Int’l Ctr. for Settlement  
of Inv. Disputes (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
italaw7111.pdf [https://perma.cc/EBV8-GHBZ]. But see Peter K. Yu, Investment Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, TEXAS A&M U. SCH. L. 2016, at 5–10 (arguing that there has long been an 
overlap of IP and investment agreements and that the only new development is the actual initiation of 
investor-state suits). 
107. The tobacco industry actually first suggested that plain package legislation could result in 
investment claims when Canada contemplated enacting legislation in 1994. E.g., Letter from RJR to 
Standing Committee on Health, May 4, 1994, Memo from Carla Hill to RJR Reynolds and Philip Morris, 
May 3, 1994, at 18, 21; Letter to Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, Mar. 25, 1994, at 5 (suggesting 
violation of NAFTA’s investment chapter). In addition, it initiated an investor-state claim in 2001, 
alleging expropriation, when Canada proposed bans of the terms “light” and “mild” on tobacco 
products, although the case settled. The actual notice of arbitration is not publicly available, but there 
is evidence that the case was filed. E.g., Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products Dispute, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/1282 [https://perma.cc/7G5T-9Z2K]; see also PHYSICIANS  
FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, THE PLOT AGAINST PLAIN PACKAGING: HOW  
MULTINATIONAL TOBACCO COMPANIES COLLUDED TO USE TRADE ARGUMENTS THEY KNEW 
WERE PHONEY TO OPPOSE PLAIN PACKAGING 25–27 (2008), http://www.smoke-
free.ca/pdf_1/plotagainstplainpackaging-apr1'.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3WE-DCK4]. 
108. The 2015 debate between different groups of academics for and against investor-state 
dispute settlement did not address this topic. See April 2015 Letter, supra note 62; March 2015 Letter, 
supra note 83; see also Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 871–72 (noting that the lack of literature 
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even though the Philip Morris case against Australia has prompted significant 
attention, attention tends to focus on a general threat to regulatory, but not 
intellectual property, sovereignty.109 In addition, although the Eli Lilly case against 
Canada could have dramatically changed the notion of TRIPS flexibilities for 
patents, this case received little attention from scholars as well as the popular media, 
especially compared to the Philip Morris cases.110 Strikingly, the Declaration on 
Patent Sovereignty drafted by prominent patent scholars does not acknowledge that 
TRIPS flexibilities could quickly evaporate if challenged by an investor-state 
dispute; rather, the underlying assumption would seem to be that these are not 
threatened.111 Similarly, although the 2016 UN High Level Panel Report cited the 
 
analyzing the use of investment claims to enforce intellectual property is “striking”). In light of Eli 
Lilly’s dispute, Canada is obviously aware of this issue and did in fact seek to limit the scope of investor-
state disputes in its trade agreement with the EU. E.g., Schewel, EU, Canada Fail to Close CETA; 
Stuck Over Issue Related to Eli Lilly Case, Inside US Trade, Sept. 12, 2013. However, Canada did not 
prevail. This seems to be changing, however. For example, a recent issue of the Journal of International 
Economic Law contained a special issue on IP and international investment law. Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan, The Protection of Intellectual Property and International Investment Law, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 
(2016). 
109. E.g., Lukasz Gruszczynski, Australian Plain Packaging Law, International Litigations and 
Regulatory Chilling Effect, 2 EUR. J. RISK REG. 242 (2014); Deborah Sy, Warning: Investment Agreements 
are Dangerous to Your Health, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 625 (2011); ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 
48. 
110. There are only a few academic articles. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Sovereignty Under Siege: 
Corporate Challenges to Domestic Intellectual Property Decisions, 30 BERKELEY TECH L.J. (2015); Okediji, 
supra note 37; Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: Investor-State Arbitration 
of IP Monopolies on Medicines–Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 23  
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2015). Although there are some articles in the popular press concerning the  
Eli Lilly case, they generally fail to recognize the implication for TRIPS flexibilities, and instead  
focus on the fact that it represents an opportunity for corporations to utilize investor-state disputes. 
E.g., BAKER DONELSON BEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ PC, The TPP Battle Begins, 
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cca98a76-30fc-49bc-
b312-842ebb76e429 [https://perma.cc/YQ2J-BYWN] (mentioning the Eli Lilly dispute as  
an example of a foreign company that can attack an adverse court or agency action, without  
mention of TRIPS implication); MICHAEL GEIST, The Trouble With the TPP, Day 43: Eli Lilly is  
What Happens When ISDS Rules Go Wrong (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2016/03/ 
the-trouble-with-the-tpp-day-43-eli-lilly-is-what-happens-when-isds-rules-go-wrong/ [https:// 
perma.cc/CR8B-WJXC] (no mention of TRIPS at all); Yiki Noguchi, Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Provision on Trade Disputes Draws Criticism, NPR: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Oct. 27, 2015, 4:17 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/10/28/452608600/trans-pacific-partnership-provision-on-trade-
disputes-draws-criticism [https://perma.cc/G99K-GXAH] (mentioning the Eli Lilly investor-state 
dispute as a way to get around domestic law, with no mention of TRIPS implications); Ed Silverman, Eli 
Lilly v. Canada: The Patent War Moves to Washington, WALL ST. J., (Apr. 14, 2014, 4:00 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/04/14/eli-lilly-vs-canada-the-patent-war-moves-
to-washington/ [https://perma.cc/MC59-2ZQ7] (noting Eli Lilly alleges violation of TRIPS, but 
focusing more on corporate efforts against Canada through investor-state arbitration and Special 301). 
111. To be fair, the Declaration on Patent Sovereignty was drafted as part of a TRIPS 
anniversary. However, one of the key drafters remarked at the Irvine symposium that he appreciated 
learning about investor-state cases and thought they should be addressed in the next version of the 
Declaration. This view is likely typical of IP policymakers since there are other recommendations  
for countries to use TRIPS flexibilities since both the Philip Morris and Eli Lilly investment  
cases were filed that do not acknowledge this issue. E.g., CHAN PARK ET AL., supra note 8. Indeed,  
the 2016 discussion by the UN continues to recommend using TRIPS flexibilities. U.N. General 
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Eli Lilly investment dispute in two footnotes,112 the Report overall does not 
recognize how this dispute could have fundamentally compromised its overall 
suggestion that states embrace more TRIPS flexibilities.113 Even those that realize 
that investment disputes could impact TRIPS tend to focus on how TRIPS should 
be interpreted to avoid conflict, without considering whether this is likely given past 
practice of tribunals, such as the fact that decisions tend to favor investors and not 
consistently rely on standard interpretive principles for international law.114 
This is not entirely surprising since the investment and IP regimes not only 
developed independently of one another, but did not seem to overlap until recently. 
For example, although investment agreements have existed for decades, it was only 
relatively recently that investment agreements consistently listed IP as a type of 
 
Assembly, Human Rights Council, Access to Medicines in the Context of the Right of Everyone  
to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, 32d Sess.,  
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/32/L.23, ¶¶ 3–4 ( June 28, 2016) (calling upon states to implement  
TRIPS flexibilities); see also Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human  
Rights [OHCHR], Human Rights Council Suspends Thirty-Second Session After Adopting  
33 Resolutions and One Decision ( July 1, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20226&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/XUG2-RAC9] (noting adoption 
of proposal); Knowledge Ecology International, Human Rights Council Adopts Watershed Resolution on 
Access to Medicines ( July 1, 2016), http://keionline.org/node/2605 [https://perma.cc/YZD5-V5QN]. 
112. UN 2016 High Level Panel Report, supra note 8, at 19 (citing Eli Lilly dispute as an example 
of how trade agreements should not interfere with health policies, without clear recognition that it is 
investment chapters of trade agreements that are problematic); Id. at 25 (citing Eli Lilly investment 
dispute as an example of “undue political and economic pressure” against government action to protect 
public health). 
113. The initial charge of the panel did not formally include investor-state disputes. Id. at 3 
(noting charge to review and assess proposals and recommend solutions regarding policy incoherence 
among inventors, international human rights law, trade rules and public health, but not mentioning 
international investment laws). However, the report is nonetheless conscious of them. In particular, it 
does note that for pending and future agreements including investment provisions, governments should 
ensure that there are no provisions that “interfere” with the obligation to fulfill the right to health. Id. 
at 28. However, this seems to fundamentally fail to realize the serious impact that many existing 
agreements with investor provisions have on the realistic use of TRIPS flexibilities. 
114. See, e.g., Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights in Investor-State 
Arbitration: From Plain Packaging to Patent Revocation (University of Cambridge Faculty of Law  
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 52/2014, 2014) [hereinafter Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual 
Property Rights], http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463711 [https://perma.cc/ 
SS8W-6TQU] (suggesting that only the exception to indirect expropriation requires TRIPS 
interpretation); Susy Frankel, Interpreting the Overlap of International Investment and Intellectual Property 
Law, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 121 (2016) (arguing that if tribunals properly apply Vienna convention, they 
should reject Eli Lilly’s claims); Kathleen Liddell & Michael Waibel, Fair and Equitable Treatment and 
Judicial Patent Decisions, J. INT’L ECON. L. (2016) (arguing that investment tribunals should defer to 
domestic court decisions concerning patent laws and that investors have no legitimate expectation that 
patent law will remain static over time, such that there should not be a FET breach); Ruse-Khan, 
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 32 (assuming the only conflict is that a state elects not 
to use TRIPS flexibility, rather than that TRIPS flexibilities may be directly challenged by investment 
actions and concluding that pending investment claims are unlikely to succeed); Okediji, supra note 37, 
at 1135–36 (noting that investment claims may be “in tension” with IP norms but suggesting that they 
should be interpreted identically for parties to the WTO). 
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investment explicitly covered.115 Similarly, although the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Forum was designed to be the sole forum to adjudicate non-compliance of 
agreement such as TRIPS,116 it is completely silent about investor-state suits.117 
Considering that the potential for such suits existed decades before the WTO, this 
suggests that in the early 1990s when the WTO was negotiated, there was no serious 
contemplation of a conflict. This could partially be due to the fact that although 
agreements existed, few cases were brought.118 Even in the years since the IP 
investment claims have been brought, they are still not widely known or 
understood.119 
In addition, both the investment and IP arenas are fairly specialized with most 
individuals in one not traditionally familiar with the other. For example, investment 
agreements have traditionally focused on tangible assets, and although IP has been 
considered a valuable asset for decades, it has long been considered a “highly 
technical subject,” such that investment lawyers may not have focused on it.120 
Similarly, IP lawyers recognize that IP is a commercial asset, but do not generally 
focus on domestic or international commercial law, such that they do not focus on 
investment law. 
Of particular note, the few who see an overlap do not necessarily see, or focus 
on, the impending conflict. To companies and those that support corporations, or 
at least investment claims, the intersection of the two systems is generally viewed as 
 
115. For example, NAFTA, which was concluded in the mid-1990s, did not include intellectual 
property as a listed investment. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1139. Of course, explicitly listing 
intellectual property is not required since the Eli Lilly case is in fact brought under NAFTA. However, 
it is notable that this is the first IP case under NAFTA, even though companies could have asserted 
such claims earlier, thus suggesting that the utility of investment claims for IP was not contemplated 
earlier. 
116. E.g., PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE & WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 161 (3d ed. 2013). 
117. See generally DSU, supra note 4, art. 23 (noting that WTO members seeking redress of 
violation of WTO agreements, such as TRIPS, should comply with the DSU and not make their own 
determinations). 
118. Before TRIPS was concluded in 1994, there were only a few known cases filed, but since 
its conclusion, cases have increased exponentially. See Van Harten, Public Statement, supra note 72. 
119. For example, after I wrote a 2015 blog post on the Eli Lilly case and the potential for 
impacting TRIPS flexibilities, I received a number of emails from attorneys and academics who were 
previously unaware of the issue. See Cynthia M. Ho, Million Dollar Mistake? The Cost of Limiting or 
Canceling IP Rights, PATENTLYO (Mar. 29, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/million-
limiting-canceling.html [https://perma.cc/7SSB-E2R3]. 
120. E.g., Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics, supra note 33, at 27. 
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a positive,121 with little concern for interference with the WTO system.122 Some 
scholars who initially recognized the overlap may not have seriously considered this 
possibility,123 or assumed that an investment tribunal would necessarily apply WTO 
norms to avoid a conflict.124 One scholar of international economic law recognized 
that investment tribunals could interpret TRIPS provisions, but seemed to assume 
that arbitrators will apply TRIPS norms even when investment agreements do not 
have any language to support such an approach.125 A few early scholars who initially 
recognized a potential problem for TRIPS flexibilities mentioned it in passing 
without actual discussion of the depth of the problem, or how to address it.126 
 
121. E.g., Christopher S. Gibson, Latent Grounds in Investor-State Arbitration: Do International 
Investment Agreements Provide New Means to Enforce Intellectual Property Rights?, in YEARBOOK  
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2009–10 397, 423 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2010) 
(noting that investment claims provide benefits to companies over the WTO context); Peter  
B. Rutledge, TRIPS and BITs: An Essay on Compulsory Licenses, Expropriation, and International 
Arbitration, 13 N.C.J. L. & TECH. ONLINE 149, 152 (2012) (suggesting that arbitration could be  
used to address compulsory licenses); Baiju S. Vasani et. al, Treaty Protection for Global Patents:  
A Response to a Growing Problem for Multinational Pharmaceutical Companies, JONES  
DAY (Oct. 2012), http://www.jonesday.com/treaty_protection/ [https://perma.cc/6TSV-K4C9] 
(suggesting that alleged violation of TRIPS standards could be challenged through investment 
agreements and that this is preferable to the WTO system for pharmaceutical patents “under assault” 
in the developing world). 
122. For example, Gibson’s article notes the competing legal regimes but solely from the 
perspective of what an investor will prefer. He acknowledges that some suggest this is a radical 
departure from the WTO system but quickly dismisses this. In particular, he argues that each system 
has distinct claims and that the WTO rules could be relevant “context” for the investment claims, such 
that there is not necessarily a conflict. See Gibson, supra note 121, at 465–72. However, one scholar with 
familiarity of not only investment claims, but also the WTO system has expressed concern. See 
Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 899–00 (noting that it would be “dangerous” for an investment 
tribunal to interpret TRIPS given the limited record of tribunals attempting to interpret WTO law). 
123. E.g., Lahra Liberti, International Property Rights in International Investment Agreements: An 
Overview 13 (OECD Working Papers on International Investment, Working Paper No. 2010/1, 2010), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2010_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4WHR-P2ZT] (stating “one might wonder whether the ‘fair and equitable’ standard can be invoked in 
order to challenge national IPR laws consistent with the TRIPS agreement” without further exploring 
the possibility). 
124. E.g., Carlos M. Correa, Bilateral Investment Agreements: Agents of New Global Standards  
for the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights?, GRAIN (Aug. 2004), https://www.grain.org/ 
article/entries/125-bilateral-investment-agreements-agents-of-new-global-standards-for-the-protection-
of-intellectual-property-rights [https://perma.cc/6L4S-34EW] (suggesting that the WTO principle of 
differentiation versus discrimination is relevant to FET and also that the NAFTA exception for 
compulsory licenses should provide protection against indirect expropriation claims). 
125. See Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics, supra note 33 at 179–81; see also Vadi, Trade Mark 
Protection, supra note 91, at 796–800 (arguing that investment tribunals do consider prior arbitral awards 
as well as the other international courts). 
126. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Investment Agreements: A New Threat to Health and TRIPS 
Flexibilities?, BILATERALS.ORG ( June 27, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investment-agreements-a-
new-threat [https://perma.cc/3R56-8QLY] (stating that “systemic implications” of the Eli Lilly case 
for TRIPS flexibilities are very significant and that countries should be circumspect about signing more 
international agreements without providing other solutions); Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 914 
(lacking any details on the danger or how to address it despite noting potential danger); van Aaken, 
Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 11, at 115–17 (noting accurately that although the Doha 
Public Health Declaration considers relevant human rights law, there is no equivalent found in 
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This may be changing. In 2014, one essay recognized that Eli Lilly’s claim 
could have major implications for TRIPS flexibilities and although primarily arguing 
that the claims should be rejected, briefly considered possible reforms.127 A 2016 
article recognized that FET claims could impact TRIPS flexibilities and argued that 
there should be great deference to judicial decisions, such as Canada’s interpretation 
of the patentability requirement of utility.128 Similarly, another article argued that 
tribunals should either have no jurisdiction to hear disputes that implicate TRIPS, 
or at least follow Vienna Convention rules to interpret TRIPS to avoid conflicts.129 
However, it remains unclear whether a tribunal of commercial lawyers will accept 
these arguments given not only a narrow view of intellectual property rights that do 
not consider public policy, but also a general trend towards viewing intellectual 
property as solely an asset divorced from its policy foundations.130 Moreover, even 
the limited recognition of overlap between IP and investment agreements is far 
overshadowed by prominent defenses that dominate in both academic and 
mainstream discussions discussed in the next section. 
2. Prominent Defenses of Investor-State Disputes Do Not Recognize Conflict 
An important issue is that those who most robustly and frequently defend 
investor-state disputes fail to recognize any overlap, and their defenses do not 
address the pending collision course. Granted, some of these defenses could reflect 
mere rhetoric or positions that have since changed—especially since some recently 
concluded agreements or proposed agreements could arguably address some 
conflict with domestic regulatory space. However, even though drafters of recent 
agreements may recognize the need to modify investment disputes going forward, 
proposals thus far do not entirely eliminate TRIPS conflicts, as discussed in Part II. 
Moreover, they do not address conflicts under the majority of existing agreements. 
Accordingly, this Section focuses on three defenses that are often articulated in 
support of investment claims and its dispute system.131 This Section begins with 
sovereignty concerns. Then, the Section addresses the arguments that investment 
claims promote foreign direct investment and economically benefit the host 
country. Finally, the argument that investment-state disputes provide a fair process 
will be addressed. As will be explained, each of the “defenses” is questionable and 
even if generally true, inadequately addresses current and forthcoming IP conflicts. 
 
investment law, but only focusing on the TRIPS conflict for compulsory licensing). See generally 
VANHONNAEKER, supra note 33 (noting that investment claims can be read coherently with TRIPS by 
giving TRIPS priority, without noting that this is unlikely). 
127. Okediji, supra note 37. 
128. See Liddell & Waibel, supra note 114, passim. 
129. Frankel, supra note 114, at 1132–38. 
130. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How 
International Law Is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557 (2015); Yu, supra 
note 106. 
131. Although there are other defenses raised, these seem most relevant to the IP collision clash 
and how the defenses are not applicable. 
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a. ISDS Promotes Sovereignty Concerns and Regulatory Chill Are Overstated 
A central defense of investment claims that has great relevance to TRIPS 
flexibilities focuses on domestic sovereignty. There are two aspects to the 
sovereignty defense that will be addressed in this Section. First, defenders of 
investment claims assert that the ISDS system in fact promotes sovereignty and the 
rule of law—in direct opposition to the concern raised by critics that domestic 
regulatory authority is unduly impeded. Second, even when defenders acknowledge 
that the system might limit traditional domestic sovereignty, they either raise 
irrelevant issues or claim these concerns are overstated. As this Section will explain, 
neither of these related defenses of ISDS are well supported and, even if accurate, 
would fail to address the problem with TRIPS flexibilities. 
Some defenders of investment claims assert that agreements promote the rule 
of law by ensuring that U.S.-like legal protections exist in other countries as well. 
For example, the USTR has alleged that investment rules are designed to provide 
“no greater substantive rights to foreign investors than are afforded under the 
Constitution and U.S. law.”132 Similarly, a number of international law scholars have 
argued that these agreements provide rights similar to the U.S. Constitution.133 
Although there are similarities, the problem is that the investment claims actually 
go beyond domestic law, but without the usual democratic accountability. As 
explained earlier, investment tribunals often interpret claims more expansively than 
U.S. law. In addition, although never mentioned by defenders of investment claims, 
the rule of law typically requires clear rules that are equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated.134 Investment claims seem to lack these fundamental qualities since the 
investment “rules” giving rise to claims generally only apply to states, not investors, 
are inherently unclear, and adjudicated by private individuals with no job security. 
Even when defenders of investment claims attempt to address concerns about 
domestic sovereignty, they tend to raise issues that do not actually address domestic 
sovereignty, as will be explained.135 For example, some allege that states often 
win,136 that the United States has never “lost” a case,137 or that most challenged 
actions are not legislative.138 However, these facts do not mean that there is no 
 
132. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48. 
133. April 2015 Letter, supra note 62, at 1 (alleging rights similar to those guaranteed in the 
Constitution). 
134. E.g., Cutler, supra note 72, at 92–93. 
135. Some even suggest that international agreements are intended to limit domestic action in 
exchange for some benefit. E.g., Schwebel, supra note 79, at 1–2. 
136. E.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62 (claiming that states win more often than investors). 
137. E.g., ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48 (“Despite having 50 ISDS agreements in place, the 
United States has never lost a case and nothing in our agreements has inhibited our response.”). 
138. See CHRISTIAN TIETJE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF INVESTOR-STATE-DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
(ISDS) IN THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 92–93 (2014) (noting 
mostly administrative decisions impacting single investors); Jeremy Caddel & Nathan M. Jensen, Which 
Host Country Government Actors are Most Involved in Disputes with Foreign Investors (Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, Paper No. 120, 2014), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-120-Caddel-and-
Jensen-FINAL-WEBSITE-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKN4-9QLQ]. 
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impact on domestic decision making; roughly a third of filed investment claims 
result in settlements that typically favor investors and intrude on domestic 
sovereignty.139 In addition, domestic sovereignty includes far more than legislative 
activity; permitting private corporations to second-guess executive or even judicial 
decisions still raises concerns. The United States has also attempted to defend 
investment claims as consistent with regulatory autonomy because its agreements 
do not permit tribunals to overturn U.S. law and instead can only award monetary 
compensation.140 Although this is technically true,141 it does not actually address 
how nations are constrained: some international agreements permit investment 
tribunals to order injunctive relief that could in fact overturn domestic laws.142 
Limiting remedies to “only” monetary compensation is of little solace to countries 
when remedies can be tens or hundreds of millions of dollars and the average 
defense of even a successful suit costs almost $5 million,143 but has been up to $40 
million to simply assess jurisdiction.144 Given that the average loss is a significant 
sum of $16.6 million,145 with awards as high as $50 billion,146 a state may consider 
legitimate action to be too much of a gamble. This is of particular concern for 
developing countries that have been ordered to pay hundreds of millions or even 
over a billion dollars in damages.147 
 
139. E.g., UNCTAD, Recent Trends, supra note 16, at 1. 
140. See ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48. 
141. E.g., 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 46, art. 34; TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.28. 
142. For example, one tribunal ordered Ecuador to halt enforcement of an Ecuadorian 
appellate ruling that had previously ordered Chevron to pay for its contamination even before a final 
panel decision. E.g., Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23, First Interim 
Award on Interim Measures (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0173.pdf [https://perma.cc/LKT3-JRYS]; Ian Laird et al., 
International Investment Law and Arbitration: 2012 in Review, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY 2012–2013, at 203 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2014); see also Ankita 
Ritwik, Tobacco Packaging Arbitration and the State’s Ability to Legislate, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 523, 528–
32 (2013) (noting that Philip Morris’ attempt to enjoin Australia’s plain package law would be broader 
than most injunctive relief previously ordered by tribunals). Of course, even though not all agreements 
would permit injunctive relief, this possibility still poses a threat under some agreements. 
143. E.g., Matthew Hodgson, Counting the Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, GLOBAL 
ARBITRATION REVIEW (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
Counting_the_costs_of_investment_treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLE6-66TJ]. 
144. E.g., OECD, GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: A PROGRESS REPORT 8 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-
policy/ISDSprogressreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/28YG-UUQL]. 
145. E.g., Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Demystifying Investment Treaty Arbitration 4 
(2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author). 
146. See Glen Moody, Corporate Sovereignty Tribunal Makes $50 Billion Award Against Russia, 
TECHDIRT (Aug. 5, 2014, 12:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140801/ 
05242228082/corporate-sovereignty-tribunal-makes-50-billion-award-against-russia.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/JAX6-8VMV]. 
147. E.g., Pia Eberhardt, Investment Protection at a Crossroads: The TTIP and the Future of 
International Investment Law, 2014 FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG INT’L POL’Y ANALYSIS 7 (noting 
2012 award of $2.4 billion against Ecuador that is about three percent of the country’s GDP and  
roughly equal to its annual health budget); see also Claire Provost & Matt Kennard, The Obscure  
Legal System That Lets Corporations Sue Countries, THE GUARDIAN ( June 10, 2015, 1:00 AM), 
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Even when defenders of investment claims actually recognize that traditional 
domestic decisions could be impacted by investment claims, they argue that there is 
no cause for concern. These defenses focus on a few different issues. First, some 
assert that “bona fide” government acts will not result in liability.148 However, what 
one nation considers “bona fide” may not be to an investor; otherwise, there would 
be no outpouring of concern regarding investment claims. In addition, although 
most defenders of investment claims seem to recognize that the challenges to 
tobacco packaging laws are challenges to domestic sovereignty, they have asserted 
that because these cases are not “representative” of investment claims in general, 
there is no actual threat to sovereignty.149 
Defenders of investment claims tend to assume that there are no sovereignty 
concerns because of supposed lack of evidence of a chilling effect.150 For example, 
the United States claims this is true because of an alleged increase in public interest 
regulation after investment agreements.151 However, it does not mean that 
governments have not been hesitant to enact more regulation because of the 
existence of investment claims. Although it can be difficult to fully catalog chilling 
effects where there are likely nonpublic negotiations, there are nonetheless some 
examples.152 Countries have limited enforcement of environmental laws due to 
actual or threatened investment claims.153 In addition, countries have been hesitant 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corportations-sue-
states-ttip-icsid [https://perma.cc/YHR9-ENC4] (noting substantial awards against Ecuador and El 
Salvador). 
148. See, e.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62, at 2 (“[B]ona fide government acts will pass 
muster.”); ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48. One article makes a similar claim based on a selective case 
study of published environmental decisions; by focusing solely on environmental decisions, it 
completely omitted discussion of the pending Philip Morris case. See The Honorable Charles  
N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: Why It 
Need Not, and Must Not Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 689–99 (2014). 
Moreover, even focusing just in the environmental area, there now seems to be a contrary decision  
in which one of the arbitrators himself noted that the majority decision was an “intrusion into  
the environmental policy of the state.” Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Canada, Dissenting Opinion of  
Professor Donald McRae, Case N0. 2009-04, ¶ 49 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015), http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4213.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5LS-
4ZWH]. 
149. E.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62. 
150. Along somewhat similar lines, some scholars have suggested that domestic regulatory 
concerns are not supported based on an empirical evaluation of renegotiated and terminated investment 
agreements, although their evaluation notably excludes the most recent time period when such issues 
have been hotly contested. Tomer Broude et al., Legitimation Through Negotiation: Do States Seek More 
Regulatory Space In their BITs?, HEBREW U. OF JERUSALEM (Sept. 29, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2845297 [https://perma.cc/ED6Y-MVUQ]. 
151. ISDS Fact Sheet, supra note 48. 
152. Some commentators have noted that investors have used the ability to sue in ISDS as a 
lobbying tool, but that it is difficult to assess the full impact of the threat to sue since there may be no 
documented public record. Van Harten, Flawed Proposals, supra note 75, at 9–10; Poulsen, supra note 
67, at 29–31. 
153. For example, Indonesia has withdrawn a prior regulation on mining and granted an 
exception to one particular investor. Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human 
Rights Enforcement and Realization, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 73, 
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to enact plain package tobacco laws due to the threat of investor-state arbitration.154 
Well-developed countries are not immune either. For example, Canada has a history 
of acting cautiously in light of threat of suit for a range of regulatory activities, with 
one official asserting that many regulations “never saw the light of day.”155 In 
addition, Paraguay failed to enforce its own laws, citing a potential expropriation 
claim under an agreement with Germany, including one instance where the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights found Paraguay’s lack of action to violate human 
rights.156 
The arguments made in defense of investment claims as not unduly impinging 
on domestic sovereignty are particularly inapplicable to the conflict with TRIPS. 
The intersection of investment claims with IP involves not only domestic 
sovereignty, but the sanctity of an entirely separate international agreement and 
process. Even if the goal of every international agreement is to constrain domestic 
sovereignty, it is generally not a goal to constrain other international agreements.157 
There are a number of interpretive principles in international law that aim to 
minimize conflict between agreements by interpreting them to avoid 
 
100 (Olivier de Schutter ed., 2006); Ilge, supra note 16, at 11. Also, Peru has declined to enforce its 
environmental regulations against Renco even though the company had agreed to comply with the 
regulations when Renco bought its metal smelter, and Peru had already granted multiple extensions  
to comply. E.g., Renco Uses U.S.-Peru FTA to Evade Justice for La Oroya Pollution, PUB. CITIZEN  
(Dec. 2012), https://www.citizen.org/documents/renco-la-oroya-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U5KD-3SBA]; Lori Wallach, Brewing Storm Over ISDR Clouds: Trans-Pacific Partnership Talks—Part 
II, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 14, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/01/ 
14/brewing-storm-over-isdr-clouds-trans-pacific-partnership-talks-part-ii/ [https://perma.cc/5CG4-
B7GN]; see also Provost & Kennard, supra note 84 (regarding Guatemala’s decision not to challenge 
mining company Goldcorp for fear that it would result in an investment claim despite domestic protests 
and a recommendation from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). But see TIETJE ET 
AL., supra note 138, at 43–48 (suggesting that investor claims alone should not be considered the sole 
reason for domestic actions, and fear of domestic court actions, which can enjoin laws, may sometimes 
be more significant). 
154. E.g., Muchangi, supra note 81; Tavernise, supra note 81. 
155. William Greider, The Right and US Trade Law: Invalidating the 20th Century, NATION  
(Nov. 17, 2001), http://www.thenation.com/article/right-and-us-trade-law-invalidating-20th-century/ 
[https://perma.cc/9F7B-G983] (quoting former Canadian government official); see also Letter from 
Elizabeth May, Member of Parliament for Saanich-Gulf Islands to Trade Agreements and NAFTA 
Secretariat ( Jan. 29, 2013), http://elizabethmaymp.ca/submission-environmental-assessment-tpp 
[https://perma.cc/Q8EZ-37A4] (noting that as a result of investment cases,  
the Canadian government has failed to regulate or ban toxic substances it would have  
before investment suits were permissible); Barrie McKenna, Ottawa Could Face Lawsuits for Strict 
Corruption Rules, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report- 
on-business/international-business/ottawa-could-face-lawsuits-for-strict-trade-corruption-rules-
report/article21739211/ [https://perma.cc/2LZW-7GFZ] (Canadian Council of Chief Executive 
warning that new anti-corruption rules could prompt investor-state action if Canada proceeded.) In 
addition, New Zealand has delayed proceeding with plain packaging of tobacco. 
156. E.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 248 (Mar. 29, 2006); Ilge, supra note 16, at 12. 
157. See generally Stephen M. Schwebel, In Defense of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 31  
ARB. INT’L 181, 189 (2015) (noting that states can “specify their rights to regulate within their borders” 
without any mention of attempting to modify other international agreements). 
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inconsistency.158 However, these principles are of little help here. The conflict 
between investment agreements and TRIPS is unusual in that there is technically 
not a direct conflict with respect to whether nations can comply with both 
agreements, but there could be a conflict with how each system interprets TRIPS, 
as well as a conflict with the TRIPS flexibilities. 
b. Investment Claims Promote Investment and Economic Development 
Another common defense is that investment agreements are beneficial to 
countries in promoting foreign direct investment as well as economic development 
more generally.159 As noted earlier, such agreements originally were intended to 
promote these goals.160 However, how well they serve that function today, and 
whether any such benefits offset current concerns with broad interpretations that 
impact sovereignty, is a major issue. 
Defenders of the ISDS process contend that it promotes foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and economic development, such that it outweighs potential 
impingement on domestic discretion. For example, the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee to the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD) considers the ISDS process “indispensable” to protect 
investments and promote FDI,161 while the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies contends that such agreements facilitate economic growth and job 
creation.162 In fact, ISDS defenders often point to surveys indicating that some 
companies consider ISDS valuable,163 and to certain studies that suggest a 
correlation between investment agreements and FDI.164 Yet, these studies only find 
a weak correlation between ISDS and FDI.165 In addition, correlation is not 
 
158. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 332 cmt. f (A.L.I. 1987) 
(“[A]greements should be interpreted to avoid inconsistency if fairly possible. Agreements may not in 
fact be incompatible if the earlier can be given effect as regards a limited subject matter while the later 
agreement may be interpreted to govern other matters within its general scope.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D 
Treaties § 21 (2016) (“To the fullest extent possible, the language of a treaty is to be interpreted so as 
to avoid inconsistency.”). 
159. E.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 148, at 701–09. 
160. See supra Part I.B.1. 
161. Business & Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD [BIAC], Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement: An Indispensable Element of Investment Protection, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &  
DEV. 4 (2015). 
162. Scott Miller & Gregory Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality Check, CTR. FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 3 (2015), http://csis.org/publication/investor-state-dispute-settlement 
[https://perma.cc/59ZS-4KWS]. 
163. E.g., Brower & Blanchard, supra note 148, at 704–05. 
164. E.g., id. at 706–08; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, The Impact of 
International Investment Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment: An Overview of Empirical Studies  
1998-2014, at 4 [hereinafter UNCTAD, FDI Overview] (Working Paper, Sept. 2014), 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/unctad-web-diae-pcb-2014-Sep%2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5YHG-ZQ9C]. 
165. E.g., Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation 
Versus Causation (Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 2255, 2007), https://mpra.ub.uni-
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causation. For example, the correlation could reflect that countries that already had 
strong FDI sign agreements.166 In addition, other studies find little or no effect on 
FDI,167 or that investment claims are only relevant to some investors or some 
industries.168 Thus, the evidence is quite mixed.169 Some countries seem to recognize 
that any theoretical benefits are far outweighed by potential financial liability as well 
as sovereignty concerns. Specifically, countries have taken action to terminate 
investment agreements of which they were signatories or have indicated a lack of 
support for existing or potential agreements that permit investor-state suits.170 
Even if there were a strong correlation between the existence of an investment 
agreement and improved economic outcomes, such an argument is tenuous and 
mirrors a similar fallacy in the IP context. In the IP context, there are those who 
argue that, since stronger IP rights correlate with foreign direct investment, stronger 
IP rights should be encouraged.171 However, both arguments ignore the 
fundamental fact in any statistical analysis that correlation does not establish 
causation. In either context, there are always a wealth of factors that impact whether 
a foreign company will invest in any given country;172 this is something the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recently 
underscored in noting that investment agreements play a complementary role 
 
muenchen.de/2255/1/MPRA_paper_2255.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U4U-4V8Z] (finding lack of 
strong correlation between investment treaties and investment flows and noting that evidence is mixed). 
166. UNCTAD, FDI Overview, supra note 164, at 5. 
167. Id. at 5–6; see also Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign 
Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (suggesting no 
meaningful correlation). 
168. Roderick Abbott et al., Demystifying Investor-State Dispute Settlement ( ISDS), (ECIPE 
Occasional Paper No. 5/2014, 2014). 
169. See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS (Karl  
P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009) (providing differing views on this issue); Todd Allee & Clint 
Peinhardt, Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment, 
65 INT’L ORG. 401 (2011) (noting that foreign direct investment only increases in countries where there 
are no investment claims). 
170. E.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, International Investment Policy Making 
in Transition: Challenges and Opportunities of Treaty Renewal, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ 
DIAE/PCB/2013/9 ( June 2013); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Denunciation of the 
ICSID Convention and BITS: Impact on Investor-State Claims, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ 
DIAE/IA/2010/6 (Dec. 2010). 
171. E.g., Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual 
Property Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 241, 248–49 (1998); see also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 621, 638 n.163 (1998) (stating that “[i]n general, strong intellectual 
property protection is correlated with the attraction of foreign direct investment.”). 
172. Studies indicate other factors such as tax incentives, infrastructure, and skill are more 
relevant. E.g., Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Relationship Between Intellectual Property  
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 163 (1998); Claudio R. Frischtak, 
Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68, 103–05 (Wallerstein et 
al. eds., 1993); Jeong-Yeon Lee & Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection and U.S. Foreign 
Direct Investment, 78 REV. ECON. & STAT. 181, 181–85 (1996). 
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among a number of determinants and that there are many data limitations.173 Thus, 
not every causative relationship has been (and perhaps never will be) explored and 
exhausted, and in fact, there are strong counter-examples in both the investment 
and IP contexts. For example, Brazil enjoys strong foreign direct investment despite 
the fact that it thus far has not agreed to investor-state arbitration.174 Similarly, Brazil 
and India enjoy strong foreign investments even though their IP laws have been 
noted as inadequate.175 
The claim that investment agreements are beneficial in promoting investment 
seems particularly unsupported in the IP context. After all, “investment” in creating 
IP is different from tangible investments such as real property that were traditionally 
envisioned by such agreements. Whereas tangible investments clearly benefit the 
host states, stronger IP more likely benefits the foreign private company, but results 
in higher prices in the host state.176 Importantly, even if investment agreements 
theoretically promoted investment, that does not address the conflict with IP 
flexibility under TRIPS. Moreover, the pending conflict is particularly problematic 
given that investment claims that impact TRIPS are considered in a process that 
lacks the type of protections available in the WTO, even though defenders of the 
system assert the system is fair.177 
 
173. UNCTAD, FDI Overview, supra note 164, at 4, 6, 8. 
174. E.g., Fabio Morosini & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The Brazilian Agreement on 
Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (ACFI): A New Formula for International Investment  
Agreements?, INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/ 
itn/2015/08/04/the-brazilian-agreement-on-cooperation-and-facilitation-of-investments-acfi-a-new-
formula-for-international-investment-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/BSV7-TEYY]; see also Pedro 
Martini, Brazil’s New Investment Treaties: Outside Looking . . . Out?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG ( June 16, 
2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/06/16/brazils-new-investment-treaties-outside-
looking-out-2/ [https://perma.cc/Z8PC-6Q7Q]. 
175. For example, India had $1 billion in foreign direct investment in three months in 2013 
despite controversial patent laws. India Receives Highest FDI Worth $1 Billion in Pharma in April-June, 
ECON. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013, 12:15 PM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-09-
01/news/41663407_1_pharmaceuticals-sector-highest-fdi-fdi-policy [https://perma.cc/BB8X-LS6E]. 
Similarly, Brazil and Thailand received substantial investment in the 1970s and 1980s  
despite relatively low levels of protection. Compare Edwin Mansfield, Int’l Fin. Corp, Intellectual Property 
Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer 10 (1994), http:// 
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/888591468739296453/pdf/multi-page.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/HUU8-ZX8Q] (discussing perceived weak intellectual property protections in Brazil and 
Thailand), with Lawrence Bouton & Mariusz Sumlinski, Int’l Fin. Corp., Trends in Private Investment in 
Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970–1998, at 8 (Working Paper No. 41, 2000), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13986/multi0page.pdf?sequence=
1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/4ZVG-TU4D] (providing comprehensive statistics of private 
investment in Brazil and Thailand). 
176. For example, when an investor purchases a plant, that usually involves hiring local 
employees, thus benefitting the host country. By contrast, when an investor has IP in a host country, 
such as a patent or a trademark, there may be little actual investment in the host country besides 
purchasing advertising. Moreover, IP is known to raise costs. 
177. For example, there is an appellate body at the WTO. See DSU, supra note 4, art. 17. 
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c. Investor-State Disputes as a Fair Process with Procedural Protection 
The final major defense of investment claims is that they should not pose any 
serious concern since the process has procedural protections.178 Defenders suggest 
that investment proceedings mimic traditional U.S. litigation where there is legal 
representation with multiple rounds of briefs and hearings, as well as the right to 
review and even annul awards.179 However, once again, the opportunity to “review” 
awards is typically based on narrow grounds with no appellate review. Also, the 
multiple rounds of briefs and hearings need not be publicly disclosed and interested 
parties may not be able to participate in direct contravention of U.S. litigation.180 
Moreover, although defenders have asserted that there is no concern about 
arbitrator bias since there is process to challenge bias, arbitrators in the current 
system inherently lack independence of an actual judiciary with procedural 
protections.181 
Most importantly, this purported defense is irrelevant to investment claims 
premised on IP issues that arguably violate TRIPS. There is already a fair and 
independent process to address such issues before the WTO.182 Unlike the situation 
with investor-arbitration claims, there is no criticism of WTO adjudication as being 
partial; in fact, a recent study suggests that the WTO system of adjudication results 
in better results than the traditional investor-state disputes before private arbitrators 
appointed by parties.183 In addition, although investment claims were created to 
 
178. See e.g., April 2015 Letter, supra note 62. 
179. Id. 
180. In response to criticisms, transparency has increased. For example, The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ratified rules to promote transparency for 
treaties using UNCITRAL arbitration after 2014. See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL  
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/68/17 (2013). 
However, these rules do not automatically apply to more than 3000 existing agreements. To this end, 
the UN General Assembly ratified the Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration to allow parties that entered into agreements before 2014 to more easily opt into these rules. 
See Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency in Treaty- 
based Investor-State Arbitration, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/69/496 (2014). But, parties that entered  
into agreements after 2014 can opt out of the default transparency. See id. at art. 1; see also  
LISE JOHNSON & NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER, NEW UNCITRAL ARBITRATION  
RULES ON TRANSPARENCY: APPLICATION, CONTENT AND NEXT STEPS 26 (2013), http:// 
ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/04/UNCITRAL_Rules_on_Transparency_commentary_FINAL1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FX7S-JNPQ]. 
181. See March 2015 Letter, supra note 83. 
182. The stability of the WTO process is underscored by the recent proposal for  
an investment court and appellate body based on the WTO system. See Commission Concept Paper  
on Investment in TTIP and Beyond—The Path for Reform 9 (May 5, 2015), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF [https://perma.cc/SZF4-
CVUW]; see also Joost Pauwelyn, Why the US Should Support the EU Proposal for an “Investment Court 
System,” LINKEDIN (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-us-should-support-eu-
proposal-investment-court-system-pauwelyn?forceNoSplash=true [https://perma.cc/ 
65BL-RXML]. 
183. See generally Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? Why Investment 
Arbitrators are from Mars and Trade Adjudicators are from Venus (Oct. 1, 2015), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2549050 (discussing the differences between WTO and 
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avoid domestic volatility and gunboat diplomacy,184 given the lack of any investment 
cases involving IP until recent years, the “need” for investment claims to protect IP 
seems particularly unfounded. 
Recently concluded or proposed agreements that aim to improve procedural 
protections still fail to adequately address TRIPS conflicts. For example, even recent 
agreements with a more independent initial investment tribunal and appellate review 
still fail to address the conflicts with TRIPS norms. In particular, while these 
measures might promote independence, they do not ensure TRIPS norms will be 
safeguarded. In addition, although both the TPP and EU proposal for the TTIP 
aim to prevent forum shopping,185 they would not completely address a conflict 
with TRIPS. The EU proposes to bar investment claims that have already been 
submitted to another international tribunal, but only if it is concerning the “same 
treatment.”186 Since investment claims provide different relief than TRIPS, this may 
be inadequate to prevent simultaneous adjudication in the WTO and investment 
arenas. Moreover, even if “same treatment” were interpreted to be simply same 
fundamental facts, the EU Proposal would not prevent a WTO case being litigated 
after the investment one and resulting in conflicting interpretations of TRIPS. The 
TPP does require investors to waive the right to initiate or proceed with another 
dispute settlement procedure regarding the same issue.187 So, this would 
theoretically prevent a subsequent WTO panel coming to a conflicting 
interpretation of TRIPS. However, this does nothing to stop a tribunal from 
interpreting TRIPS provisions in the first instance, let alone inconsistently with 
prior WTO decisions and/or accepted norms, even if not embodied in an actual 
WTO panel decision. CETA also aims to address conflicts by noting that an 
investment tribunal shall stay its proceedings, but again does not address possible 
TRIPS issues. After all, it only requires the investment tribunal to stay its 
proceedings where there is potential for overlapping compensation—which is never 
the goal of a WTO claim, or another international claim that could have a significant 
impact on the investment dispute.188 This provision would still not have stopped 
the Eli Lilly dispute where there is no parallel proceeding in the WTO and does 
nothing to prevent inconsistency with WTO norms. 
 
ICSID adjudicators as the basis in fact for disparate outcomes between WTO and ICSID adjudication 
systems). 
184. See supra Part I.B.1. 
185. E.g., European Commission Press Release IP/15/5651, Commission Proposes New 
Investment Court System for TTIP and Other EU Trade and Investment Negotiations  
(Sept 16, 2015); European Commission: Fact Sheet on Investment Protection in the TTIP, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153018.5%20Inv%20Prot%20and%20I
SDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/M28J-ZJ75]. 
186. See TTIP, supra note 95, art. 14, ¶¶ 2–3. 
187. TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.20(2)(b). 
188. CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.24. 
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II. THE CURRENT COLLISION COURSE 
This Part aims to explain how investor-state disputes based on IP issues 
governed by other agreements raise unique conflicts that are not adequately 
recognized. This Part begins by discussing the first investor-state cases involving 
alleged violations of TRIPS. Then, this Part provides an overview of potential 
situations in which investor-state cases could present serious challenges to TRIPS 
flexibilities. 
A. Initial Investment Cases Challenging TRIPS 
This Section addresses the first investment cases that directly challenge 
intellectual property norms under TRIPS. Notably, these cases involve not only 
TRIPS patent rights, but also trademark rights. Although the Declaration of Patent 
Sovereignty focuses on patents, domestic discretion that may impinge on 
trademarks is consistent with the idea of TRIPS flexibilities. As this Section explains, 
although a direct collision of TRIPS flexibilities has thus far been averted with 
regard to domestic regulations on tobacco that impact trademark rights, a future 
collision is possible. Although Part III discusses how to minimize collisions and 
recognizes that some recent agreements have promising language to do so, these 
initial cases are likely more representative of likely collisions under the vast majority 
of investment agreements that lack the new language. 
1. Philip Morris 
Philip Morris189 brought investment disputes regarding tobacco regulation 
against Uruguay190 and Australia.191 Although both countries have regulated 
tobacco for decades, they have also been on the forefront of implementing the 2003 
World Health Organization’s Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.192 The 
 
189. For the purposes of this section, any reference to the multinational company Philip Morris 
includes all related entities in the case.  
190. P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1.  
191. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 1.1. 
192. WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION (WHO) (2003) [hereinafter WHO FCTC]. See generally Josef Ostransky,  
Tobacco Investment Disputes—Public Policy, Fragmentation of International Law and Echoes of  
the Calvo Doctrine, 3 CZECH Y.B. INT’L L. 161, 164–65 (2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2164726 (noting that Uruguay and Australia are pioneers at combatting 
tobacco consumption and Uruguay was one of the first countries to ratify the FCTC). In addition,  
some have suggested that Philip Morris intentionally chose Uruguay because it is a country with 
reasonable damages, yet limited resources, to defend against an investment claim. See Todd Weiler, 
Philip Morris v. Uruguay: An Analysis of Tobacco Control Measures in the Context of International 
Investment Law 17 nn. 54, 36 (Physicians for a Smoke-Free Can., Report #1, 2010), 
http://www.smoke-free.ca/eng_home/2010/pmivsuruguay/opinion-pmi-uruguay.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/34HS-JXXL] (noting that while the market in Mauritius was too small for damages to be 
worthwhile, the market in Mexico was larger and established enough to better respond to investment 
claims such that Uruguay is chosen to “make an example”). Notably, Philip Morris is seeking  
$25 million in damages against Uruguay, a country that has a domestic GDP that is roughly half  
of Philip Morris’ annual revenue. See Duff Wilson, Cigarette Giants in Global Fight on Tighter Rules, 
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Framework Convention does not expressly require any bars to trademarks, although 
the guidelines for implementation do suggest limiting trademarks.193 These 
investment disputes were brought after failed attempts to enjoin the laws 
domestically.194  
a. Factual Context 
Although both Uruguay and Australia regulated tobacco packaging in a 
manner that impacted trademark rights, their regulations differed. Uruguay’s 
regulations were less onerous on trademark rights; it only required that each brand 
have a single variation and required health warnings on 80% of the package.195 
Australia, on the other hand, required cigarettes to be packaged in “drab dark 
brown” and severely restricted the use of trademarks to essentially just the brand 
name with no trademarked logos.196 In both cases, Philip Morris claimed that its 
trademarks were expropriated and that it was denied fair and equitable treatment, 
with the FET claim based in part on alleged failure to comply with international 
obligations, under TRIPS and the Paris Convention.197 The TRIPS claims were 
contrary to the views of most academics, as well as the World Intellectual Property 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, at A1; Jim Armitage, Big Tobacco Puts Companies on Trial, INDEPENDENT, 
(Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/big-
tobacco-puts-countries-on-trial-as-concerns-over-ttip-deals-mount-9807478.html 
[https://perma.cc/2B8S-QGHU]. 
193. See WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Elaboration of Guidelines for 
Implementation of Article 13 of the Convention, ¶¶ 15, 16, FCTC/COP/3/9 (Sept. 2, 2008); WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Elaboration of Guidelines for Implementation of Article 11 
of the Convention, ¶ 46, FCTC/COP/3/7 (Aug. 21, 2008); WHO FCTC, supra note 192. 
194. See, e.g., British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v Commonwealth, Order, [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 
3 (Austl.), http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2012/HCA/43 [https://perma.cc/56CA-
KE3S] (entering judgment on behalf of Australia that its tobacco packaging law did not deprive 
company investment); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth, Order, [2012] HCA 43, ¶ 3 (Austl.), 
http://eresources.hcourt.gov.au/downloadPdf/2012/HCA/43 [https://perma.cc/BS8Z-K66C] 
(entering judgment on behalf of Australia that its tobacco packaging law did not deprive company 
investment); P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 30–31. Technically, Philip Morris 
was the intervener in the Australia case. See British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd v Commonwealth, Philip 
Morris Ltd’s Submissions (Intervening) , (2011) HCA 43, ¶ 2, http://www.hcourt.gov.au/ 
assets/cases/s389-2012/BAT_Phillip.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BKH-NPRJ] (entering as an 
intervener). 
195. Uruguay only mandated that each brand of tobacco products has a single presentation to 
prohibit labeling cigarettes as “light” or “ultralight” and required health warnings on 80% of the 
package. P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 24–25. 
196. See Tobacco Plain Packaging Act 2011 (Cth) ss 19 20 (Austl.). This law prohibits trademarks 
from appearing on the package other than as permitted in Article 20(3), which only allows the brand 
name for the tobacco products. See id. s 20. 
197. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6.6–6.12 (alleging Australia’s 
breach of international agreements), ¶ 7.2(a)–(b) (alleging P.M.’s deprivation of investment in Australia), 
¶ 7.7 (referring to violation of international law for FET claim); P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, 
supra note 1, para 85. While Philip Morris also made other allegations, only these claims have been 
highlighted to allow for comparison with the Eli Lilly case. 
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Office.198 
After the 2011 investment claim against Australia was initiated, Ukraine, likely 
acting in conjunction with Philip Morris, initiated a WTO dispute against Australia 
regarding the same plain package tobacco laws that allegedly violate TRIPS.199 
Other countries, including Indonesia, Cuba, Honduras, and the Dominican 
Republic subsequently joined the consultation, and the WTO set up a panel to hear 
a consolidated case.200 This was a high profile WTO case with many third party 
observers that seemed on a direct collision course with an investment tribunal 
interpretation of the same TRIPS provisions.201 
A complete collision is presently averted since the Australian tribunal 
dismissed the investment case on jurisdictional grounds202 and a majority of the 
Uruguay tribunal found in favor of Uruguay.203 The Australian tribunal agreed to 
 
198. E.g., PHYSICIANS FOR A SMOKE-FREE CANADA, supra note 107, at 16–19 (WIPO 
Comments); Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests, and Justifiability: 
Art 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 505 (2014); see also infra notes 
234, 241 and accompanying text (providing views of additional academics on proper interpretation of 
TRIPS article 15 and article 20). But see Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, Plain Packaging and the 
Interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1149 (2013). Intellectual Property 
attorneys, however, were more sympathetic. E.g., Carmela R. Zocco, Plain Packaging: A Growing Threat 
to Trademark Rights, LES NOUVELLES, June 2013, at 140, 141 (noting that numerous intellectual 
property rights groups have condemned plain packaging as an “unjustified attack” on rights); Stephen 
Stern & Olivia Draudins, Generic Packaging: A Bridge (Over the Bodies of IP Rights) Too Far?, AUSTL. 
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 146, 149 (2011) (arguing that TRIPS article 20 bars total ban on trademark use 
even if not explicitly stated). 
199. Request for Consultations by Ukraine, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning 
Trademarks and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS434/1 (March 15, 2012). Indeed, Philip Morris is financing legal costs of two countries 
in the WTO challenge. E.g., Stephanie Nebehay, Australia Says Big Tobacco Aiding WTO Challenges, 
REUTERS (May 23, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/23/us-trade-tobacco-
idUSBRE84M0IO20120523 [https://perma.cc/VV4K-2JAM]; Myron Levin, As Nations Try to Snuff 
Out Smoking, Cigarette Makers Use Trade Treaties to Fire UP Legal Challenges, FAIR WARNING (Nov. 
29, 2012), http://www.fairwarning.org/2012/11/as-nations-try-to-snuff-out-smoking-cigarette-
makers-use-trade-treaties-to-fire-up-legal-challenges/ [https://perma.cc/4VHL-834R]. 
200. Dispute Settlement, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks, Geographical 
Indications and Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Packaging, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS458/16 (May 5, 2014); see also Brief: Panel Appointed for WTO Mega-Case on Australia 
Tobacco Packaging, IP-WATCH (May 6, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/ 
06/panel-appointed-for-wto-mega-case-on-australia-tobacco-packaging/ [https://perma.cc/5J7X-
L5QR]. 
201. E.g, Dispute Settlement, Australia—Certain Measures Concerning Trademarks and  
Other Plain Packaging Requirements Applicable to Tobacco Products and Other Packaging, WTO  
Doc. WT/DS434/13 (May 5, 2014) [hereinafter WTO, Australia Dispute Settlement]. 
202. P.M. v. Austl., Award, supra note 75; see also Jarrod Hepburn & Luke Eric  
Peterson, Australia Prevails in Arbitration with Philip Morris over Tobacco Plain Packaging Dispute,  
INV. ARB. REP. (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevails- 
in-arbitration-with-philip-morris-over-tobacco-plain-packaging-dispute/ [https://perma.cc/6HLA-
C7JT]. However, the tobacco industry could easily bring another dispute since it has aggressively  
fought tobacco restrictions. E.g., Sergio Puig, Tobacco Litigation in International Courts, 57 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 384 (2016). 
203. Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award ( July 8, 2016) [hereinafter P.M. 
v. Uru., Award]. 
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dismiss the Philip Morris claim after finding that the company had improperly 
restructured itself to become a “foreign” corporation after Australia announced its 
plans to enact plain packaging, such that there was no jurisdiction.204 However, the 
tribunal’s failure to address Australia’s other challenge to jurisdiction leaves open an 
important question for future collisions. In particular, Australia had argued that the 
investment tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide any issues under TRIPS given the 
existence of a separate dispute settlement mechanism for such claims with which 
the investment tribunal ruling could potentially conflict.205 Uruguay did not raise 
this issue, even though it was facing an alleged violation of TRIPS and challenged 
jurisdiction on other grounds.206 Accordingly, it remains to be seen whether 
collisions in the future can be averted based on the defense that there is no 
jurisdiction at all. 
Although the WTO panel is reported to have ruled in favor of Australia on 
the plain package case as this article goes to press, the panel report is not expected 
until July and investment claims against countries that enact similar packaging rules 
are possible.207 Countries have shown clear interest in such laws and some have 
been enacting them even before the conclusion of the investment cases, let alone 
the WTO panel ruling.208 At the same time, the tobacco industry continues to 
vigorously contest such regulation.209 Immediately after the conclusion of the 
 
204. Id. ¶¶ 460, 584; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth, Australia’s Response to Notice 
of Arbitration, PCA Case No. 2012-12, ¶¶ 29–32 (BIT/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 21 2011) 
[hereinafter Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration]. 
205. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 33–35. 
206. See generally Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case  
No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013) [hereinafter P.M. v. Uru., Decision on 
Jurisdiction]; P.M. v. Uru., Request for Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 86 (asserting violation of unstated 
provisions of TRIPS). 
207. E.g., Tobacco Industry Suffers Defeat as WTO Upholds Australia's Plain Packaging Laws 
GUARDIAN (May 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global/2017/may/05/australias-defeats-
wto-challenge-to-plain-packaging-of-tobacco. 
208. Countries that have already enacted plain packaging laws so far include UK, Ireland, and 
France. Children and Families Act 2014, c. 6 (Eng.); Public Health (Standardized Packaging of 
Tobacco) Bill 2014 (Bill No. 54/2014) (Ir.); Ordonnance no..2016-623 du 19 mai 2016 portant 
transposition de la directive 2014/40/UE sur la fabrication, la présentation et la vente des produits du 
tabac et des produits connexes [Ordinance No 2016-623 of May 19, 2016 transposing Directive 
2014/40/EU on the manufacture, presentation, and sale of tobacco and related products],  
Journal Officiel de la République Francaise [ J.O] [Official Gazette of France], May 20, 2016.  
In addition, other countries are considering such laws. E.g., Canadian Cancer Society,  
Plain Packaging—International Overview, ACTION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (May 19, 2016), 
http://ash.org.uk/information-and-resources/packaging-labelling-information-and-resources/ 
standardised-plain-packaging/plain-packaging-an-international-overview/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4VXC-FDQB]; World Health Organization [WHO], World No Tobacco Day 2016: Get Ready for Plain 
Packaging (May 31, 2016), http://www.who.int/campaigns/no-tobacco-day/2016/event/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/PX9C-FMW9]. 
209. For example, Britain’s recent plain package laws have been challenged in British courts. 
E.g., David Jolly, Tobacco Giants Sue Britain over Plain Packaging, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/23/business/international/tobacco-plain-packaging-philip-
morris-british-american-cigarettes.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TJ5A-VCTX]. 
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Uruguay case, Philip Morris issued a press statement that it was not a party to any 
investment disputes and that it would use “thoughtful diplomacy,” that suggests it 
will not assert investment claims—but could still threaten to do so.210 Countries 
faced with such a threat should realize that although Uruguay prevailed, it was not 
a unanimous opinion and future tribunals need not follow the majority opinion. 
Also, even if no future investment claims are actually asserted based on plain 
packaging, examining how a conflict was narrowly avoided is helpful to not only 
show the inherent conflict between the IP and investment regimes, but also to show 
why the Eli Lilly case posed a much more serious, yet not well understood threat 
to TRIPS flexibility. 
b. Investment Claims 
This Section evaluates the extent to which tobacco regulation, such as plain 
package tobacco laws, might result in liability for expropriation and then FET 
claims. Although plain package tobacco laws such as Australia’s are recommended 
by the WHO, there was no decision on the merits in that case. As noted below, 
although the expropriation claim failed against Uruguay, another case might not find 
similarly. Moreover, even though a majority of the tribunal in Uruguay agreed that 
there was no FET claim, the lack of a consensus indicates vulnerability to FET 
claims. Although it is of course possible for an investment tribunal to read other 
international agreements harmoniously, as some have suggested,211 that does not 
mean that there is no vulnerability—especially given structural elements of 
investment agreements and how they are adjudicated that tilt more towards interests 
of investors, rather than public health.212 
i. Vulnerability to Expropriation Claims 
Philip Morris alleged that domestic laws limiting the use of some trademarks 
constitute an expropriation of its investments in trademarks.213 Essentially, it 
 
210. Philip Morris International Comments on Tribunal’s Decision in Arbitration Between 
PMI and Uruguay, BUS. WIRE ( July 8, 2016), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/ 
20160708005828/en/Philip-Morris-International-Comments-Tribunal%E2%80%99s-Decision-
Arbitration [https://perma.cc/3S4Z-PABA]. 
211. E.g., Harold Koh, Global Tobacco Control as a Health and Human Rights Imperative, 57 
HARV. L. REV. 433, 444 (2016) (arguing that since the Tobacco Convention was later in time and more 
specific, it should prevail under rules of treaty interpretation in the context of how a WTO panel should 
rule, although the same principle should apply to an investment dispute). 
212. Not only do most investment agreements aside from the newest agreements not have 
balancing language concerning other policies beyond promoting investments, but they are also 
interpreted by a small group of primarily commercial arbitrators that would seem likely to be more 
sympathetic to commercial interests, especially since there are a number of arbitrators that also act as 
counsel or party experts in other cases. E.g., Sergio Puig, Blinding International Justice, 56 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 46 (2016); David Graukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping 
Paper for the Investment Policy Community, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 44 
(2012) (majority of arbitrators have served as counsel for investors in other cases whereas only ten 
percent of arbitrators have acted as counsel for states in other cases). 
213. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1 ¶¶ 7.3-7.5; P.M. v. Uru., Request for 
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asserted that the regulations create “substantial interference” with use of its 
trademarks and significant losses, such that its trademarks were expropriated.214 
Importantly, although the Australian court previously rejected a similar claim under 
domestic law, that does not preclude an expropriation claim which is often 
interpreted more broadly.215 In some cases, tribunals have found expropriation to 
exist if there is substantial interference with the investment, regardless of whether 
there is a strong policy ground.216 
Although the Uruguay tribunal rejected Philip Morris’s assertion that there is 
inadequate justification for its tobacco regulations and found no expropriation 
consistent with some recent decisions, another investment dispute against a country 
for tobacco regulation could have a different outcome.217 Uruguay was fortunate to 
not only have financial support to battle Philip Morris’s claim,218 but a tribunal that 
was willing to accept and actually rely on supportive amicus submissions.219 Neither 
of these factors is typical of most investment cases. Indeed, commentators have 
noted that Philip Morris brought its investment claim against Uruguay to threaten 
other countries and likely was not anticipating that Uruguay would receive financial 
support to defend itself.220 
The details of the Uruguay tribunal finding, even if not binding on future 
tribunals, are of interest. Most notably with regard to TRIPS collisions, the tribunal 
concluded that there is no absolute right to use trademarks pursuant to TRIPS 
Article 20.221 Even though this is consistent with many academic commentators and 
the WHO position, this does not guarantee a similar finding in a future case—
especially since not all commentators agree with this position. In addition, the 
tribunal found that the Uruguay regulation mandating that trademarks be limited to 
twenty percent of the packages was not an expropriation since it did not limit how 
the trademarks were used.222 However, in plain package regulation, such as 
 
Arbitration, supra note 1, at ¶ 82. 
214. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.3; see also P.M. v. Uru., Request for 
Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 48, 82 (arguing that regulations deprived trademarks of commercial value 
and that mandatory discontinuation of trademarks constituted expropriation). 
215. See, e.g., Been & Beauvais, supra note 50. 
216. E.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, supra note 71; see also Newcomb, The 
Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, FOREIGN INV. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005). 
217. E.g., Ursula Kriebaum, Expropriation, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 38–41 
(Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 2015). 
218. E.g., Tobacco Industry Targets Uruguay’s Gold Standard Anti-Tobacco Laws, MIKE 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.mikebloomberg.com/news/tobacco-industry-targets-
uruguays-gold-standard-anti-tobacco-laws/ [https://perma.cc/U6UX-BAFP] (indicating intent to 
support Uruguay government). 
219. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶¶ 38, 43. 
220. E.g., Tavernise, supra note 81 (noting that Uruguay would have had to settle if the 
Bloomberg Foundation had not intervened to provide financial support). 
221. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 262 (“[N]owhere does the TRIPS  
Agreement . . . provide for a right to use.”); see also id. ¶ 269 (noting “no absolute right to use” 
trademarks, especially for an industry that is often subject to regulation). 
222. Id. ¶ 276. 
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Australia’s, the use of trademarks are in fact limited when a company is barred from 
using logos at all. Accordingly, a country that adopts plain package regulations is 
still vulnerable to losing an expropriation claim even if a future tribunal were to 
follow the majority of the Uruguay tribunal’s reasoning. In addition, although the 
tribunal rejected the expropriation claim against Uruguay that limited companies to 
one brand variant within a family, this is not typical of most tobacco regulations, 
such that it is likely not directly applicable to other regulations.223 However, the 
tribunal did characterize this regulation of tobacco as within police power of a 
nation, such that there would be no compensable expropriation, even if there were 
economic injury.224 In particular, the tribunal noted that the regulations were 
consistent with Uruguay’s domestic obligation under the Constitution to legislate in 
the interest of public health, as well as comply with the FCTC, and the regulation 
was proportionate to the intended objective, citing the amicus briefs of the WHO 
and PAHO.225 Thus, even though Uruguay’s law is not typical of most plain package 
laws, the rationale in support of Uruguay’s law would seem helpful to countries with 
plain package tobacco laws if a future tribunal agrees. However, not only does a 
tribunal not need to follow this reasoning, but countries could still be hesitant to 
enact domestic regulation to avoid an investment dispute.226 
ii. FET Claims Can Prevail Against Tobacco Regulation 
FET claims regarding plain package tobacco laws are even more problematic 
than expropriation claims with regard to TRIPS flexibilities. In particular, a country 
could have TRIPS-consistent laws according to a WTO panel, yet nonetheless be 
liable for millions of dollars if an investment tribunal is sympathetic to the claim 
that FET can be based on a “legitimate expectation” of TRIPS compliance that is 
consistent with corporate interpretation of TRIPS.227 Although Philip Morris made 
this claim in its dispute against Australia, there was no decision on the merits since 
that dispute was dismissed. In the Uruguay case, Philip Morris did argue a legitimate 
expectation—but only that the laws would remain stable, and not based on TRIPS 
compliance. So, even though a majority of the Uruguay tribunal ruled in favor of 
Uruguay, there is still no decision on whether a company has a legitimate 
expectation of TRIPS compliance. The Uruguay tribunal suggested that legitimate 
expectations should be based on specific representations.228 However, other 
 
223. In addition, the tribunal found inadequate expropriation based on evaluating the business 
as a whole which did not suffer losses. Id. ¶¶ 283–84. 
224. Id. ¶¶ 291–307. 
225. Id. ¶¶ 301–06. 
226. Id. (noting countries that have declined to enact plain package tobacco laws for fear of 
investment suits). 
227. Although one tribunal has stated that companies should not have a legitimate expectation 
that tobacco regulations remain static, not only need subsequent tribunals not follow that, but also it 
would have no impact on a FET claim premised solely on alleged TRIPS violation. See Grand River 
Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2011). 
228. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 376. 
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tribunals have sometimes found violations of FET claims without specific 
representations to an investor, or implied commitments from general legislation or 
government statements to the public.229 Although some have suggested that 
tribunals may be inclined to require a specific representation in recent cases, a 
tribunal need not follow this approach and this is particularly true since many FET 
claims are asserted under agreements that have limited guidance concerning FET 
claims.230 Divergent interpretations of identical trademark articles of TRIPS seem 
likely not only because investment tribunals are not bound to follow WTO law, but 
because of different views on how key TRIPS provisions should be interpreted, as 
discussed below. 
While a full analysis of the many TRIPS provisions cited is beyond the scope 
of this Article given other issues, a brief overview should be adequate to underscore 
the likelihood of conflicting rulings with the WTO case, or at least a challenge to 
TRIPS norms.231 There are two TRIPS articles for which there are vastly different 
interpretations. One open issue is whether a nation would implicitly violate TRIPS 
Article 15 concerning obstacles to registration if it permitted registration, but barred 
use of the mark.232 The second contested issue is whether plain packaging 
requirements violate TRIPS Article 20 that bars trademarks from being 
“unjustifiably encumbered” by special requirements. Although the Uruguay tribunal 
interpreted TRIPS Article 20 in a manner favorable to countries desirous of tobacco 
regulation, other panels need not follow the decision and, as explained below, it is 
possible that they may not. 
Although TRIPS Article 15 is about registration, there is a substantial dispute 
concerning whether the owner of a trademark has an affirmative right to use with a 
registered trademark. Philip Morris and a number of other attorneys have asserted 
that plain package regulations inherently violate TRIPS Article 15.4 which bars 
obstacles to registration based on the nature of goods to which a trademark is 
applied since registration includes an implicit right to use.233 The argument is 
 
229. E.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 154 (May 29, 2003); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. The Republic 
of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, ¶ 277 (May 12, 2005); Enron Corporation and 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, Award, ¶ 264 (May 22, 
2007); National Grid plc v. The Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶¶ 176–79 (Nov. 3, 2008). 
230. E.g., Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public Interest: The Role  
of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L  
DISP. SETTLEMENT 197, 38 (2012). 
231. Others have also noted that views on whether plain package measures comply with TRIPS 
“vary greatly.” E.g., Mercurio, Awakening, supra note 55, at 900. 
232. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 15.4 (“nature of the goods or services to which a trademark is to 
be applied shall in no case form an obstacle to registration of a trademark”). 
233. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.11; e.g., Julius L. Katz & Richard  
G. Dearden, Plain Packaging & International Trade Treaties, in PLAIN PACKAGING & INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE TREATIES 111 ( J.C. Luik ed., 1998); Carmela Rotundo Zocco, Plain Packaging: A Growing 
Threat to Trademark Rights, LES NOUVELLES 140 (2013); Stephen Stern & Olivia Draudins, Generic 
Packaging—A Bridge (Over the Bodies of IP Rights) Too Far?, AUSTL. INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 146 
(2011). 
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premised on the fact that plain packaging targets only tobacco products. However, 
a number of scholars contest this position and note that there is no TRIPS provision 
that permits an affirmative right to use.234 This is also buttressed by a prior WTO 
panel decision, as well as traditional trademark law that does not consider 
trademarks to provide an affirmative right to use.235 Nonetheless, two scholars 
suggest that the “spirit” of the provision at least makes this a close case.236 
Considering that tribunals sometimes broadly interpret claims in favor of investors 
and generally lack any knowledge of intellectual property law as commercial lawyers, 
it seems that an investment tribunal could find this provision violated. That said, 
although this provision was not at issue in the Uruguay case, the Uruguay reasoning 
concerning Article 20 suggests that it is also possible, although not guaranteed, for 
a tribunal to interpret this to bar an affirmative right to use. 
Another contested issue is the TRIPS article that permits trademarks to be 
regulated, but not unjustifiably encumbered by special requirements, such as use in a 
manner that would negatively impact its ability to distinguish the goods or services 
of one from another.237 According to Philip Morris, plain packaging clearly 
encumbers its trademarks since it is barred from using logos and also restricted in 
the size of trademarks on the package, such that its product cannot be distinguished 
from others except as to price.238 
There are two different issues with this TRIPS provision. Some claim that it 
does not apply to a law that would completely bar a use.239 However, others argue 
that it is illogical and inconsistent with treaty interpretation norms to interpret this 
provision as prohibiting some encumbrances, but not complete bans.240 In addition, 
even assuming that plain packaging is a “special form” to which Article 20 applies, 
Australia as well as many others assert that the rules are justified.241 After all, plain 
 
234. E.g., Mark Davison & Patrick Emerton, Rights, Privileges, Legitimate Interests and 
Justifiability: Art 20 of TRIPS and Plain Packaging of Tobacco, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 505 (2014); 
Benn McGrady, TRIPS and Trademark: The Case of Tobacco, 3 W. TRADE REV. 53 (2004); Alberto 
Alemanno & Enrico Bonadio, Do You Mind My Smoking? Plain Packaging of Cigarettes Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 450 (2011); Mercurio, Awakening, supra 
note 55; see also TRIPS, supra note 6 (only providing a right to exclude third parties, but not a right to 
use). 
235. Panel Report, European Communities—Protection of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, at ¶ 7.611, WTO Doc WT/DS290/R (Mar. 15, 
2005) (in discussing Article 24.5 of TRIPS, where it provides that certain measures “shall not 
prejudice . . . the right to use a trademark”); JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.). 
236.  E.g., Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais, supra note 198; see also Annette Kur, The Right to Use 
One’s Own Trade Mark: A Self-Evident Issue, EIPR (1996) (supporting argument that trademarks have 
a right to use, although not regarding the Philip Morris case in particular); PATRICK BASHAM ET AL., 
ERASING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PLAIN PACKAGING FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADEMARK RIGHTS (2011). 
237. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 20. 
238. P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.8. 
239. E.g., McGrady, supra note 235, at 62–63. 
240. Frankel & Gervais, supra note 198, at 1172. 
241. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 33–35, 46, 49; Davison 
& Emerton, supra note 235; McGrady, supra note 234; Alemanno & Bonadio, supra note 234, at 463–
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package tobacco laws such as Australia’s have been endorsed by both the WHO 
and the Convention Secretariat of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control.242 There are also studies that suggest such laws will reduce smoking 
rates.243 Not surprisingly, critics of plain package tobacco disagree;244 they also 
assert that such laws are not the least restrictive means, and the laws will increase 
illicit trade in tobacco products.245 The Uruguay tribunal did not engage in all of 
these issues since it found that Article 20 simply did not provide an affirmative right 
to use a trademark. However, it is unclear whether another tribunal would agree. 
2. Eli Lilly 
Eli Lilly has initiated the first investor-state claim that specifically threatens 
patent flexibilities under TRIPS.246 Similar to Philip Morris, Eli Lilly only initiated 
an investment claim after exhausting its domestic recourse. Eli Lilly began with a 
 
66; Andrew Mitchell & David Studdert, Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products in Australia: A Novel 
Regulation Faces Legal Challenge, 307 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 261 (2012). 
 242. World Health Organization [WHO], Submission of the World Health Organization Re: 
Australia Plain Packaging Legislation ( June 2011); World Health Organization [WHO] Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, Submission by the Convention Secretariat in Respect of Australia’s Draft 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Bill 2011 ( June 6, 2011). 
243. E.g., Rachel Pechey et al., Impact of Plain Packaging of Tobacco Products on Smoking in 
Adults and Children: An Elicitation of International Experts’ Estimates, 13 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1 (2013); 
Melanie Wakefield et al., Australian Adult Smokers’ Responses to Plain Packaging with Larger Graphic 
Health Warnings 1 Year After Implementation: Results from a National Cross-Sectional Tracking Survey, 
24 TOBACCO CONTROL ii17 (2015). 
244. E.g., P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 6.4 (Philip Morris claims there is 
no credible evidence that plain packaging will reduce smoking prevalence or that it will increase 
effectiveness of health warning); Researchers Find No Evidence Plain Packaging “Experiment” Will  
Cut Smoking, PHILIP MORRIS INT’L, http://www.pmi.com/eng/media_center/Pages/plain_ 
packaging_experiment.aspx [https://perma.cc/FYF6-3DHT] (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). But see Sarah 
Bosley, If Plain Packaging Does not Deter Smoking, Why Was Industry Against It, GUARDIAN, ( Jan. 22, 
2015, 6:35 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jan/22/plain-packaging-not-deter-
smokers-big-tobacco [https://perma.cc/7CMP-XSGL] (noting that Philip Morris has funded studies 
to prove its point and that if it actually believed there was no impact, it would not so aggressively argue 
against plain packaging). 
245. There is also disagreement on whether plain packaging might result in an increase in illicit 
trade in tobacco products. E.g., K. A. Evans-Reeves et al., It Will Harm Business and Increase  
Illicit Trade: An Evaluation of the Relevance, Quality and Transparency of Evidence Submitted  
by Transnational Tobacco Companies to the UK Consultation on Standardized Packaging 2012,  
TOBACCO CONTROL (Dec. 3, 2014), http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content/early/2014/11/28/ 
tobaccocontrol-2014-051930 [https://perma.cc/KU7X-LHX3] (finding evidence submitted to  
UK by tobacco companies not persuasive since all information was not independent); Philip  
Morris Ltd., Response to UK Consultation on Standardised Packaging, PHILIP MORRIS INT’L (Aug. 7, 
2014), http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/submissions/Documents/UK%20-%20%20 
Standardised%20Packaging%20Submission%20PML.pdf [https://perma.cc/D244-KJZJ]. 
246. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, U.S. Pharmaceutical Corporation Uses NAFTA Foreign Investor 
Privileges Regime to Attack Canada’s Patent Policy, Demand $100 Million for Invalidation of a Patent 
(2013), http://www.citizen.org/documents/eli-lilly-investor-state-factsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
APK9-95UP]; Carlos M. Correa, Investment Agreements: A New Threat to the TRIPS Flexibilities, 
SOUTH CENTRE (May 13, 2013), http://www.southcentre.int/question/investment-agreements-a-
new-threat-to-the-trips-flexibilities/ [https://perma.cc/Y23Y-GFLE]. 
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notice of intent to arbitrate in November 7, 2012.247 The actual notice of arbitration 
was filed on September 12, 2013 and included claims for expropriation as well as 
breach of minimum standards of treatment, including fair and equitable 
treatment.248 
a. Factual Context 
The investment claims are premised on judicial invalidation of Eli Lilly patents 
for two commercially successful drugs sold under the names Strattera and Zyprexa 
for failing to meet the “promise doctrine,” a judicial interpretation of the core patent 
requirement of utility.249 This doctrine only applies when a patent applicant, such as 
Eli Lilly, “promises” that an invention will have a particular purpose.250 An 
application satisfies the promise doctrine if it discloses data to support the 
promise.251 Eli Lilly had to make such promises because it had already received at 
least one full term of patent protection for the basic chemical compound underlying 
each drug and was seeking additional protection after earlier patents expired.252 The 
invalidated patent on Strattera was found to fail to satisfy its promise of treating 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) as a chronic condition because 
it failed to include any data to establish that it would be efficacious for long-term 
use.253 The invalidated patent on Zyprexa was also found to promise a superior 
treatment for long term treatment of psychosis without supporting data.254 
Although Eli Lilly has complained that Canada’s law is unique and 
unprecedented,255 a number of scholars note that other countries effectively require 
patent applications to make the same showing, but simply under a different, yet 
universally recognized patent standard, such as whether its description is 
adequate.256 In addition, it is consistent with longstanding and universally 
 
247. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Notice of Intent to Submit a 
Claim to Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter Eleven (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1172.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN67-L92V]. 
248. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1. 
249. Id. 
250. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, ¶ 76 (Can.). 
251. Id. 
252. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Canada Statement of 
Defence ¶ 53 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 30, 2014), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw3253.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5F2-D2W4] [hereinafter Canada 
Statement of Defence]. 
253. See Novopharm Ltd. v. Eli Lilly & Co. [2010] F.C. 915 (Can. Ont.). 
254. See Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2011] F.C. 1288, ¶ 218 (Can. Ont.). 
255. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 96, 98, 107. 
256. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Expert Report of  
Timothy R. Holbrook, ( Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw4137.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ8T-P3F7]; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/2, Second Expert Report of Timothy Holbrook, (Dec. 5, 2015) http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ITA%20LAW%207020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
G3N9-J7F5]; Dimtry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C.L. REV. 949; Gold 
& Shortt, supra note 25, at 53–57, 61–77; id. But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case  
No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to File A Non-Disputing Party Amicus Curiae Submission By 
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recognized patent policy to mandate disclosure of something valuable to justify the 
social cost of a patent, such as higher prices during the term of the patent.257 
Canada’s promise doctrine can be considered a type of TRIPS flexibility. The 
basic notion of TRIPS flexibilities is that countries can provide their own 
interpretation of key patentability requirements that are undefined to limit patents 
to truly deserving inventions and promote access to lower cost drugs.258 Although 
proponents of these flexibilities typically suggest interpreting the terms “invention” 
or “new,” any core patentability requirement that is undefined in TRIPS can provide 
flexibility.259 So, although atypical among most countries, Canada’s promise 
doctrine interpreting the requirement of “useful” is a type of TRIPS flexibility. 
Canada’s promise doctrine addresses a key issue in the pharmaceutical industry 
that is of particular concern to those who advocate using TRIPS flexibilities. In 
particular, the industry has a practice of sequentially patenting minor modifications 
or different uses of a drug after first obtaining a patent on the basic chemical 
compound in an attempt to maximize revenue.260 The industry considers this 
appropriate “life cycle management.”261 However, public health advocates, as well 
 
Intellectual Property Law Professors, (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw7107.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NXW-5WZB] (opposing view by 
seven law professors). However, as explained by Canada, the opposing view of these law professors is 
not supported. See Government of Canada Observations on Issues Raised in Amicus Submissions, Case 
No. UNCT/14/2, April 22, 2016. 
257. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519. 535–36 (1966) (“[A] patent is not a hunting 
license.”); Eli Lilly Can. Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., [2012] 1 F.C.R. 349, ¶ 70 (Can.). 
258. See, e.g., WIPO, Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, Patent Related 
Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the National 
and Regional Levels, CDIP/5/4 Rev., at 10–11 (Aug. 18, 2010); GERMÁN VELÁSQUEZ,  
SOUTH CENTRE, GUIDELINES ON PATENTABILITY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES (2015), 
http://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/RP61_Guidelines-on-Patentability-and-
A2M_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/TXJ9-HXJA]; SERGEY KONDRATYUK ET AL., EAST EUROPE & 
CENTRAL ASIA UNION OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV, IMPLEMENTATION OF TRIPS PUBLIC 
HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN BELARUS, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA 
AND UKRAINE 15–17 (2013), http://ecuo.org/media/filer_public/2013/12/26/analytical_report_ 
ecuo_trips_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8WV-TH56]. 
259.  Indeed, some have suggested that any of the patentability requirements can be interpreted 
to promote flexibility, although not specifically suggesting a provision similar to Canada’s.  
E.g. SISULE F. MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION  
AND PUB. HEALTH, THE USE OF FLEXIBILITIES IN TRIPS BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  
CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 34 (2005), http://www.who.int/ 
intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHP5-MGAL]; UNCTAD-
ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 358–361 (2005); Carlos Correa, Guidelines 
for the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health Perspective 3–4 (World Health 
Organization [WHO et al., Working Paper 2006). 
260. See, e.g., JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40917, PATENT 
“EVERGREENING”: ISSUES IN INNOVATION AND COMPETITION (2009); Roger Collier,  
Drug Patents: The Evergreening Problem, 185 CAN. MED. ASSOC. J. E385 (2013); Rebecca  
S. Yoshitani & Ellen S. Cooper, Pharmaceutical Reformulation: The Growth of Life Cycle Management, 7 
HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379 (2007). 
261. See, e.g., TONY ELLERY & NEAL HANSEN, PHARMACEUTICAL LIFECYCLE 
MANAGEMENT: MAKING THE MOST OF EACH AND EVERY BRAND (2012); Vandana Prajapati et al., 
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as some governments including not only India, but also the EU, consider this to be 
an inappropriate way of “evergreening” patent profits.262 Eli Lilly’s patents illustrate 
how Canada’s promise doctrine addresses this problem. Both of the invalidated 
patents were attempts to obtain additional patent protection after the original patent 
on the underlying chemical compound had expired. Moreover, Eli Lilly did not even 
make any modifications to the compound, but instead simply attempted to claim 
that it had a new use without any basis for that claim.263 
b. Investment Claims 
The Eli Lilly case will apparently not result in a complete collision between 
investment claims and TRIPS since the tribunal just ruled unanimously in favor of 
Canada.264 However, analyzing the details of the case, including the potential harm 
of investment claims to TRIPS norms is important since this decision is not binding 
on any future investment tribunal. In addition, even though Canada ultimately 
prevailed, including recoupment of some costs, the fact that Canada still had to 
engage in multi-year litigation and nonetheless pay some costs, with the risk of 
losing millions could be enough to have a chilling effect on the use of TRIPS 
flexibilities.265 This is especially true for developing countries that have fewer 
resources than Canada. Accordingly, this Section will explain Eli Lilly’s arguments 
and how the expropriation and FET claims could have a major chilling effect on 
TRIPS in a subsequent case, even though they were rejected here. In analyzing the 
potential impact on TRIPS flexibilities, it should be noted that although Eli Lilly’s 
claim were not based solely on breach of TRIPS, some investment claims were 
premised on breach of NAFTA provisions that are identical to TRIPS.266  
Before discussing the specific investment claims at issue, it may be relevant to 
consider some specifics of the tribunal decision. Unlike the Uruguay decision, which 
had discrete sections on expropriation versus FET claims, the tribunal considered 
a number of issues as necessary pre-requisites before considering the details of the 
 
Product Lifecycle Management Through Patents and Regulatory Strategies, 13 J. MED. MARKETING 171 
(2013). 
262. E.g., Novartis Ag v. Union Of India & Ors., (2013) 6 SCC 1 (India); TONY HARRIS  
ET. AL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT, at x (2013), https://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/ 
sites/g/files/net856/f/2013-05-27_ppr_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2WP-YC42]; Nathalie 
Vernaz et al., Patented Drug Extension Strategies on Health Care Spending: A Cost-Evaluation Analysis, 
10 PLOS MED. 1 (2013); Commission Preliminary Report on Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, (Nov. 28, 
2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4K23-X6N7]. 
263. See, e.g., Canada Statement of Defence, supra note 252, ¶ 4. 
264. Eli Lilly v. Canada, Final Award, Mar. 16, 2017 [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Award]. 
265. See id. ¶ 480 (requiring Canada to pay twenty-five percent of its legal costs). 
266. Eli Lilly has also claimed that Canada is in breach of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. See 
Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 45. However, this does not directly address TRIPS 
flexibilities and is also substantively incorrect. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 110, at 241–42. 
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investment claims.267 For example, the tribunal first rejected Canada’s argument that 
judicial decisions were immune from the pending investment claims unless there 
was a denial of justice. The tribunal also addressed two factual questions as essential 
predicates to Eli Lilly’s investment claims. In particular, the tribunal evaluated 
whether (a) there was a dramatic change in Canada’s utility requirement, as well as 
(b) whether the utility requirement as applied to Eli Lilly’s patents were arbitrary 
and/or discriminatory.268 Since the tribunal found Eli Lilly failed to establish that 
either of these factual predicates existed, it did not need to assess the details of the 
expropriation and FET claims. Accordingly, many of the most concerning threats 
to TRIPS flexibilities in this case have been temporarily avoided. Indeed, PhARMA, 
the lobbying group for pharmaceutical companies issued a press release expressing 
disappointment that the ruling failed to address whether Canada’s law complied 
with NAFTA, and, by implication, TRIPS.269 So, in other words, PhARMA was 
hoping that the dispute would in fact limit existing TRIPS flexibilities. Although 
that has not come to pass, the underlying facts can still be used to explain how 
TRIPS flexibilities may be systematically threatened in another case. 
i. Expropriation 
Eli Lilly made two claims for expropriation: (1) that the patents were directly 
expropriated (because the rights were taken away), and/or (2) that the patents were 
indirectly expropriated (because the judicial invalidations destroyed the value of the 
patents).270 Eli Lilly also alleged that although there is a specific exclusion from 
expropriation for intellectual property rights that are revoked, this does not apply 
because the patent rights were revoked inconsistently with NAFTA patent 
requirements.271 This Section will focus on how the expropriation claims could have 
potentially challenged TRIPS flexibilities.272 After all, even though the tribunal ruled 
in favor of Canada, a subsequent tribunal would not be bound to this decision. In 
addition, even the positive ruling for Canada does not mean that there is no threat 
to TRIPS flexibilities. To the contrary, Canada and other WTO members were 
simply fortunate that Eli Lilly failed to satisfy its necessary burden of proof, such 
 
267. E.g., Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 110 (noting organization of tribunal analysis). The 
tribunal first evaluated whether jurisdiction was proper before any of these issues, although that is not 
pertinent to TRIPS issues. 
268. Id.; see also ¶ 307 (noting that parties agree a “[d]ramatic change” in the utility requirement 
is a fundamental question and that Eli Lilly confirmed that it must establish this to win). 
269. Pharma, Press Release, Pharma Statement on NAFTA Tribunal Decision in the Eli Lilly 
Case, (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.phrma.org/press-release/phrma-statement-on-nafta-tribunal-
decision-in-the-eli-lilly-case [https://perma.cc/3KG3-ZH8Y]. 
270. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 102. 
271. In particular, Eli Lilly alleges that the promise doctrine did not exist when the initial patents 
were issued, such that the exception does not apply. See, e.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 
1, ¶ 69. However, there are disputes both as to whether the promise doctrine has been long in existence, 
as well as how to interpret the NAFTA exception. See, e.g., Gold & Shortt, supra note 25, at 38, 50 (long-
standing doctrine); Ho, supra note 110, at 259–60 (arguing that Eli Lilly’s claim should be rejected). 
272. However, for details on expropriation, see Ho, supra note 110. 
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that there was no need for the tribunal to address issues that could have conflicted 
with TRIPS norms. 
An initial issue at the intersection of TRIPS and investment claims is that Eli 
Lilly argued that the exemption from expropriation for TRIPS-consistent claims 
permits an investment tribunal to decide TRIPS disputes. Even though Australia 
had argued that investment tribunals have no jurisdiction to decide TRIPS disputes 
and even though NAFTA has an explicit exception from expropriation for 
revocation of patent rights consistent with NAFTA (and inherently TRIPS), did not 
halt the dispute between Eli Lilly and Canada. Of course, Canada did not make the 
same objection as Australia; although it did suggest that the tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction to rule on breaches of international treaties such as TRIPS, it did not 
suggest that the dispute should be entirely dismissed on this ground.273 However, 
even if it had, it is unclear whether a tribunal would be sympathetic to this argument. 
Although a few commentators have suggested that that there should be no 
jurisdiction, the actual text could provide a basis for a tribunal to determine whether 
Canada’s actions are consistent with NAFTA, and by implication TRIPS, which 
could be why Canada did not suggest that there was no jurisdiction on this 
ground.274 
Eli Lilly’s assertion that the revocation of its patents was inconsistent with 
NAFTA could have created a critical challenge for TRIPS flexibilities. NAFTA has 
the same requirements for patents as TRIPS in that patents on inventions must be 
granted when they are “useful,” among other requirements, but without defining 
this term; so Eli Lilly essentially challenged TRIPS patentability requirements.275 Eli 
Lilly made several arguments concerning this term. Initially, it argued that the 
undefined term “useful” should mean what is stated in the Oxford Dictionary and 
that any ambiguity should be resolved by referring to the laws of the United States 
and Europe which allegedly formed the basis for these terms during the negotiating 
process.276 Although WTO panels do often consult the Oxford Dictionary, that is 
simply a starting place for assessing the ordinary and customary meaning of terms 
consistent with interpretation of terms under customary interpretation of 
international laws.277 There is no precedent for suggesting that international 
 
273. E.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Counter Memorial, ¶¶ 209–
10 ( Jan. 27, 2015) [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Counter Memorial], http://www.italaw.com/sites/ 
default/files/case-documents/italaw4131.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWU5-3YWV]. 
274. E.g., Frankel, supra note 114; see also NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7) (providing 
exception to expropriation for intellectual property rights revoked “consistent” with the NAFTA 
chapter on intellectual property). Canada raised a totally different jurisdictional objection based on 
timing of the claim, which the tribunal considered unfounded. See Eli Lilly, Counter Memorial, supra 
note 273. 
275. Compare NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1709, with TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27. 
276. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 9–10 (quoting dictionary to support that 
“useful” means “able to be used for a practical purpose or in several ways.”). 
277. See Andreas Sennekamp & Isabelle Van Damme, A Practical Perspective on Treaty 
Interpretation: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 
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agreements should be interpreted based on prior laws of members that were not 
included in the agreement.278 Then, in its notice of arbitration, Eli Lilly suggested 
that its drugs should be useful because they were consistent with the patent 
examination guidelines in effect when Eli Lilly’s disputed patents were issued, and 
that Canada’s modification of its patent laws since then to be “out of step” with 
NAFTA members is improper.279 However, the fact that Canada’s laws are different 
than those of other NAFTA and WTO member countries is explicitly contemplated 
by the minimum standards of TRIPS. In addition, as other scholars have noted, 
patent law has never been static and in fact new innovations often require 
reinterpretation of relevant statutes, including reweighing of public and private 
interests, such that corporate investors should expect modifications in the law.280 
Although the panel did not technically address this issue, it did not consider 
differences in member state laws to be necessarily of relevance. 
Although the panel did not technically address whether Canada’s laws comply 
with NAFTA, and thus TRIPS, it did provide some interesting statements. For, 
example, in rejecting Eli Lilly’s suggestion that Canada’s unique law is inherently 
significant, the tribunal noted that “it is difficult to see how a comparison across 
jurisdictions can demonstrate a change over time within a single jurisdiction.”281 In 
addition, the tribunal noted that although Eli Lilly assumes common law decisions 
“must follow in a reasonably foreseeable and predictable channel, without 
significant or material changes,” in fact, “evolution of the law through court 
decisions is natural, and departures from precedent are to be expected.”282 Both of 
these statements seem consistent with TRIPS flexibilities. Of course, whether other 
tribunals will follow suit remains to be seen. 
In addition, a different type of TRIPS flexibility was potentially vulnerable 
based on Eli Lilly’s claim that the promise doctrine discriminates against 
pharmaceuticals as a field of technology in violation of NAFTA and TRIPS.283 
WTO jurisprudence makes an important distinction between legitimate 
differentiation and improper discrimination, which is also supported by the 
 
CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 489, 498 (2014) (dictionary as starting point for interpretation, but 
not complete source). 
278.  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Second Report of 
Dr. Daniel Gervais, ¶ 17 (Dec. 7, 2015) http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ 
ITA%20LAW%207018.pdf [https://perma.cc/73ZP-ZMYM]. 
279. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8–9. Canada continues to suggest that 
Canada’s different definition of “useful” for some inventions is necessarily suspect for being different 
from NAFTA partners and because it has not been traditionally a patentability requirement for which 
there were different views. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Claimant’s Post-
Hearing Memorial ( July 25, 2016) ¶¶ 48, 62–146 (NAFTA partners), 166–175 (no prior international 
disagreement), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7465.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4VKD-ZQKG]. 
280. Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 130, at 591. 
281. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 377. 
282. Id. ¶ 310; see also ¶ 324 (noting that although the promise doctrine did not play a significant 
role before 2005, the rule was clearly “‘out there’, to be ignored at a patentee’s peril.”). 
283. Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 52. 
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Declaration on Regulatory Sovereignty.284 A WTO panel has noted that there is no 
prohibition against dealing with problems that may exist only in certain product 
areas.285 Notably, the panel stated that even when a country intended to regulate a 
particular area, it did not constitute implicit discrimination since “preoccupation” 
with the impact of a law to one area is not discriminatory unless there is evidence 
that the broader purpose is a “sham.”286 There is nothing to indicate that the 
promise doctrine is a “sham.” Indeed, the Canadian Manual of Patent Procedure 
uses a mechanical example in discussing this doctrine.287 The fact that more 
pharmaceutical patents are invalidated could simply reflect that the industry is 
violating the doctrine, rather than indicating that the doctrine discriminates against 
the industry.288 
The tribunal decision is consistent with prior WTO jurisprudence, even 
though there was nothing to indicate that this was a goal of the tribunal. In 
particular, the tribunal ruled that Eli Lilly’s statistical data did not support its claim 
of improper discrimination that would give rise to a claim for violation of 
international minimum standards of treatment, or fair and equitable treatment. The 
tribunal noted that at most, Eli Lilly had shown a relationship between the promise 
doctrine and higher invalidity rates in the pharmaceutical sector; there was nothing 
to support a claim of improper discrimination. For example, the tribunal noted that 
Canada’s argument that the patent practices of pharmaceutical companies could 
result in more challenges was plausible289 and that there is no basis to infer 
discriminatory intent.290 
Although there was never a parallel WTO proceeding to the Eli Lilly 
investment case, this case could have presented a greater systemic challenge than 
the Philip Morris disputes. After all, while TRIPS flexibilities have been repeatedly 
noted as important for patents, the trademark provisions in the Philip Morris case 
have not typically been discussed as an essential part of TRIPS flexibilities. In 
addition, the Eli Lilly case was the first challenge to TRIPS flexibilities on 
patentability that could have resulted in an interpretation of TRIPS by an 
 
284. E.g., Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9, ¶¶ 6–8; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
& Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Diversifying Without Discriminating: Complying with the Mandates of the TRIPS 
Agreement, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 445, 450–53 (2007) (agreeing with differentiation 
goal and further arguing that there should be no discrimination so long as there is a legitimate purpose 
demonstrated). 
285. Panel Report, Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.92, WTO  
Doc. WT/DS114/R (adopted Mar. 17, 2000). 
286. Id. ¶ 7.104. 
287. CANADIAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, K1A 0C9, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE 
PRACTICE (2016), ¶ 12.08. 
288. Indeed, it has long been recognized that uniform patent standards may result in different 
application to different technologies. See, e.g., Dan Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 
89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003). 
289. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 435. 
290. Id. ¶ 438. 
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international body.291 In the over twenty years since TRIPS was concluded, 
countries have notably been cautious in challenging TRIPS flexibilities at the 
WTO.292 For example, even the United States, which generally robustly argues for 
broad IP interpretations, has not alleged that Canada’s laws violate TRIPS; the 
United States has only noted a concern for potential innovation293 despite corporate 
claims that TRIPS has been violated.294 
The outcome of the Eli Lilly dispute was unclear even after Uruguay prevailed 
against Philip Morris’ claims of expropriation, since the analysis of the Uruguay 
tribunal—even if adopted—would not necessarily have provided immunity to 
Canada’s ability to use TRIPS flexibilities. Notably, Uruguay’s tobacco regulations 
were considered within its police power to protect public health.295 This is not 
surprising since the regulations are consistent with the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control guidelines and no one contests that tobacco use 
is harmful. In contrast, there is no uniform view of whether more patents on drugs 
negatively impacts public health to support Canada’s interpretation of “useful” to 
make it more difficult to obtain subsequent patents on a drug. Although public 
health advocates have vigorously argued that additional patents such as those 
obtained by Eli Lilly do not promote public health and therefore should not be 
granted, limiting patent rights in such a situation is very different than limiting 
trademarks on tobacco, a product that has universally admitted lethal consequences. 
Revocation of the patents at issue would not protect consumers from the same type 
of lethal consequences as more limited use of tobacco. Also, Canada’s judicial 
interpretation of what is “useful” is unlike most public health issues found to be 
within the scope of domestic police power, which typically is associated with 
protecting the public from immediate public health harms, such as regulatory 
 
291. Of course, there is an earlier WTO panel decision regarding the scope of the “limited 
exception” to TRIPS patent rights under article 30. But, there is no panel report regarding basic 
patentability under TRIPS article 27. Although the United States did initiate a dispute that alleged that 
Brazil’s “local working” requirement violated TRIPS, including article 27, the parties settled this case. 
Brazil v. U.S., Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, July 5, 2001. Some scholars have suggested 
that initiation of a subsequently abandoned WTO dispute may nonetheless create a chilling effect on 
use of TRIPS flexibilities. E.g., Dreyfuss & Frankel, supra note 130, at 600. 
292. For example, although compulsory licensing is frequently contested, no country has ever 
initiated a TRIPS dispute. Similarly, although India’s interpretation of TRIPS patentability requirements 
under section 3d of its patent laws is regularly criticized, no country has initiated a TRIPS dispute against 
India either. 
293. See MICHAEL B.G. FROMAN, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., SPECIAL 301 REPORT 66 
(2015). 
294. PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA, SPECIAL 301 
SUBMISSION 81 (2015), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PhRMA-2015-Special-301-
Rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AQ4-ZV94] (alleging that Canada’s interpretation of utility violates 
TRIPS and NAFTA). Of course, the United States has taken other actions, such as entering into 
agreements with other countries to raise patent requirements and thus need not directly challenge 
TRIPS flexibilities at the WTO since it is directly circumventing them through other means. 
295. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 382. 
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measures to prevent an epidemic of infectious disease.296 Even if one accepts that 
stringent patent standards promote public health by minimizing the harm of 
unnecessary patent profits that made drugs unaffordable, this public health goal is 
more attenuated and different than other previously recognized public health harms 
that result in a clear and immediate harm. In addition, police power is traditionally 
associated with domestic legislation and regulation, not judicial interpretation. Also, 
the Uruguay tribunal accepted the amicus submissions of major international 
organizations, such as the WHO that supported Uruguay’s interpretation of TRIPS 
whereas no amicus briefs from similar entities were involved here, although some 
were filed; moreover, the most detailed proposed amicus brief regarding TRIPS was 
not accepted by the tribunal simply because it was not authored by citizens of 
NAFTA member states.297 Even the types of patented drugs involved might seem 
less essential to public health than tobacco regulation. In particular, although many 
believe that “essential medicines” should be affordable, the patented drugs in the 
Eli Lilly dispute do not fall in this category. 
Canada was fortunate that the tribunal was sympathetic to its “legitimate 
public policy” for the judicially crafted promise doctrine. The tribunal seemed quite 
deferential to Canada in assessing whether the doctrine was arbitrary. The tribunal 
simply reiterated Canada’s explanation that the doctrine helps ensure the public 
receives the benefit of the patent bargain and encourages accuracy. It interestingly 
noted that it “need not opine on whether the promise doctrine is the only, or the 
best, means of achieving these objectives. The relevant point is that, in the 
Tribunal’s view, the promise doctrine is rationally connected to these legitimate 
policy goals.”298 Notably, a rational relation to policy goals seems a far lower 
threshold for a nation to establish than whether action is within traditional police 
power. The tribunal also noted that it had no role to “question the policy choices” 
of a nation.299 Moreover, it rejected Eli Lilly’s contention that some uncertainty in 
application of the promise doctrine made it arbitrary; in its view, that is true of all 
legal regimes.300 
 
296. Id. ¶¶ 298–99 (citing Chemtura Corp. v. Canada, Award, UNCITRAL ¶ 266 (Aug. 2, 2010); 
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, UNCITRAL, 
Pt. IV, Ch. D, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005); Bischoff Case, Decision, 10 R.I.A.A. 420, 421 (1903)). 
297. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Procedural Order  
No. 4 (Feb. 23, 2016), [hereinafter Eli Lilly, Procedural Order No. 4] http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7145.pdf [https://perma.cc/27GQ-MZLJ]; see also Eli  
Lilly & Co. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. UNCT/14/2, Application for Leave to File Amicus  
Submissions (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
7112.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PVY-3NXQ]. 
298. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 424; see also id. ¶ 428 (noting that Canada had “advanced 
a legitimate justification. . . . Whether or not this is the preferred approach, it is plainly not an irrational 
one.”). 
299. Id. ¶ 426. The panel quoted from Professor Levin that “it is not the role of a NAFTA 
Chapter Eleven tribunal to question the policy choices of a NAFTA party.” Id. 
300. Id. ¶ 429. 
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The tribunal also found that Canada’s application of the promise doctrine was 
not de facto discriminatory against pharmaceutical patents. The panel noted that Eli 
Lilly’s claim of a causal relationship between the doctrine and higher invalidity rates 
in the pharmaceutical sector was not supported by the facts.301 Eli Lilly’s expert 
could only support the fact that the numbers of invalidations was not due to 
chance.302 The tribunal noted that it was possible that the practices of such 
companies result in more challenges on this ground and that although it could not 
evaluate this claim, this helped to explain why Eli Lilly’s claim of causation was 
lacking.303 
The recent tribunal decision did not focus squarely on Eli Lilly’s expropriation 
claim in the same way as the tribunal in the Philip Morris Uruguay decision. Granted, 
the factual context was different, and there was an initial dispute regarding whether 
a judicial act could even be the basis for a claim for expropriation or fair and 
equitable treatment. The tribunal noted that judicial acts are attributable to a state 
and that it could constitute an expropriation even without an actual denial of 
justice.304 However, it took care to note that an investment tribunal is not intended 
to provide an appellate review of domestic judicial decisions with regard to either 
expropriation or FET claims—a point that it reiterated more than once.305 
ii. Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Eli Lilly also alleged that Canada violated minimum standards, including fair 
and equitable treatment because the judicial invalidations are allegedly arbitrary and 
inconsistent with its legitimate expectation of a stable business and legal 
environment.306 In particular, Eli Lilly alleged that it could not have anticipated that 
the Canadian law on utility would be “so drastically altered” and also “retroactively 
applied” to invalidate its patents.307 
Eli Lilly’s FET claim is the most significant challenge to TRIPS flexibilities 
presented in the investment context thus far. Although the expropriation claim also 
 
301. Id. ¶¶ 433, 437 (noting that the proposed causal link was based on mere assumptions). 
302. Id. ¶ 434. 
303. Id. ¶ 435. 
304. Id. ¶ 221. 
305. Id. (“[A] NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier with respect to national 
judiciaries.”); Id., ¶ 225 (“[A] NAFTA Chapter Eleven tribunal is not an appellate tier with a mandate 
to review the decisions of the national judiciary[.]”). 
306. Technically, the claim is violation of minimum standard of treatment, which includes fair 
and equitable treatment. NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1105. However, Eli Lilly’s claim does specifically 
mention violation of fair and equitable treatment. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 
81–82. FET claims that are not linked to international minimum standards of treatment could be 
considered broader, although even FET linked to a minimum standard of treatment can be broadly 
interpreted. E.g., Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals, INV. TREATY  
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-without-a-difference-the-
interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-international-law-by-investment-
tribunals/ [https://perma.cc/965A-5DTK]. 
307. See Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶¶ 82–83. 
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challenged the same law, there is at least an exception to expropriation for 
revocation of patents consistent with NAFTA and TRIPS provisions. Of course, as 
noted previously, the application of this exception was disputed and ultimately not 
even addressed by the tribunal. Nonetheless, there is at least a recognition for 
expropriation claims that revocation of patent and other intellectual property rights 
in some instances should not constitute expropriation. In contrast, there is no such 
exception to FET claims in NAFTA or other investment agreements. Moreover, 
FET claims tend to be broadly interpreted based on violating “legitimate 
expectations” of investors. 
If the tribunal had found for Eli Lilly, that would likely have completely halted 
efforts by policy makers to encourage countries to modify domestic laws to better 
enhance TRIPS flexibilities. Importantly, a negative decision for Canada would have 
had a major chilling effect on the ability of any country to modify laws to take 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. This would have been contrary to the repeated 
recommendation of policy makers that nations modify their laws to implement 
TRIPS flexibilities. In addition, it would have been contrary to the embrace of such 
flexibilities in the Declaration of Regulatory Sovereignty.308 
There were grounds for the tribunal to reject Eli Lilly’s argument that a 
country can never modify its laws after an agreement or else be found in breach of 
fair and equitable treatment. In particular, there is no traditional understanding that 
members to an agreement must not thereafter modify their laws; indeed, multiple 
policy reports since the conclusion of TRIPS are premised on the assumption that 
countries can and should modify their laws.309 And, Eli Lilly’s suggestion is in fact 
contrary to domestic patent law practice in which changes in common law regularly 
invalidate patents issued under a different standard.310 The tribunal properly 
rejected Eli Lilly’s assumption that common law decisions must “following a 
reasonably foreseeable and predictable channel without significant or material 
changes.”311 Rather, the tribunal noted that common law evolution necessarily 
involves departures from precedent.312 However, the tribunal’s decision was not a 
foregone conclusion. After all, past tribunals have previously been sympathetic to 
investor claims, and especially FET claims, although there are no prior cases 
involving changes in common law. In addition, an early article by a commercial 
 
308. See Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9. 
309. See, e.g., supra note 8. 
310. For example, patents have been invalidated following recent Supreme Court cases 
narrowing the scope of patentability. E.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714–16  
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (invalidating patent in light of 2014 Supreme Court decision in Alice Corp. narrowing 
patent eligibility after twice finding the patent valid); Steven Seidenberg, After Alice: Business-method  
and Software Patents May Go Through the Looking Glass, 101 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2015, at 19; Donald  
Vinson, Key Cases Shaping the Future for Patent Litigation Funders, LAW 360 (Apr. 27, 2015, 10:13  
AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/646193/print?section=ip [https://perma.cc/P5YC-C6MS] 
(noting that patent owners may reconsider pursuing infringement in light of the potential for validity 
challenges). 
311. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 310. 
312. See id. 
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lawyer, the type of individual likely appointed an arbitrator by an investor, was 
sympathetic to Eli Lilly’s position.313 Accordingly, the assumption of IP scholars 
that this claim would necessarily fail was always questionable.314 
Moreover, even though a majority of the Philip Morris tribunal found no FET 
violation by Uruguay, the reasoning would not have been helpful to Canada against 
Eli Lilly’s claims. First, whereas the majority in the Uruguay panel found that 
tobacco companies had no legitimate expectation that nations would not modify 
regulations, it was much less clear that the Eli Lilly tribunal would concur.315 In 
addition, although a majority of the tribunal found that Uruguay’s two regulations 
were not arbitrary, one tribunalist contested that the regulation not explicitly 
recommended by WHO guidelines violated FET. Notably, that tribunalist found it 
significant that “no other country in the world” had a similar requirement, as well 
as the fact that there was “no meaningful prior study, internal debate or external 
consultation.”316 These arguments seem to mirror what Eli Lilly repeatedly noted—
that Canada’s law is unique and that the Canadian judiciary allegedly arbitrarily 
imposed the disputed promise doctrine. In addition, although the dissenting 
tribunalist recognized that a state could legitimately enact a measure that advances 
a legitimate governmental objective, it is unclear that a tribunal would find a clear 
governmental objective in judicial cases mandating a promise doctrine, or that the 
doctrine in fact supports an objective of public health.317 Notably, even though 
tobacco is a lethal product, the dissenting opinion in the Uruguay case was not 
persuaded that the “single presentation requirement” actually achieved the purpose 
of preventing misleading use of trademarks beyond previous laws. Also, although 
the majority was sympathetic to Uruguay and noted a margin of appreciation to 
government regulatory acts, the dissent affirmatively rejected the relevance of a 
margin of appreciation. 
Although the reasoning of the Uruguay tribunal did not apply to the Canadian 
tribunal evaluating Eli Lilly’s claim, the latter tribunal still found grounds to reject 
Eli Lilly’s claim—and perhaps provide a glimmer of hope for other disputes. In 
particular, even though the health impacts of expensive patented drugs are not 
recognized in the same way as tobacco use, Canada won in a unanimous decision, 
whereas there was still a dissent to the overall favorable decision to Uruguay. Of 
course, the tribunal finding in Canada’s favor did not characterize the issue as one 
of whether it is wise to limit patents on drugs that may result in higher cost. Rather, 
it simply considered whether the stated justification for the domestic law had some 
basis. If other tribunals used a similar criteria, that would seem to preserve TRIPS 
 
313. See M.L. Seelig, Can Patent Revocation or Invalidation Constitute a Form of Expropriation?, 
6 TRANS. DISP. MGMT. 1, 8–9 (2009). 
314. E.g., Ruse-Khan, Litigating Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 114. 
315. P.M. v. Uru., Award, supra note 203, ¶ 430. 
316. Philip Morris v. Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinion, ¶¶ 5, 167,( July 8, 2016). 
317. Id. ¶ 137. 
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flexibilities. However, as noted earlier, the majority in the Uruguay decision required 
a higher threshold relating to police power.. Of course, future tribunals are not 
bound to either approach and can adopt yet a different approach that could still 
encroach upon TRIPS flexibility. For example, the dissent in the Uruguay decision 
suggested that simply having a different approach than other countries could be 
suspect. So, while Canada’s win is a positive development, it does not ensure that 
TRIPS flexibilities are immune from conflicts in future investor disputes. 
Also, although the Eli Lilly tribunal repeatedly noted that it was not intended 
to provide appellate review of domestic judicial decisions, it nonetheless left open 
the possibility that some judicial measures may give rise to a claim for FET, as well 
as expropriation. In particular, for FET claims, the tribunal noted that such a claim 
could exist with respect to a decision that is “egregious and shocking,” even while 
stating that there should be “considerable deference” to domestic courts.318 
Canada’s change in the law was found not to be “dramatic” and thus failed to meet 
this standard. But, it remains to be seen how other tribunals might view challenges 
to judicial actions, which is a relatively new area in investor-disputes. 
B. Potential Problems 
There are a variety of potential conflicts that could arise if investment tribunals 
adjudicate more claims that touch upon TRIPS flexibilities. Although any TRIPS 
flexibility is potentially vulnerable to an investment claim, some types of TRIPS 
flexibilities seem more likely to be subject to such claims. Accordingly, this Section 
will briefly provide an overview of some flexibilities under the Declaration that are 
at risk.319 
1. Patentability Standards 
If Eli Lilly prevails against Canada on any ground, it will likely have a chilling 
effect on domestic efforts to tailor patentability standards for any country that is 
subject to an investment agreement. The chilling effect is actually twofold. First, 
countries that had been previously considering modifying patent standards to use 
TRIPS flexibilities may no longer do so for fear of claims of expropriation and, 
especially, fair and equitable treatment. Worse yet, countries that have laws that take 
advantage of TRIPS flexibilities, such as India, may feel pressure to jettison such 
flexibilities to avoid vulnerability for investment claims. Although India has not 
specifically signaled any intent to modify its patent laws, its 2016 model investment 
 
318. Eli Lilly, Award, supra note 264, ¶ 224. 
319. This is of course not intended to be comprehensive, but, instead explain a range of 
different types of flexibilities at risk. Another possible TRIPS flexibility at risk is whether countries can 
impose a “local working” requirement since there was a TRIPS dispute initiated in 2001. However, 
since that did occur, but did not result in an actual panel report, countries may already be predisposed 
not to use this flexibility, such that it is not discussed here. 
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agreement suggests greater encroachment on TRIPS flexibilities than the proposed 
2015 draft.320 
Any change to Indian patent law presents a serious international problem 
because India is the predominant source of low-cost generic drugs to the developing 
world. It has thus far been able to do so because of patent laws that provide less 
protection than most other countries, such as the United States.321 However, if that 
changes, the only way that India could continue to make and sell generics would be 
to issue compulsory licenses, but that in itself could subject India to a separate basis 
for an investment claim. Although many investment agreements technically have an 
exception to expropriation claims for compulsory licenses that are “consistent” with 
TRIPS, an investment tribunal would still be deciding whether a domestically issued 
license is consistent with TRIPS.322 Given a wide divergence in views on TRIPS 
requirements by government officials and companies, a country could be vulnerable 
to an expropriation claim under an investment agreement for a license that not only 
complies with TRIPS, but would be unlikely challenged at the WTO.323 After all, a 
number of countries have issued compulsory licenses since TRIPS was enacted, and 
although companies and even some countries have loudly protested,324 no country 
has ever initiated a WTO dispute settlement proceeding.325 
2. Denial of Permanent/Preliminary Injunction 
Another possible TRIPS flexibility that may be at risk is the flexibility to deny 
permanent or even preliminary injunctions for cases of alleged patent infringement. 
 
320. Compare Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art 2.4(iii) (2016) 
[hereinafter Indian Model BIT 2016], http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/modelbit_annex.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KUY7-7PMB] (exempting from revocation, limitation or creation of rights arguably 
consistent with TRIPS, which would permit an investment tribunal to decide this), with Model Text for 
the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 2.6(v) (2015) [hereinafter Indian Model BIT 2015], 
https://mygov.in/sites/default/files/master_image/Model%20Text%20for%20the% 
20Indian%20Bilateral%20Investment%20Treaty.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W7F-YR55] (excluding 
from scope of arbitration compulsory licenses, as well as revocation, limitation of IP if “consistent with 
the law of the host state.”). 
321. E.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, supra note 35 (barring patents on new variations of 
existing compounds unless they provide improved efficacy). 
322. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7) (exception to indirect expropriation); TPP, supra 
note 40, art. 9.8(5) (exception to indirect expropriation). 
323. E.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking or Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction 
Under TRIPS, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 371 (2009); see also, Christopher Gibson,  
A Look at the Compulsory License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 357, 386 (2010). Most early commentary concerning the intersection of IP and 
investment claims focused on compulsory licenses. E.g., Tsai-Yu Lin, Compulsory Licenses for Access to 
Medicines, Expropriation and Arbitration Under Bilateral Investment Agreements—Issues Beyond TRIPS, 
40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 152 (2009). 
324. For example, Thailand and India have both issued compulsory licenses that have been 
strongly contested. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 323, at 168; Vasani et al., supra note 121. 
325. See generally WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Index of Dispute Issues, https:// 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#selected_subject [https:// 
perma.cc/PM8A-G6NP] (last visited Mar. 21, 2016) (containing no dispute relating to compulsory 
licenses). 
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TRIPS notably requires nations to have a system in place to award such injunctions 
but does not demand that domestic courts grant them in particular situations.326 
However, since Eli Lilly seems to believe that an issued patent needs to be forever 
valid to preserve fundamental patent exclusivity,327 a company could be expected to 
claim that injunctions are also part of patent exclusivity. A domestic court decision 
that declined to provide such an injunction would not be an automatic violation of 
investment claims. Nonetheless, it could form the basis of a claim that the value of 
the rights was “expropriated.” This could be yet another situation where a company 
could obtain greater rights than under domestic laws that do not guarantee either 
permanent or preliminary injunctions.328 Alternatively, a company could claim that 
it had a legitimate expectation that an injunction would issue, such that there is a 
violation of fair and equitable treatment if that does not occur. This is especially 
true if the Eli Lilly tribunal is sympathetic to Eli Lilly’s position that there should 
be a legitimate expectation that a patent right entitles its owner to absolute 
exclusivity. 
3. No Data Exclusivity 
Yet another possible TRIPS flexibility at risk relates to undisclosed 
information as required under TRIPS Article 39.329 Technically, this provision is not 
part of TRIPS patent rights, but it is covered in the Declaration on Patent Protection 
and generally considered part of the patent flexibilities that countries use.330 
There are extremely divergent views on what TRIPS Article 39 requires. Some 
believe that TRIPS requires U.S. style “data exclusivity” that essentially bars generic 
companies from relying on the clinical data of a pioneer drug for obtaining 
regulatory approval for a certain period of time.331 Other scholars, policy makers, 
and even some countries consider it to only require “data protection,” which means 
protecting the data submitted to a regulatory agency from unfair competition, but 
 
326. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 44. 
327. E.g., Eli Lilly Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 78 (alleging that invalidation of patents 
constitutes expropriation that is “contrary to the public purpose that is inherent in the grant of a 
patent . . . pursuant to which the patentee receives an exclusive right.”). 
328. See, e.g., Ebay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (clarifying that patent 
owners are not automatically entitled to a permanent injunction even after they establish infringement). 
329. TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 39. 
330. Declaration on Patent Protection, supra note 9, ¶ 35–36. 
331. E.g., ORG. OF PHARM PRODUCERS OF INDIA, OPPI OPPOSITION PAPER, REGULATORY 
DATA PROTECTION—A BUILDING BLOCK FOR PHARMACEUTICAL R&D (2008); NUNO PIRES DE 
CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME OF PATENT RIGHTS 392–93 (2d ed. 2005). See also 21 C.F.R. § 
314.108 (2012) (noting a five-year period of exclusivity in the United States: “(2) If a drug product that 
contains a new chemical entity was approved after September 24, 1984, in an application submitted 
under section 505(b) of the act, no person may submit a 505(b)(2) application or abbreviated new drug 
application under section 505( j) of the act for a drug product that contains the same active moiety as 
in the new chemical entity for a period of 5 years from the date of approval of the first approved new 
drug application, except that the 505(b)(2) application or abbreviated application may be submitted 
after 4 years if it contains a certification of patent invalidity or noninfringement described in 
314.50(i)(1)(i)(A)(4) or 314.94(a)(12)(i)(A)(4).”). 
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does not necessarily mean reliance of the data by a generic company that never has 
physical access to the data.332 A few take an intermediate position and find that 
TRIPS precludes generic companies from relying on the data of another company 
without paying some fee.333 
A company could claim that a country that does not provide data exclusivity, 
such as India, is indirectly expropriating its data by permitting a proposed generic 
company to immediately rely on clinical data of the original company to establish 
bioequivalence immediately after the originator is approved.334 Clinical data is 
expensive to develop and thus would seem to easily fall within the definition of an 
investment. Innovator companies complain this is fundamentally unfair for 
countries not to provide data exclusivity, with some arguing that this violates 
TRIPS.335 There is obviously no consensus on this issue. Importantly, it is 
considered a type of TRIPS flexibility to not provide data exclusivity as a matter of 
public policy. Although not highlighted by innovator companies, data exclusivity 
often provides more protection than patents by barring generic entry—even if the 
patented drug may in fact be subject to an invalid patent since the majority of drug 
patents are found invalid when challenged.336 If there is no data exclusivity, a 
country can quickly approve a generic equivalent and let the generic company legally 
contest whether the drug is properly patented.337 A generic company is not likely to 
 
332. CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
383–92 (2008); Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid, 34 AM. J. L. &  
MED. 303, 315–16 (2008); Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Test Data under the TRIPS Agreement 
and its Progeny (UNCTAD-ICTSD Dialogue Paper 2004), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/ 
bellagio/docs/Reichman_Bellagio4.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQK-56QT]. But see NUNO PIRES DE 
CARVALHO, supra note 331. 
333. See, e.g., Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data under Article 39.3 of TRIPS: The 
Indian Context, 28–29 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934269; Aaron 
Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly and Access to Pharmaceuticals in International Trade Law: Protection 
of Marketing Approval Data under the TRIPs Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 446 (2004). However, 
this interpretation seems to be inconsistent with appropriate interpretation of TRIPS since there was 
an explicit proposal to require cost-sharing that was rejected. Draft Agreement on the Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from the United States, art. 33, GATT Doc. 
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) (suggesting one alternative to permitting use of originator 
data would involve “payment of reasonable value of the use”). 
334. See, e.g., HO, ACCESS TO MEDICINE, supra note 32, at 119. 
335. E.g., PHRMA SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016, at 46, 94 (2016) (arguing that India and 
Brazil violate TRIPS by not providing data exclusivity); BIO SPECIAL 301 SUBMISSION 2016, at 16–17, 
46 (2016) (arguing Brazil and India presently violate TRIPS by not providing data exclusivity); see also 
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 8 
(2000) (arguing that countries lacking data exclusivity, such as South Africa, Brazil, Israel and Ecuador, 
violate TRIPS). 
336. See, e.g., Final Report of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, at 191 ( July 8, 2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MR5Z-A6K6]; FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO 
PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 20 (2002). 
337. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Beyond Patents: Global Challenges to Affordable Medicine, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 302, 304 (I. Glen Cohen ed.,  
2013). 
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undertake such a contest lightly given the risks of litigation, but at least the public 
interest in lower cost generics is recognized and not stifled; this seems particularly 
important if a patent were in fact invalid. However, it is unclear whether a tribunal 
would be sensitive to these policy concerns. In addition, although there is an 
exception to indirect expropriation for denial of intellectual property rights 
consistent with TRIPS, lack of data exclusivity is not a prototypical denial of rights 
in the same way as a denial of a patent application since there is no separate 
application to obtain this benefit. Moreover, the exception would still result in an 
investment tribunal, rather than a WTO panel, deciding on TRIPS compliance. 
Even if there is no finding of indirect expropriation for a country that declines 
to provide data exclusivity, this could still be the basis for a claim of violation of fair 
and equitable treatment. A company could make a claim similar to Philip Morris in 
the Australia case that it has a purported legitimate interest in a country “complying” 
with TRIPS by providing data exclusivity based on its belief that this is what TRIPS 
requires.338 This would obviously create a conflict with TRIPS flexibilities and have 
a serious chilling effect. 
III. ADDRESSING CURRENT CONFLICT 
Although current investment agreements pose a threat to TRIPS flexibilities, 
there are nonetheless steps that can be taken to minimize conflicts between TRIPS 
flexibilities and the investment system.339 First, the scope of covered investments 
could be narrowed. Second, if IP claims were not more broadly excluded, 
investment claims could be more narrowly construed to promote TRIPS 
flexibilities. Third, the scope of dispute settlement could be modified to minimize 
or completely eliminate conflict with TRIPS flexibilities. These can be most easily 
done in future treaties, but existing agreements can be amended, or at least clarifying 
statements could be issued in hopes of achieving similar outcomes.340 
A. Narrow Scope 
There are two primary ways in which the scope of coverage of investments 
could be modified to minimize overlap with IP norms. In particular, the definition 
of what a covered investment is could be narrowed, or investment claims 
themselves could be narrowed. Although some recent agreements have aimed to 
narrow investment claims to cabin undue impact on sovereignty, this Section goes 
 
338. See P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.7 (alleging FET claim based on 
violation of international law). 
339. This focuses on solutions that assume countries do not exit from investment treaties, or 
ICSID, which is an alternative possibility, but not a complete one since it would only eliminate 
prospective claims. 
340. This is particularly true for investment agreements to which the United States is a party 
since the United States has generally included language that permits nations to provide clarifying 
statements that should then be binding on member states. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1131.2; 
TPP, supra note 40, art. 27.2(2)(f ); see also CETA, supra note 15 (permitting binding interpretations 
regarding intellectual property). 
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further to address the IP-specific conflict for future agreements. However, for 
existing agreements, one additional option is for states to exclude IP from ICSID 
disputes under Article 25(4) of ICSID.341 Although no state has yet done so for IP, 
there have been notifications for other topics.342 One possible downside to this is 
that it may be overbroad in excluding all IP, even if there were no possible TRIPS 
conflicts. 
1. Limit the Scope of Covered Investments 
Future agreements that could arguably exclude IP from the scope of 
investments are unlikely to happen. Furthermore, focusing solely on future 
agreements would do little to address the many existing agreements under which IP 
is explicitly or implicitly covered as an investment. Accordingly, this Section 
suggests some modest modifications such as modifying the scope of investments 
that results in jurisdiction, as well as modifying the type of intellectual property that 
is covered. 
One way to minimize TRIPS collisions is to narrow the scope of what 
constitutes an investment that gives rise to an investor-state dispute. In particular, 
tribunals should only find jurisdiction if there is an investment that meets the criteria 
noted in the Salini decision, which includes contribution of investment to the 
economic development of the host state that is beneficial to the public interest.343 
Of course, not all tribunals have followed this decision, even when they cite it.344 
However, this is especially important in the context of intellectual property since 
simply obtaining a patent or trademark in a country does not directly benefit the 
host country in the same way as traditional types of investments. For example, 
investing in a physical plant would result in hiring of employees in that country as 
well as other economic benefits. However, mere grant of a patent will not result in 
any economic benefit. To the contrary, grant of a patent in a country often results 
in economic loss to a country when the patent is to a foreigner who can then charge 
 
341. ICSID Convention, supra note 63, art. 25(4). 
342. For example, Guatemala eliminated claims arising from armed conflicts, Indonesia 
eliminated claims for administrative decisions, and Jamaica eliminated claims relating to natural 
resources. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], Notifications 
Concerning Classes of Disputes Considered Suitable or Unsuitable for Submission to the Centre, ICSID/8-D 
(May 2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/Notifications-Concerning-Classes-of-
Dispute-(ICSID8D).aspx [https://perma.cc/85B3-SST8]. 
343. Salini Costructtori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Moroco, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 
(Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 July 2001). In addition, although Salini was interpreting article 25(1) of 
ICSID, its interpretation has been affirmed in non-ICSID cases. E.g., Romak SA v. The Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Case No. AA280, 53 (Perm. Ct. of Arb. 2009) (noting that even if an investor resorts to 
UNCITRAL, Salini is relevant). 
344. E.g., Consortium Groupment v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, ICSID Case 
NO. ARB/03/8, Award of Jan. 10, 2005, ¶ 13(iv) (rejecting criteria of contribution to investment to 
economic development); LESI v. Algeria, ICSID Case NO. ARB 05/03, Decision on Jurisdiction,  
¶ 72(iv) (finding contribution to host state economic development irrelevant); P.M. v. Uru., Decision 
on Jurisdiction, supra note 206, ¶ 204-210 (2013); ¶ 220 (rejecting economic development as an 
unnecessary element). 
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higher prices for a patented good. There is some academic support for following 
Salini in general, as well as with IP in particular.345 Notably, while there is no 
investor-state tribunal decision on this specific issue, the relatively recent Apotex 
decision supports the idea that mere application of a property right is not enough 
to be an investment that justifies an investor-state dispute.346 
The definition of intellectual property could also be clarified to exclude a mere 
application. This would be consistent with long-recognized intellectual property 
policy that there are no rights attendant to a mere application. In addition, denials 
of applications and revocations of intellectual property could be entirely excluded 
from the scope of investments where they are consistent with domestic law, as 
decided by domestic courts.347 Using domestic law, rather than TRIPS consistency, 
as the relevant criteria would ensure that investment tribunals have no occasion to 
interpret TRIPS norms and disrupt them. 
While companies would likely protest these suggestions as inconsistent with 
international investment provisions, such a claim fails to recognize a fundamental 
difference between intellectual and real property. Intellectual property rights are 
inherently creations of governments that should not be considered to exist if a 
nation finds that they fail to meet the basic requirements. Real and personal 
property, on the other hand, do not depend on government action to exist. In 
addition, if there was a problem with the process for issuing an intellectual property 
rights, such as arbitrary denial, the process itself could be challenged under an 
investment agreement as arbitrary or lacking due process. However, the simple 
denial of a right itself should not give rise to a claim. 
2. Narrow Investment Claims 
If the types of intellectual property covered under investments cannot be 
adequately cabined to alleviate conflicts, an alternative approach would be to narrow 
the scope of specific investment claims. Since expropriation and FET claims can 
 
345. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How 
International Law is Reconceptualizing IP, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557 (2015); Okediji, supra note 37, at 
1137; Alex Grabowski, The Definition of Investment Under the ICSID Convention: A Defense of Salini, 
15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 287 (2014). But see THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 134 (Schreuer et 
al. eds., 2009); D. Mortenson, “The Meaning of ‘Investment’: ICSID’s Travaux and the Domain of 
International Investment Law”, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 257 (2010). 
346. Apotex v. Gov’t of the United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF/12/1, Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶¶ 158, 243 ( June 14, 2013). 
347. See, e.g., European Commission Directorate-General for Trade, Note for the Attention of the 
Trade Policy Committee (Services and Investment), art. X.11 ¶ 5, E.U. Doc. Trade B2/CBA/eg/Ares 
1151153 (Apr. 7, 2014), http://docplayer.net/1529313-Section-1-scope-and-definitions-article-x-1-
scope-of-application-a-air-services-and-related-services-in-support-of-air-services-other-than.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z8A5-WM9L] (noting that Canada proposed that expropriation be barred for a 
“decision by a court, administrative tribunal, or other governmental intellectual property authority, 
limiting or creating an intellectual property right except where the decision amounts to a denial of justice 
or an abuse of right”); Indian Model BIT 2015, supra note 320 (stating that “revocation, limitation or 
creation of intellectual property rights” are excluded as investments under the treaty if “consistent with 
the law of the Host State.”). 
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clearly impact TRIPS norms, this Section provides specific proposals for limiting 
how these claims conflict with TRIPS.348 
3. Expropriation 
Although investment agreements generally already have an exception to 
indirect expropriation claims for denial or revocation of intellectual property rights, 
the Eli Lilly case underscores inadequacies with the provision.349 After all, this 
provision generally only exempts claims that are consistent with TRIPS, or 
potentially a TRIPS-plus agreement.350 This means that an investment tribunal 
decides consistency with TRIPS, rather than a WTO tribunal. 
There are a variety of possible ways to minimize the conflict. One would be 
to exclude intellectual property claims entirely from possible claims for indirect 
expropriation by investors and instead only permit them to be raised through state-
to-state challenges.351 Another possibility is to exempt from indirect expropriation 
IP revocations and denials that are consistent with the domestic law, so long as there 
is no abuse of process.352 This would avoid TRIPS conflicts, but would still enable 
a tribunal to essentially second-guess whether domestic law was properly applied. 
4. FET 
The most problematic claims are Fair and Equitable Treatment claims for IP 
rights. Unlike the situation with expropriation claims, existing agreements do not 
even have any exception to such claims for any types of IP. Moreover, Philip 
Morris’s claims against Australia highlight how creative interpretations of these 
claims could directly interfere with TRIPS if a panel agreed that an alleged violation 
of TRIPS could constitute violation of FET.353 Although most scholars that have 
considered the issue have argued that tribunals should interpret investment claims 
to preserve TRIPS flexibility, that approach seems unlikely since tribunals tend to 
rule in favor of investors, rather than consider other international agreements that 
 
348. Australia’s Response to Notice of Arbitration, supra note 204, ¶¶ 57–58 (explaining that 
ideally investment agreements should either exclude “umbrella” clauses that permit a tribunal to decide 
whether there has been a violation of any other agreement, or at least clarify that this excludes 
international agreements such as TRIPS to prevent claims). 
349. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 110(2). Indeed, the existence of this provision did not 
prevent filing of the case against Eli Lilly as earlier discussed. See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying 
text (section on expropriation claims in Eli Lilly case). 
350. E.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 1110(7); TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.8(5); CETA, supra note 
15, art. 8.12(5). 
351. See, e.g., Sean Flynn, How the Leaked TPP ISDS Chapter Threatens Intellectual Property  
Limitations and Exceptions, IP WATCH (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/03/26/ 
how-the-leaked-tpp-isds-chapter-threatens-intellectual-property-limitations-and-exceptions/ [https:// 
perma.cc/DN73-HRAQ] (recognizing and suggesting this approach). 
352. India has suggested this in its 2015 draft model BIT. Indian Model BIT 2015, supra note 
320. 
353. See, e.g., P.M. v. Austl., Notice of Arbitration, supra note 1, ¶ 7.7 (alleging FET claim based 
on violation of international law). 
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are not specifically referenced in the investment agreement. Accordingly, new FET 
text, or interpretive statements to clarify what existing FET claims should mean is 
necessary. 
There are a variety of approaches that can be taken to minimize the incursion 
of FET claims on TRIPS flexibilities going forward. First, such claims could be 
entirely eliminated.354 Or, at least eliminate claims based on “legitimate 
expectations,” because those are the broadest rights and instead limit FET to 
situations where there is denial of justice.355 Alternatively, FET claims could 
preclude ones involving TRIPS; many agreements already preclude investment 
claims based on FET involving tax or other financial matters.356 Unless TRIPS 
claims are barred, or limited to denial of justice situations, there are still potential 
problems; for example, although the TPP attempts to clarify that breach of another 
agreement does not alone constitute a violation of FET, this would still permit a 
tribunal to consider a TRIPS breach and potentially use that as a basis for finding 
FET. Accordingly, the other suggested approaches are preferable. 
B. Modify Dispute Settlement 
Conflicts with TRIPS flexibilities may also be avoided by fundamental 
modifications to the dispute settlement process. There are a variety of ways this can 
be done. First, investment claims involving intellectual property as an investment 
could be limited to state to state action, or require state consent before an investor 
can assert a claim. Second, investment claims premised on adjudication of TRIPS 
rights could be excluded. Third, a hybrid dispute settlement system involving 
potential additional action by the WTO could be created. 
One approach that would likely minimize TRIPS conflicts is to require 
investment claims premised on IP to be limited to claims by states. Notably, states 
would still have the power to assert claims, such that conflict would not be 
completely eliminated, although it would better parallel the WTO process and at 
least reduce the number of likely conflicts since states are more discerning in 
bringing disputes. Investment agreements already permit state-to-state adjudication 
and for some subject matter, only state-to-state disputes are permitted.357 Although 
there have been long standing exceptions for national security, and some types of 
 
354. This is especially true for agreements between nations with well-developed legal  
systems. See, e.g., Draft Report Containing the European Parliament’s Recommendations to the  
Commission on the Negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), ¶ xiv, 
EUR. PARL. DOC. 2014/2228 (INI) (Feb. 5, 2015) (explaining that ISDS is not necessary between  
the United States and the European Union given their robust legal systems). 
355. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.10 (FET claims linked to denial of justice); Indian 
Model BIT, supra note 320, art. 4 (national treatment); JOHNSON & SACHS, supra note 54 (suggesting 
eliminating this entirely or leaving it only subject to state-to-state resolution). TPP, however, does not. 
E.g., TPP, supra note 40, art. 9.6. 
356. See, e.g., CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.6 (excluding financial service investments); William 
Park, Tax Arbitration and Investor Protection, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 227,  
238 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P. Alford, eds., 2009). 
357. As noted earlier, this is already the case for some types of tax claims. 
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tax, the TPP recently added a “carve out” of investor-disputes for tobacco 
regulations.358 However, this carve out was a political compromise after some 
advocated a broader exception for more types of public interests and this limited 
exception was noted as potentially problematic for obtaining congressional 
approval.359 Accordingly, an exclusion for IP claims may be unlikely, especially given 
the power of the pharmaceutical lobby. 
Alternatively, investors could be permitted to still bring claims based on 
alleged IP investments, but only if there is first specific consent by the host nation. 
For example, many investment agreements not only restrict what investment claims 
can be brought based on taxes, but only permit arbitration after the host state and 
investor have first considered whether an investment claim is appropriate.360 A 
similar provision could be added that would require domestic consent before an 
investor can assert a claim that might comprise TRIPS flexibilities. Although some 
might suggest that taxes are more essential to domestic sovereignty and thus entitled 
to different rules that do not apply to other areas, some commentators have noted 
that this distinction is not robust.361 Although companies would likely assert that 
this is radical and unfair, considering that there is not a long tradition of states 
asserting investment claims based on IP, this is not a major change. Moreover, 
corporate claims and interests do not align with TRIPS norms and only considering 
their issues would fail to preserve TRIPS flexibilities. 
A more modest change that would still minimize TRIPS conflicts would be to 
exclude from investor claims any situation that requires adjudication of TRIPS 
rights. This could be based on existing language involving tax or environmental 
agreements that states which international agreement prevails in the event of an 
inconsistency.362 However, whereas these existing agreements focus on an explicit 
conflict, the problem for IP claims may be a systemic conflict for which more than 
 
358. TPP, supra note 40, art. 29.5. 
359. See, e.g., Lukasz Gruszcynski, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the ISDS Carve-
Out for Tobacco Control Measures, 6 EUR. J. RISK REG. 652 (2015); Mike Masnick, The TPP and the 
Tobacco Carve-Out Bring Together Strange Bedfellows . . . While Highlighting The Problems of the TPP, 
TECHDIRT (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20151005/15595532440/tpp-tobacco-
carveout-bring-together-strange-bedfellows-while-highlighting-problems-tpp.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/9PZ5-TFMM]; Wendy Parmet, Trade, Health and Tobacco Exceptionalism: The TPP Tobacco 
Carve Out, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Nov. 10, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/ 
blog/2015/11/10/trade-health-and-tobacco-exceptionalism-the-tpp-tobacco-carve-out/ [https:// 
perma.cc/WYM2-UTS9]. Congressional approval is a moot issue with regard to the TPP, but the 
difficulty of getting the approval of even the limited tobacco carve-out suggests difficulty with a broader 
exclusion of IP claims. 
360. See, e.g., ECT art. 21(5) (for expropriation claims, investor must refer the issue to  
the relevant Tax Authority; NAFTA, supra note 40, art. 2103(6) (explaining that competent authorities 
to assess whether the measure is an expropriation); see also TPP in Focus: Investment  
and Investor-State Dispute Settlement—The Need for Reform, WAYS AND MEANS COMM. DEMOCRATS 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/media-center/blog/tpp-focus-
investment-and-investor-state-dispute-settlement-need-reform [https://perma.cc/75WV-53BS]. 
361. E.g., PARK, supra note 8, at 233. 
362. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 40, arts. 103, 2103; see also Guillermo Alvarez & William Park, 
The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 390 (2003). 
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a simple conflict of law choice is needed. One possibility would be to preclude 
adjudication of any claim that requires adjudication of a TRIPS provision unless it 
has been previously determined to be in violation of TRIPS by a WTO panel. This 
still may be inadequate, however, since investment claims do not necessarily require 
an actual TRIPS violation. Accordingly, this could be phrased more broadly to 
preclude any claim involving rights and flexibilities under TRIPS from adjudication 
unless and until there has been a finding of TRIPS violation by the WTO. This 
would preclude a systemic collision, but may not find support of countries desiring 
strong investment rights, such as the United States. In addition, there is a logistical 
problem in that not every investment case has a parallel WTO proceeding. 
However, this problem can be solved with a new hybrid dispute settlement 
proceeding. 
Investment disputes based on IP that might challenge TRIPS flexibilities could 
minimize incursion on TRIPS norms with a hybrid system.363 For example, if there 
is an investment claim that inherently involves TRIPS flexibilities, but no related 
WTO dispute, perhaps the investment claim could be stayed while the WTO system 
evaluates the TRIPS issues and then the investment tribunal should defer to this 
ruling. Of course, there is no precedent in international law in general, but perhaps 
interpretive statements or amendments to existing agreements could state that 
tribunals should defer to the WTO. Notably, not every investment claim will involve 
a related WTO dispute or a direct interpretation of TRIPS rules. However, all 
indirect expropriation claims where the exception based on TRIPS consistency is at 
issue would be relevant. The harder issue is for FET claims where there is no 
exception for IP, let alone TRIPS consistent action by states.364 However, perhaps 
the WTO could help provide interpretive guidance on the impact of a FET ruling 
on TRIPS norms in such a case even if no state initiates a formal WTO dispute. For 
example, in a case such as Eli Lilly’s challenge to Canada’s norms, the WTO could 
potentially provide insight into the impact on TRIPS flexibilities. 
A number of logistical issues would need to be addressed to put this plan in 
place. First, because the DSU only permits parties to bring disputes, there is no 
current mechanism for a WTO panel to assess TRIPS issues if no country is willing 
to bring a dispute.365 However, the existing and potential conflicts noted here 
indicate that there is a real threat to TRIPS flexibilities if nothing is done. 
 
363. Another possibility is to bring investment claims within the scope of the WTO, although 
that seems unlikely because prior negotiations on a multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) failed 
and the TRIMS Agreement that was negotiated as part of the WTO fell short of goals first proposed 
as part of the MAI. See, e.g., Susan Sell, Cat and Mouse: Forum-Shifting in the Battle over Intellectual 
Property Enforcement, at 9 (draft, prepared for IGIS Research Seminar), www.gwu.edu/~igis/ 
Sell%20Paper.doc [https://perma.cc/3V5L-94NG]. Notably, developing countries have previously 
argued that IP issues should be solely a matter of domestic control, and not subject to international 
commercial arbitration. See, e.g., M. Sornarajah, The UNCITRAL Model Law: A Third World 
Viewpoint, J. INT’L ARB. 7, 19–20 (1989). 
364. Compare TPP, supra note 40, art 9.8(5) (exception to indirect expropriation), with TPP, supra 
note 40, art 9.6 (FET claims with no exception). 
365. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 4, at art. 22. 
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Considering that the WTO Dispute Settlement was intended to be the sole process 
for resolving interpretations of WTO agreements such as TRIPS, amendments to 
ensure that this can exist in a world where investment claims based on arguable 
TRIPS violations would seem consistent with the original intent of the agreement. 
Alternatively, perhaps another WTO organ, such as the WTO General Counsel, 
could consider specific issues upon request. Alternatively, the WTO General 
Council could be tasked with finding a solution to the conflict between investment 
claims and TRIPS norms. This body has, in the past, found a solution to a TRIPS 
specific problem concerning poor countries that could not take advantage of the 
TRIPS compulsory licensing flexibility.366 
Even if a complete overhaul of the dispute resolution process is not 
undertaken, raising awareness at the WTO of the impending conflict between 
investment claims and TRIPS norms would be an important first step. Notably, 
there has not been substantial discussion in the WTO arena thus far concerning the 
potential for investment claims to overshadow TRIPS rights and norms. There has 
been discussion of the tobacco dispute, but it tends to focus more on general 
domestic sovereignty, rather than a threat to TRIPS conflicts.367 In addition, there 
is virtually no discussion relating to the Eli Lilly case, which has a much bigger 
potential impact on patent flexibilities that would promote access to medicine. So, 
a first step might be for member states to raise this issue at a WTO meeting. India 
has expressed some awareness of this problem and has raised it at the World Health 
Assembly, but not thus far at the WTO.368 
At the same time, increased awareness and cross-fertilization in the investment 
arena of TRIPS norms would be desirable. For example, perhaps pending 
agreements could explicitly note that they do not modify rights under TRIPS or 
refer to TRIPS and other documents to help provide specific contextual balance to 
counter investment claims. For example, just as some agreements have been adding 
 
366. WTO Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement,  
Annex to the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [https://perma.cc/KYE6-KZFD]; 
Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm [https://perma.cc/XPX4-
MDTW] (listing limited number of countries far fewer than the two third of member countries required 
to pass a WTO amendment). 
367. E.g., Catherine Saez, Tobacco Plain Packaging Discussion Lights UP Again at WTO, IP 
WATCH (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/02/25/tobacco-plain-packaging-discussion-
flames-up-again-at-wto/ [https://perma.cc/HH4R-HP4K] (noting domestic plain package legislation 
in a number of countries as well as TRIPS issues, but nothing concerning potential systematic threat to 
TRIPS flexibilities). 
368. India seems to be one of the few countries that have expressly noted investor-state 
provisions as potentially compromising TRIPS flexibilities. E.g., Josephine De Ruyck, World Health 
Assembly Approves Plan to Strengthen Access to Essential Medicines, IP WATCH (May 24, 2014), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/24/world-health-assembly-approves-plan-to-strengthen-access-
to-essential-medicines/ [https://perma.cc/LQ7Y-7UFZ] (India argued that TRIPS flexibility is 
“under attack” through a variety of means including, but not limited to investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions). 
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development-friendly language, agreements could specifically add language that 
incorporates the 2001 Doha Public Health Declaration, and ideally, also the 
Declaration on Regulatory Sovereignty. Alternatively, interpretive statements could 
be issued that clarify that TRIPS flexibilities should be considered. However, 
considering that the NAFTA interpretive statement has not completely obviated 
problems with tribunal decisions that defy the actual FET requirement of NAFTA, 
this may be of minimal value.369 
C. Increase Transparency and Access 
Another important component to addressing the current conflict may be to 
promote more transparency, access, and participation with respect to individual 
disputes, as well as the negotiation of future agreements with investor-state 
provisions. Although there has been recognition of the need for transparency, the 
current situation is still largely cloaked in secrecy with limited participation. As noted 
earlier, this is particularly problematic because tribunals are deciding issues of major 
public concern without any accountability. In addition, given the practice of 
negotiating agreements in secret, it is difficult for opposing norms and views to be 
recognized, including those who can identify a conflict of regimes to participate.370 
Some lessons can be learned from the EU’s recent response to public criticism 
and concern of the TTIP. Although the EU had strongly defended investor-state 
disputes for years in conjunction with the United States, it did bow to public 
concern and initiated public consultations in an attempt to address concerns.371 
Those consultations were important to the EU’s recent inclusion of an investment 
court, as well as an appellate body in recent agreements, as well as its proposal to 
do so in the TTIP. 
Greater transparency and participation in individual disputes would also be 
advantageous. Even if investment tribunals are not ultimately accountable to the 
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370. Notably, even when a court considered some negotiations—but not draft texts—must be 
public, this was still considered notable. William New, IP-Watch/Yale FOIA Case Decided: USTR Can 
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public, greater transparency could help provide tribunals with relevant 
information.372 This may be particularly important since investment arbitrators tend 
to be commercial lawyers with no knowledge of IP other than as an asset; in other 
words, they do not view IP as inherently part of a broader balance between 
corporate rights and public access and interests. In addition, since most agreements 
lack any language acknowledging these principles in contrast to TRIPS, they do not 
even have any textual basis for considering such interests. Granted, arbitrators may 
still be inclined to favor primarily investor interests in agreements that contain no 
countervailing language that expressly favors public interests. However, the 
situation could at least be improved if third parties could explain the need to balance 
IP rights against other values. 
Although defenders of investment agreements often note that investment 
tribunals may accept amicus briefs, they often fail to note that it is only under limited 
circumstances that amicus briefs are accepted, and even then, the tribunal has 
discretion to decline to accept briefs.373 Individual investment agreement 
agreements may limit some types of amicus briefs. Indeed, in the Eli Lilly dispute, 
a well-reasoned amicus brief was rejected simply because it was not authored by a 
national of NAFTA, even though the proceeding has global implications.374 
Although the investment tribunal in the Eli Lilly dispute was following NAFTA 
guidelines, tribunals should broadly accept amicus briefs from any interested 
participant, rather than limiting it to only citizens of member states. In addition, 
although there is a trend towards broader access by third parties, there is still no 
universal recognition of a right to amicus briefs.375 This is particularly problematic 
for issues involving TRIPS, since there are necessarily global impacts. Also, notably, 
unlike most domestic proceedings, as well as at the WTO, there is generally no 
affirmative right for third parties, such as non-member countries to affirmatively 
participate, such that there is a particular need for amicus briefs.376 In addition, for 
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non-disputing party submissions). 
376. Compare CETA, supra note 15, art. 8.38(2), with FED. R. CIV. P. 24 and DSU, supra note 4, 
art. 4(11). Although the EU has proposed broader participation by any person with a “direct and present 
interest,” it is only to support what is already sought by one of the disputing parties and still 
discretionary after disputing parties have a right to comment. CETA, supra note 15, art. 23. 
Ho_Final to Printer (Do Not Delete) 5/29/2017 11:04 AM 
2016] A COLLISION COURSE 467 
participation by third parties as well as amicus briefs, greater transparency of the 
entire proceedings is essential,377 rather than the historic situation where third 
parties lack access to relevant documents as well as the ability to attend oral 
proceedings.378 Although this principle is recognized by newer or pending 
agreements, they have no direct effect on the vast majority of existing agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
Although these first known cases to implicate TRIPS have (so far) avoided a 
direct collision, a collision of some sort seems inevitable given the existence of 
thousands of agreements under which companies can assert investment claims. At 
this point, it is unclear to what extent companies will bring further claims, or at least 
threaten to do so to obtain results that could not be obtained under TRIPS.. This 
fundamentally threatens the inherent flexibilities under TRIPS that policy makers 
have been advocating countries to adopt. 
This Article has aimed to shed light on this important problem so that greater 
attention may be devoted to minimizing this conflict and preserving the already 
limited flexibilities to promote public health under TRIPS. Importantly, even 
though states “won” the initial disputes, other nations could be challenged and it is 
not clear that they will necessarily win. Notably, the initial cases do not indicate that 
TRIPS flexibilities are immune from investment challenges. To the contrary, the Eli 
Lilly decision in particular seems to indicate that although Eli Lilly lacked adequate 
facts to establish its investment claim, such a claim could exist and, in particular, 
could even exist as a result of common law modifications to the law beyond denial 
of justice situations. 
The impact of investment disputes on TRIPS flexibilities remains to be seen. 
After all, the outcomes of these initial cases were never certain. Even in retrospect, 
it is not clear how to reconcile the initial decisions. It would seem that a case 
involving domestic regulation of a known carcinogen would yield a unanimous 
opinion in favor of the state. However, the unanimous decision was in favor of 
Canada against Eli Lilly’s challenge to domestic common law. Nonetheless, 
continued attention and advocacy concerning the tension between TRIPS 
flexibilities and investor disputes seems especially important. Hopefully such 
attention will have a positive influence on tribunalists, as well as those negotiating 
agreements that could be modified to minimize harms to TRIPS flexibilities.   
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However, a serious threat to TRIPS flexibilities remains and may be most 
significant regarding lower profile disputes, that nonetheless may have major 
repercussions for countries. For example, as this article goes to press, two additional 
investment cases were discovered to have been filed, although the details are not 
available because the documents are not publicly available. In one case, Ukraine 
withdrew approval of a generic version of the drug sold as Sovaldi after American 
pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences filed an investment dispute.379 In another, 
case, Novartis filed an investment dispute against Columbia for contemplating a 
compulsory license, without actually issuing one.380 The lack of transparency of 
these reported cases makes it difficult to assess whether the claims have any merit. 
Nonetheless, they indicate a continuing threat to TRIPS flexibilities even after the 
initial “wins” in the fully litigated disputes by Uruguay and Eli Lilly. 
 
379. E.g., Luke Eric Peterson & Zoe Williams, Pharma Corp Withdraws Investment Arbitration 
After Ukraine Government Agrees to Settlement of Dispute over Monopoly Rights to Market Anti-Viral 
Drug, Inv. Arbitration Reporter (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/pharma-corp-
withdraws-investment-arbitration-after-government-agrees-to-settlement-of-dispute-over-monopoly-
rights-to-market-anti-viral-drug/ [https://perma.cc/9HD9-66HP]. 
380. E.g., Zoe Williams, Investigation: As Colombia Pushes for Cancer Drug Price-Cut and 
Considers Compulsory Licensing, Novartis Responds with Quiet Filing of an Investment Treaty Notice, 
Bilaterals.org (Nov. 30, 2016), http://www.bilaterals.org/?investigation-as-colombia-pushes 
[https://perma.cc/D5HF-JB7S]. 
